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THE NICARAGUAN POLITICAL SYSTEM:
THE FLOW OF DEMANDS AND THE REACTIONS OF THE REGIME

by

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CHAPTER I

DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM AND THE RESEARCH DESIGN

It seems reasonable to take the position that a methodological revolution has taken place in political science. Although somewhat behind the other social sciences, this revolution has turned the attention of the researcher first to empirical raw data and then to theory, and to the relationship that exists between the two, which makes it possible for the latter to serve as a guide for the research and the analysis of the former.[1]

One of the valid criticisms which can be leveled against some of the work that has been produced in the field under the influence of the new trend in the last twenty five years or so, is that this work has focused almost exclusively on the United States, and to a lesser degree, on Western European and other highly developed societies.[2] That such a geographical concentration of research has taken place should not come as a surprise if one remembers that political science in its modern form was developed first in the United States and somewhat later, and to a much lesser degree of sophistication, in Western Europe and other areas.[3] The lack of advancement of the discipline in Eastern Europe and the underdeveloped world can be easily ascertained by examining any comprehensive bibliographical list dealing with the subject.[4]

This condition can perhaps be explained, with reference to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, on the basis of the peculiarities of their political systems and the particular role of political doctrine in those systems. Consideration of these factors helps us understand the striking contrast that is found there between the greatly advanced state of the natural sciences and the relative stagnation of political science in particular, and the other social sciences in general.[5] In

the underdeveloped world on the other hand, such a contrast does not exist. There, the lack of trained scholars, financial resources, and technical facilities have not permitted the advancement of either the natural or the social sciences to the degree to which they have progressed in other parts of the world.[6]

The fact that most contemporary research in political science has concentrated on highly developed political systems has undoubtedly kept the results of that research from having general applicability. From a strictly scientific point of view, the hypotheses derived from observations of such a partial nature cannot be truly said to have universal relevance, for the findings of such research cannot be predicated of political man in general. This has marked modern political science with a certain degree of parochialism--a condition that it is now trying to remedy.[7]

The discipline has, no doubt, become aware of the problem. Behaviorally or scientifically-oriented researchers are beginning to turn, in increasing numbers, to studies that deal with underdeveloped countries and which compare them with highly developed societies in an attempt to obtain increasing levels of generality. The fact remains, nevertheless, that very little has been done to study and analyze, with the method and tools of modern political science, the political systems of a great part of the world. This is particularly true of Central America and specifically of Nicaragua, whose political life is to be the center of attention of this dissertation. An examination of the brief survey of the available literature which follows in the next pages will show that there is not even a good, up-to-date, description of the legal structure and the political institutions of Nicaragua.

I. A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE ON NICARAGUAN POLITICS

Published material dealing directly with Nicaraguan politics from the point of view of modern political science is unavailable. The general works on Latin or Central American politics which make references

to Nicaragua, usually make such references in a very brief and cursory manner. Among others, the works of Needler and Gomez could be mentioned as well as Busey's article, "Foundations of Political Contrast: Costa Rica and Nicaragua" published in the Western Political Quarterly and reproduced in Robert D. Tomasek's Latin American Politics.[8] Aside from works of this type, there remain only works of a historical, legal, economic, and geographical nature, some of which are practically political (in the active, everyday, partisan sense) literature, and the non-technical and unpublished dissertations and theses dealing with Nicaragua and Central America.

The following is not an exhaustive analysis of all of these works. It is rather an attempt to provide an overview of the major books and articles which can provide us with information, albeit indirectly, about the politics of Nicaragua. At the end of the present work a more inclusive bibliographical list is included which does not pretend to be exhaustive. A complete bibliography, even if it were possible, would be out of the scope of this dissertation since it would have to include those books that have been published and deal with matters peripheral to the politics of Nicaragua.

Consideration of the available bibliography will be made in the following order: a) general historical accounts, b) works dealing with specific aspects and periods of Nicaraguan history, c) constitutional history, d) the contemporary political debate, e) modern socio-economic studies, and f) unpublished material.

General Historical Accounts

With reference to Nicaragua, there exist serious general works of a historical nature which deal only with events of the 19th century. The works of Ayon, Historia de Nicaragua, and Gamez (with the same title) are the best available. The only attempt to write a Nicaraguan history covering the 20th century that is worth mentioning is the work of Cabrales, but, the fact that it was written as a textbook to be used in secondary schools seriously limits its scope and importance.[9]

In addition to the books that have been mentioned above, consideration would have to be given to works dealing with Central American history in general. This results from the fact that Nicaragua obtained her independence together with the other Central American Republics and formed a unit with them until 1838. The history of the five countries has since been very closely intertwined. Montufar's Resena Historica de Centroamerica and the works of Milla and Salvatierra are the main works to be considered in this respect.[10]

Specific Aspects and Periods of Nicaraguan History

Early years.-- The pre-independence period is only partially treated because Vega Bolanos' collection treats the pre-independence period only partially, as it deals exclusively with the time period of Nicaragua's discovery by Columbus in his fourth travel to 1550. Covering the early years of independence one would have to consider the basic documents of Nicaraguan history, especially those edited by Alvarez Lejarza in his Constituciones de Nicaragua.[11]

The early years of the independence of Nicaragua and Central America were recently analyzed in a very interesting book by Jose Coronel Urtecho: Reflexiones sobre la Historia de Nicaragua. Two volumes have been published, covering the period to 1824, and Coronel is currently working on a third volume.[12]

Central American Union.-- The many unsuccessful attempts to reconstruct the broken Union have given rise to an extended body of literature. These studies refer both to the military and political adventures of the last of the 19th and the early 20th centuries, as well as to the new functional approach represented by the Organization of Central American States and its many economic and cultural institutions. Of these works, Herrarte's La Union Centroamericana: Tragedia y Esperanza Mendieta's La Enfermedad de Centroamerica, and Thomas L. Karnes' The Failure of Union as well as Busey's article "Central American Union: The Latest Attempt" are of particular relevance.[13]

Some aspects of Nicaraguan history have attracted special attention: 1) the National War, 2) the interoceanic canal and the British occupation of the Mosquito Coast, 3) the direct political intervention

and military occupation of Nicaragua by the United States, and 4) the boundary dispute with Honduras.

The National War.-- The National War was the result of the attempt by William Walker to take over the country in the 1850's. It was fought by the Nicaraguan and Central American armies against Walker's American falange. It produced an extensive literature which ranges from accounts given by participants in both sides of the war, such as those of William Walker himself, Clinton Rollins, and Jeronimo Perez among others, and to more recent serious attempts at an objective evaluation of this part of the history of the country. As an example of this latter type, Ildefonso Palma's La Guerra Nacional is worth mentioning.[14] Moreover, the National War gave rise to a very heated controversy in the efforts to determine the causes and historical responsibilities for the state of anarchy which attracted Walker and permitted him to dominate the country for some time. This controversy also concerns the degree to which some of the political factions of the time collaborated, in one way or the other with the invader. The works of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Zelaya and Sofonias Salvatierra, which focus on the personalities of the principal Nicaraguan political leaders of the time are good examples of this type of work.[15]

The Canal Issue.-- Since the Spaniards first discovered Lake Nicaragua, the possibilities of finding a natural passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific were pondered. When it became clear that such a natural passage could not be found, the alternative of building a canal began to be considered. This attracted the attention of Great Britain and other powers, eventually including the United States. The subsequent power struggle and its consequences for Nicaragua are accounted for extensively in Gamez's Historia de la Costa de los Mosquitos.[16] In addition to this book, and although they are not properly speaking historical works, Squier's Nicaragua, and Levy's Notas Geograficas y Economicas[17] should be mentioned here. They are the two most fascinating descriptions of Nicaragua by travelers who came to the country in the last century and were attracted most of all by the possibilities of the interoceanic canal. They give accounts, not only of the geography, economy, and customs of the country, but also of its political organization and problems.

The American occupation.-- The intermittent occupation of Nicaragua by troops of the United States from 1912 to 1933 also attracted considerable attention to the country. The literature which resulted covers the occupation itself and also the extraordinary stand of the Nicaraguan guerrillero Augusto C. Sandino, who alone with his band of rebels kept the resistance of the Nicaraguan people to foreign intervention alive. In this respect one would include the several collections of documents put out by the United States Department of State.[18] There are also several books which were written in order to defend the policies of the United States during the intervention; Stimson's book is a case in point.[19] Others analyze the military and economic aspects of the occupation, such as those written by Goldwer and Hill.[20] Some are attempts to justify the position taken by the Nicaraguan politicos vis a vis the occupying forces. The books published by former President Moncada and the memoirs of ex-President General Chamorro provide examples of these attempts at justification.[21]

The Sandino War.-- The assassination of Sandino and the organization of the National Guard of Nicaragua have also received considerable attention. The Guardia Nacional was established and trained by the American forces in order to fight against Sandino and with the idea of establishing a permanent armed force. Sandino: General de Hombres Libres and El Pequeno Ejercito Loco, both by Gregorio Selser,[22] and Lejeune Cumming's Quijote on a Burro,[23] are good attempts at providing an account of these times. General Somoza himself wrote El Verdadero Sandino o el Calvario de las Segovias[24] in which he attempted to justify his intervention in Sandino's death. The books by Aleman and Salvatierra on the other hand are condemnations of the assassination.[25] The serialized work published in Revista Conservadora by Captain Cuadra deals with the origin and organization of the Guardia.[26]

The boundary dispute.-- The boundary dispute with Honduras and its settlement produced a number of books and theses. The books by Jose Sanson on the part of Nicaragua and that by Lopez Villamil[27] on the part of Honduras summarized the arguments and the historical background of the issue.

Constitutional History

In the field of constitutional history one book and a thesis, the latter available only in mimeographed copies, deserve special attention; the first by Alvarez Lejarza has already been mentioned. It contains the main documents of Nicaragua's constitutional history from the Spanish Constitutions of Bayona and Cadiz to the Constitution of 1950, and it includes the Declaration of Independence and the Federal Constitution among other important documents. This work lacks only the amendments that have been made to the 1950 Constitution after the book was published. It also has an introductory essay which attempts to give a general account of the historical process of Nicaraguan politics through the analysis of the pertinent legal documents and the circumstances of their inception. This essay, in addition to being formal, is rather superficial and is somewhat partisan in outlook. On the other hand, the thesis presented to the"Law School of the National University of Nicaragua by Serigo Remirez in 1964, La Problematica del Derecho Constitucional Nicaraguense"although still using the formal approach, gives a more penetrating analysis of Nicaragua's political history and is more balanced in its consideration of the issues.[28]

The Contemporary Political Debate

The contemporary period of Nicaraguan politics may be said to begin when the United States' troops left in 1933 and the Guardia Nacional took over. It is dominated by the personalities of General Somoza Garcia and his two sons, Anastasio Jr. and Luis. The debate around the death of Sandino has already been mentioned. Interest in the consequences of the control of Nicaraguan politics by General Somoza and his two sons has also produced volumes of literature. It would be impossible to try to cover a substantial part of it in a work of this type since the literature is dispersed and includes innumerable newspaper and magazine articles both in and outside of Nicaragua. It is of a markedly partisan nature and its analytic value is questionable. Some of it defends and glorifies the Somoza Regime. Somoza by Gratus Halftermeyer is an example of this type of publication; it is an uncritical apologetic work. Pedro Joaquin Chamorro's Estirpe Sangrienta: Los Somoza and Luis Cardenal's

Mi Rebelion are on the other hand, critical polemics against the Somoza regime.[29]

Modern Socio-Economic Studies

The beginning of socio-economic studies which Parker[30] saw in the early 1960's has already materialized in a series of works that deal with Nicaraguan social and economic problems. However, none of them attempts an objective political analysis. Nevertheless, they contain valuable information about the country and its people.

The awakening of interest in studies of this type resulted from the stimulus provided by international programs first of the United Nations and UNESCO, and later on by the various programs of Central American integration including the common market, the Council of Central American Universities, and the Central American Bank, among others.

Examples of these works include Louis Ducoff's Human Resources of Central America, Panama and Mexico, The Economic Development of Nicaragua, published by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Oferta y Demanda de Recursos Humanos en Centroamerica, and El Sistema Educativo en Nicaragua, published by the Consejo Superior Universitario Centroamericano, Los Problemas de la Tenencia de la Tierra en los Paises de Centroamerica, Lockley's Caracteristicas del Mercado Centroamericano, and Nemesio Porras' Tenencia de la Tierra en Nicaragua.[31]

In addition to these works, much information about the country can be found in the publications of the Central Bank,[32] the Department of Statistics,[33] the National University,[34] and the Revista Conservadora,[35] although it is of a diverse nature and either does not deal directly with politics or approaches the study of politics in an unsystematic manner.

Two works deserve special mention; that of Teran and Incer published two years ago, Geografia de Nicaragua, which provides interesting information on the environmental conditions and administrative divisions

of the country, and the Plan de Desarrollo 1966-1972 published by the National University.[36]

Among works done by individual scholars from outside of the area, it would be important to mention Franklin D. Parker's The Central American Republics, which deals indirectly with some aspects of Nicaraguan politics, and Richard N. Adams' Cultural Survey of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama.[37]

Unpublished Material

There are a few unpublished dissertations and theses which deserve mention. Some of these are available in microfilm copies and they include Anderson's "Political Ideology and the Revolution of Rising Expectations in Central America, 1944-1958", and Wright's "American Support of Free Elections Abroad". In general these dissertations are historico-political in approach and are not highly sophisticated in their methodology. Not available in microfilm is the Master's Thesis of Burt H. English "Nicaragua: A Study on the Evolution of One Family Rule," which gives a penetrating account of Nicaraguan politics.[38]

II. THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS

If we think with Lastrucci[39] that all scientific inquiry stems from a problem, the lack of truly analytic information about Nicaragua which is clear from the first section of this chapter is an indication of the magnitude of the problem which Nicaraguan politics presents to the political researcher. In Nicaragua we have a country whose political life is unanalyzed and about which we have little data that can be considered useful as a basis for scientific research. This deficiency should suffice to awaken the curiosity that according to Aristotle stands at the basis of all knowledge.[40] Moreover, the application to the Nicaraguan political system of some of the hypotheses which have been worked out with respect to highly developed societies presents an opportunity to test these hypotheses in a different type of environment, and this provides a constructive framework for modern analysis.

Nicaragua may be viewed as a case study of an underdeveloped country. A good general analysis of its politics could provide the discipline with extremely interesting information. As the second chapter of this dissertation attempts to show, Nicaragua is in reality an underdeveloped country both economically and politically if we accept the concept of development (and its correlate underdevelopment) as an empirically derived ideal type that, if properly applied can be of value in understanding political phenomena.[41] In addition, since Nicaragua, like the other Latin American countries, remains within what is called the Western tradition or civilization,[42] the results from research done there can be compared with the findings of investigations carried out in other underdeveloped countries that are not within such a tradition giving place to the possibility of formulating and testing theories of a higher level of generality.

This dissertation, of course, neither can nor intends to carry out such a task, if only because modern social research has to be, if it wants to be comprehensive, a matter of teamwork. It attempts to provide a tentative framework for the initial understanding and explanation of the diversities of the Nicaraguan political system by the application of modern political theory and the utilization of appropriate techniques of inquiry. It will be of value if, besides answering some specific questions, it is also able to provide a basic analytic scheme which, 1) identifies some of the fundamental political variables in Nicaragua, and 2) points the way for future researchers in the area by formulating relevant questions for further inquiry.

General Approach

Since Kaplan says[43] that empirical information in its pure form does not have significance of itself in real research, when the scientific observer begins looking into the world (and for the specific case of this dissertation into the political world of Nicaragua) he must do so with a set of significant questions in mind. The following paragraphs attempt to make explicit which ones were and which ones were not the starting point of the present inquiry.

Because of the nature of some of the traditional approaches of political science, and their present status within the discipline it is perhaps best to begin by stating those questions which were not posed for research.

First it should be said that we did not try to answer the questions of how good a political system Nicaragua enjoys, or how bad a one it suffers. It was not our intention to find out how it compares with some ideal archetype of a polity, or how the latter can be achieved. As a word of caution, it should be added that this does not mean that such questions are considered as totally irrelevant or that they cannot be asked at all. They are rather the subject matter of a different type of intellectual activity and require totally different assumptions, methods and techniques which are beyond the scope of this work.

A second question which was not directly considered in this work is that which refers to the formal or legal structures of Nicaragua. This does not mean either that such a question is unimportant. It means only that it is the proper object of a different type of inquiry and that it requires a different methodological approach.

The object of this dissertation is rather that of describing or explaining as accurately as data permits, human behavior as it actually goes on. As such we were concerned with the basic patterns of human interaction in the Nicaraguan polity which were politically relevant insofar as they had known public consequences. Because of this, however, references were made to archetypes and formal norms for the simple reason that they exist and are relevant as legal or ideological inputs or outputs, and as such are subject to empirical observation. Their influence on actual political life is important. Their existence poses immediately the question of how much and to what extent, the actual behavior of people conforms to what these norms define as ideal or proper conduct, i.e., as goals to be attained.

Much has been written as to the possibility or impossibility of real value-free research in political science[44] Without going into a discussion of the complicated questions involved (for which this dissertation is not obviously the proper medium), we would like to point out

that it has been our intention throughout this work to give an objective description and explanation of Nicaragua because this seems to be a reasonable way to approach research in modern political science. How close to this goal the dissertation gets, is open to the scrutiny on the part of those scholars who may be interested in the subject of this dissertation.

The Need of a Theoretical Basis

The universe out there, however, will not automatically provide the researcher with the relevant and important data he needs for his analysis. He has to ask the proper questions and look for the appropriate facts where they can be found. Human behavior in general and political life in particular, are so extraordinarily complex and varied that it is impossible to apprehend them in their totality. Because of this complexity then, it is necessary to map out the road of inquiry in such a way as to make it clear as possible before actual research begins. It is necessary to determine what aspects of behavior are to be examined, and what aspects of the, at first undifferentiated, stream of action confronting us are to be considered as suitable objects of research in accordance with the specific propositions which are to be tested.

It is at this point that we find ourselves in need of good theory--that is to say, in need of a coherent set of propositions that, by filtering and organizing past research and conceptualizations about politics, provide us with the criteria for selecting the relevant propositions for this inquiry. In its present stage of development, political science does not provide us with a theory as advanced or as logically tight as one can find in some of the natural sciences. However, there are available the beginnings of theory, which it is true, still need much testing and development. But this very need for testing makes these theoretical schemes relevant in a study of this kind.

Systems Analysis

This dissertation uses systems analysis as a general theoretic framework for research. For this reason, it draws considerably from the work of David Easton and specifically from A Framework for Political

Analysis[45] and Systems Analysis of Political Life.[46]

A full-blown explanation of systems analysis would be beyond the scope of this dissertation. But a brief outline of the main systems scheme and particularly of the several concepts that center around the idea of flow of demands, control, and satisfaction outputs is necessary because the latter are the conceptual foci of this work.

The main systems scheme.-- According to Easton, political life is to be interpreted as "a complex set of processes through which certain kinds of inputs are converted into the types of outputs which we may call authoritative policies, decisions and implementing actions".[47] A political system can be designated as "those interactions through which values are authoritatively allocated for a society."[48] A political system is never isolated, it is always placed besides other systems that form what may be called its environment. Some of these systems are a part of the same society in which the political system lies but are distinguished from it by the different nature of their interactions. They are the sets of behaviors that are usually called the economy, culture, social structure, or personalities. Other systems lie outside this particular society and form the extra-societal environment. The international political systems, the international economy, and the international cultural system are examples of the latter.

From the total environment of the system, (both intra- and extra-societal) "arise influences that are of consequence for possible stress to the political system."[49] A changing economy, culture, or social structure, or a changing international world, have tremendous impact upon political life. These influences, coming from the total environment of a system, may be conceived of as disturbances that act upon the system as inputs to which it has to respond.

Since "all political systems as such are distinguished by the fact that if we are to be able to describe them as persisting, we must attribute to them the successful fulfillment of two functions. They must be able to allocate values for a society; they must also manage to induce most members to accept these allocations as binding, at least most of the time."[50] It follows that "the allocation of values for a society and the

relative frequency of compliance with them are the essential variables of political life" and that stress occurs when "there is danger that the essential variables will be pushed beyond what we may designate as their critical range."[51]

The potentially stressful conditions from the environment are communicated to the political system as inputs which, in the form of demands and supports are processed by the system into outputs consisting of authoritative polities, decisions, and implementing actions. These outputs not only help to "influence events in the broader society of which the system is a part, but in so doing, they also help to determine each succeeding round of inputs that finds its way into the political system."[52] This is what may be called a feedback effect, which by acting on the input flow, helps to explain the process through which the authorities may cope with stress.

The central problem of political theory is to know "how it comes about that any political system can persist long enough to continue to make such decisions." The question becomes "How does a system manage to deal with the stress to which it may be subjected at any time?"[53]

Wants, Demands, Issues, Outputs and Feedback

Demands defined.-- "A demand may be defined as an expression of opinion that an authoritative allocation with regard to a particular subject matter should or should not be made by those responsible for doing so."[54] Demands may be quite narrow, specific, and simple in nature or they may be "highly general, vague, and complex. Broad pleas for better government, for a more vigorous defense policy, or for a greater attention to the underprivileged, without specification of the exact steps to be taken, represent such highly generalized demands. Ideologies frequently embody ill-defined, all-encompassing programs of action that can be realized only through binding decisions. To the extent that they do so, they can be interpreted as sets of demands."[55]

Types of demands.-- "Demands also have a built-in direction and it takes two forms. Those who voice the demands will intend that those persons normally perceived as responsible for the day-to-day business of

acting on behalf or in the name of society shall take the desired action. In addition, the demands may be directed toward these persons but not as a suggestion that they act in a certain way. Rather, if it is thought that the current incumbents of the roles burdened with this responsibility are unlikely to be responsive to the demands, the voicers of the demands may support an overriding demand which calls for the replacement of these members."[56]

Some demands are clearly enunciated orally or in writing. But demands are often implied among other ways in actions such as membership in organizations, support for persons other than the incumbent authorities, and public demonstrations.

The flow of demands.-- Demands keep flowing into a political system and "constitute one of the major sources of stress acting on its essential variables."[57] They are a danger to the persistence of systems; for if they are to survive, systems must be able to devise means for handling potential dangers arising from the flow of demands.

Demands act as stress factors in a system in two different ways. First, to the extent that they remain unfulfilled, they may lead to the decline of support for the system. Secondly, a system is able to accept and process only a determinate amount of demands because the channels along which they flow, the time to process them and the resources available for their satisfaction are limited and cannot be expanded infinitely. When that limit is exceeded demand input overload results and the system begins to operate under the danger of collapse.

The rate of flow of demands.-- The number of demands which enter the political system is affected by several factors. It depends on "the number and kinds of wants generated in society"[58] which in turn depends on several socio-economic and cultural factors. In the case of the developing nations, says Easton, "the effect of the diffusion of Western culture, technology and industrial organization has led to the spectacular spread of Western types of wants." "These have become transformed into widespread expectations that the new authorities should meet these wants by experimenting with directed economies of various sorts, progressive taxation, public aid for the sick, poor and unemployed, public

ownership of the mass media and transportation systems and government-financed industrialization."[59]

Not all wants however, get converted into demands. There are certain characteristics of the social structure of the society and certain cultural norms which act as constraints and which reduce the process of conversion of wants into demands helping to keep the system from suffering a demand overload.

In addition, after demands enter the political system many of them are modified in content and their number may be reduced as a result of the characteristics of the channels through which demands are processed. The communication structure of the society as one of these channels is an important factor in the reduction of the flow of demands. It must be noted that here not all demands become issues.

Issues.-- Demands are converted into issues when they "come under the active consideration" of the system. Issues are "those demands that become a matter of contention because they are being considered as the basis for implementation in the immediate future."[60]

The process of conversion of demands into issues aids the capacity of a system to handle demand overflow. By bringing an unmanageable number of demands into some orderly arrangement for the consideration of the authorities, conversion enables the latter to process them into outputs.

Outputs.-- Outputs consist of a stream of activities flowing from the authorities of a system. They may give satisfaction to certain demands or they may tend to control or reduce the flow of demands by interferring for instance, with the communication channels or by other means. In any event, they may effect the system itself or the environment in which the system exists. In both cases they may act as stimuli for further inputs to come into the system or reduce the rate of conversion of wants into demands or of demands into issues. Thus, they are the basis of a feedback effect on the flow of demands.

Feedback.-- Feedback results when the outputs of a system return to it and affect the future behavior of the system. In this way they are

converted into inputs that are in turn processed by the system into new outputs that of course, may again be fed back into the system.

Theoretical Proposition of the Dissertation

In accordance with the system scheme outline above, and in particular with the aspects of it that refer to the flow of demands and its processing within the political system, the following general propositions were constructed:

1) The political system of a developing nation affected by the impact of modern technology can be expected to have suffered a considerable stress due to the great increase in the production of social wants and therefore, in the rate of flow of demands into the political system.
2) If the political system, the regime, and the authorities of such a nation have been able to persist under these conditions of stress it should be possible to find:
    a) structural and cultural constraints that act upon the process of conversion of wants into demands and on the canalization of the resulting demands so that the rate of flow of the latter is considerably reduced.
    b) general adaptive changes in the political structure and in the type and number of the outputs of the political system in response to the increase in the flow of demands that the structural and cultural constraints were not able to negate.
    c) a flow of demands calling for, 1) the replacement of the incumbent authorities, 2) specific governmental action for changes in the political, cultural, and socio-economic structures of the country, and 3) abstention from governmental intervention in specific situations.
    d) specific outputs to satisfy control, reduce, or suppress demands of both kinds, and
    e) a feedback effect in which previous outputs of the system act upon inputs to either reduce or increase the flow of demands.

III. RESEARCH DESIGN

This part of the chapter gives a general description of the research operations that were designed and subsequently carried out in order to test the propositions stated above and to verify this theoretical framework when it was applied to Nicaragua.

Basic assumptions.-- The first steps of the investigation were an attempt to ascertain:

1) if Nicaragua fulfilled the basic requirements of systems analysis, that is to say whether it was possible to:
   a) identify a Nicaraguan political system and to distinguish it from its environment, and
   b) to show that the system has persisted through time;
2) if Nicaragua is in reality an underdeveloped country subject to the impact of modern technology;
3) if there have been in recent years a considerable increase in the flow of demands presented to the political system; and
4) to what degree the political regime and authorities of the country have been able to persist in this changing environment.

General description of Nicaragua.-- Chapter II and the first part of Chapter III attempt to accomplish this task. Chapter II provides a general description of Nicaragua, using published materials and information gathered directly by the author from Nicaraguan officials and private sources, documents, as well as personal observation. In this section we seek to identify what we consider as the main variables of Nicaraguan politics and to incorporate them into our theoretical frame of reference. It schematizes the geophysical as well as the social environment of Nicaragua both at the extra-societal and the internal levels.

Socio-economic changes.-- Chapter III, part I, concentrates on the socio-economic and cultural changes suffered by Nicaragua between 1950 and 1957. We decided on 1950 as the first year to be covered by our research in this section because that was the year in which the first technically designed census was carried out in Nicaragua. In addition, almost no reliable socio-economic study of the country can be found before that date.[61]

Assuming that these previous questions could be answered affirmatively we proceeded to a research design destined to test propositions 2a, b, c, and e. The following were the main research operations.

Structural and cultural constraints.-- First the communication and educational structures of the country were examined in order to determine if the structural constraints such as the lack of enough telephones, roads, etc., linking far away places with the main decision making centers or the lack of sufficient numbers of educated people able to know about the existence of services or to communicate with the authorities to press for the satisfaction of their wants, referred to in proposition 2-a could be found in Nicaragua. The results of the analysis are in the second section of Chapter III, part II.

In order to test for the existence of the cultural norms that were expected to act upon the process of conversion of the wants into demands and on the flow of demands through political channels (in accordance with proposition 2-a) an opinion survey was carried out in the city of Leon in January, 1967. The questionnaire submitted was designed to find out what people expect from and think about government, how information about previous governmental outputs affect their attitudes toward the polity (feedback), what type of demands they were likely to present to the political system, what demands they actually presented, and in what form they were presented. The assumptions, technical characteristics of the survey, the questionnaire submitted, and the results that were obtained, are presented in Chapter II, part II and in Appendix A and B.

General adaptive changes.-- To test proposition 2-b, the general governmental output, the budget appropriations, and their distribution, the creation of new administrative agencies, the reorganization of governmental services, and the enactment of new taxes and socio-economic legislation that took place between 1950 and 1967 were examined to see if there had been any changes in the structure and outputs of government corresponding to the socio-economic changes that were expected to be found in the same time period. The results of this analysis are found in Chapter III, part III.

The 1957-1967 events.-- To test propositions c, d, and e, the main events which took place in Nicaragua between 1957 and 1967 were analyzed

in order to see if it was possible to ascertain the existence of the inputs and outputs that our propositions envisioned. That is to say if inputs such as demands for the replacement of the authorities, demands for changes in labor legislation and electoral taxes, etc., or outputs such as the marshaling of military forces, new statutes, or the creation of new governmental services could be found.

The dates 1957-1967 were chosen for two main reasons:

a) it was thought that a period of ten years would be long enough to allow general trends to be made visible, yet short enough to make the amount of data manageable;

b) 1957 provides a good cutting point because in that year President Luis Somoza was inaugurated for a term of his own and initiated what was then termed a"transition" government. The research covered events up to May 1, 1967.

The newspapers, El Centroamericano, La Prensa, and Novedades published during this period were the main sources of current information. The author examined them during March, April and May, 1967. In addition, several interviews with political and civic leaders and government officials were made during the same months and also in June, July and August of the same year. Some were informal, as required by the circumstances, but others were formal and are duly reported and footnoted accordingly.

Types of demands that were found.-- The research was divided in two main areas. The first covered demands referring to the legitimacy of the authorities and the regime. Two types of demands were found here. The first type consisted of violent demands for the replacement of the authorities. The second type was composed of demands for changes in the electoral process as a means of obtaining legitimacy.

The second area of research referred to demands for specific political and socio-economic outputs. The main types of demands that were found related to: a) freedom of political prisoners, b) University reform and religious education, c) land distribution and the level of salaries, and d) tax increases and subsidies. Chapters IV and V give an account of the findings in this regard.

Feedback effect.-- Feedback effects were studied in several of the areas of inquiry. They were found to be important in the results of the survey and also in the examination of the political events between 1957 and 1967. An account of this is given in the appropriate chapters.

Conclusions.-- Finally, Chapter VI gives the general conclusions of our research and some considerations about the present political situation of Nicaragua and about the fitness of systems analysis as a tool for research.

CHAPTER II

A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE NICARAGUAN POLITY

In this chapter we attempt to describe the geographic and socio-economic conditions which limit and give form to the Nicaraguan political system; to demonstrate its persistence through time, and show at the same time the historical traits that to a considerable extent determine its present circumstances; and to point out the more relevant characteristics of the Nicaraguan political system.

I. GEOGRAPHICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

The Geographical Setting

Nicaragua is a small country. With 130,000 square kilometers (59,190 square miles), it is not one of the smallest in the world, if we consider Belgium, El Salvador, or some newly independent nations, but it is still geographically small, for the longest distances that can be measured in straight lines are about 500 kilometers (310 miles) in range. All of Nicaragua is located in the tropics, between 10°45' and 15°5' latitude North. It is also located between 83°11' and 87°42' west of Greenwich, in the same standard time zone of the rest of Central America, Mexico City, New Orleans, Louisiana, and Lawrence, Kansas.[1]

The territory of Nicaragua is divided by the Sierra Madre that crosses it from North to South, in two very different regions. The first comprises the Atlantic coastal plains and the Eastern slopes of the Sierra. The other, the plains of the Pacific coast, the lowlands around the lakes (Lake Nicaragua and Lake Managua) and the slopes west of the Sierra and around the volcanic chain of Los Marrabios. Depending on the altitude above sea level the climate in Nicaragua varies from warm to relatively cool. Since the highest peak in the country is

only 2,000 meters high (6,600 feet) and the inhabited valleys and mesas are much lower than that, there is really no place in Nicaragua where heating in the homes becomes a necessity.

There are few variations in temperature during the year. The seasons are differentiated by the amount of rainfall. The driest places, with some 500millimeters (19") of average yearly precipitation are located in the Pacific belt. They usually have a rainy season of five months and the rest of the year is normally dry. In the same region there are some places with a rainy season of seven to eight months duration and with 2,156 mm. (80") of precipitation every year. In the Atlantic coast and the Eastern slopes of the Sierra, on the other hand, the rainy season lasts about 10 months, and in some places, the Valley of the San Juan River, it rains during the whole year and at San Juan del Norte there is an average yearly precipitation of 6,000 mm. (240").

The Atlantic region is very sparsely populated. It contains most of the ethnic minorities of the country, including some non-acculturated Indians. The Pacific region, on the other hand, comprises most of the cultural, economic, and political life of the country. The greatest part of the population lives there. While the overall population density of Nicaragua is 13 inhabitants per square kilometer (33.7 square mile), that of the departments of Zelaya and Rio San Juan which encompass most of the Eastern part of the country, has less than 5 inhabitants per square kilometer (13 per square mile). The Departments of Masaya and Managua, at the core of the Pacific region, have a population density per square kilometer of 141 and 87.7 (366 and 288 per square mile) respectively.[2] It can be said that roughly 87% of the population lives in the Pacific area which comprises only 39% of the land. Agriculture and cattle raising is relatively easy in the Pacific area where the soil is usually rich and the climate appropriate. In the Atlantic Coast the yearly precipitation and the difficulties in communications make such activities difficult, although in the last years the situation has changed a little.

The Nicaraguan People

In absolute numbers, the population of Nicaragua according to the 1963 census was 1,535,588 inhabitants.[3] This figure places Nicaragua as the fourth Central American country in terms of population, after Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, although it is the largest of the five countries in respect to area.

Most of this population can be defined as ethnically homogeneous. On the whole the great majority of Nicaraguans are mixed Spanish and Indian stock. It is practically impossible to draw the line separating those of Indian and Spanish descent since one can find all degrees of mixture everywhere in the country. This is reflected in the popular language where the word Indian has lost its racial connotation to acquire a socio-economic one. As Adams points out in his Survey, there are certain boroughs in Leon and Masaya that are considered as Indian although their inhabitants are really neither more, nor less, mestizos than the other Nicaraguans and speak only Spanish.[4]

There are however, some pockets of non-acculturated Indians of a very primitive degree of civilization. They live in the Atlantic region around the main rivers and speak several Indian dialects corrupted by their contact with Spanish and English. The Department of Statistics reported in 1954 that there were 21,496 speakers of five Indian dialects (the main ones are Miskito and Sumu) of which 15,931 did not speak Spanish.[5] According to Teran and Incer, they tend to disappear due to increasing contact with Nicaraguan civilization that draws the young ones away, and because of difficult sanitary conditions among those that remain. On the whole, they represent no more than 1.4% of the population.[6] This figure can be compared with the corresponding one for Guatemala which is 40.1%.[7]

There are also some Negroes whose native language is English, or rather a dialectal form of it, and who live mostly in the cities and towns of the Atlantic region. They do not amount to more than 3% of the population.[8] These Negro inhabitants are a remainder of the British occupation of the Atlantic region during the XVIII and XIX centuries. They were brought from Jamica and the West Indies in order to work in

the exploitation of the woods and mines of the area.

Immigration in Nicaragua is very small. It is not an important source of heterogeneity in the population. In 1963, only 13,076 persons were counted as foreign-born. This is only .85% of the population and includes people born in the Central and Latin American countries. Of this group, 3,000 were reported to have acquired Nicaraguan citizenship.[9]

Urban and Rural Population

The differences between the inhabitants of the country and those of the cities and towns is perhaps more important. Nicaragua remains a country of campesinos since according to the 1963 census 59% of the population lives in the country, while the rest lives in towns of more than 1,000 inhabitants, or with some urban facilities such as clearly marked streets, public lighting, etc., or with an economic life that is mostly non-agricultural.[10] However, the observation made by Scott about Mexico, can be considered valid for Nicaragua. He said in Mexican Government in Transition, that people living in towns of less than 10,000 can hardly be classified as urban.[11] From that point of view we can consider as more significant the figure of 28% which corresponds to the percentage of Nicaraguans living in towns of more than 10,000.[12] It could also be added that in Nicaragua, there was in 1963 only one town of more than 100,000 population, Managua, with its 234,580 inhabitants.[13]

The ways of living, culture, access to communications and political activities of campesinos and town dwellers differ markedly. If we take illiteracy as an example we can say that 81.1% of the rural population does not read and write while only 20.6% of the urban inhabitants suffer from the same condition.[14] In Managua, this figure goes down to 14.2% and the same is true of other important urban centers in varying degrees.[15] Physicians, taking another example, live primarily in the urban centers; Managua alone accounts for 48% of them although it only has 15% of the population.[16] While 39.5% of the urban dwellers enjoy running water in their homes, only 1.7% of the rural inhabitants do so.[17]

Educational Characteristics

The illiteracy rate is 49.2% but the criteria for separating those who are classified as illiterate from those who are considered literate is a questionable one. It is only necessary to be able to read and write a small and simple paragraph. Some other figures can be more telling. For example, 49.4% of Nicaraguans older than 10 years of age, have less than one year of schooling. Only 21.1% have gone beyond the third grade, 7.2% have completed primary education, and only 5.1% have gone beyond the first year of secondary school, 0.7% have completed secondary education.[18] The drop-out rate is terrifying. A study of a generation of students shows that 62,334 children were registered in the first year of school in 1954, but only 16,762 reached the second year in 1955; only 2,444 of them reached secondary schools in 1960 and those who got into a university in 1965 were only 1,150, of which only some 350 are expected to graduate.[19] Only 0.12% of the population of Nicaragua consists of university graduates.[20]

At present, a great part of the children of school age (40%) remain outside of the schools. It has been estimated that at the present rate of growth, it would take at least 150 years to have a 100% attendance in elementary schools.[21]

Social Structure

The social structure of Nicaragua has not yet been thoroughly studied. However, it can be described in a tentative manner by utilizing some preliminary studies and surveys, and several recent statistics referring to income distribution, land ownership, housing, and other aspects of Nicaraguan society.

There would seem to be in Nicaragua, a thin upper layer of large land owners, businessmen, and successful professionals, technicians, and politicians. Those who are part of this layer live in comfort, with access to all of the conveniences of modern civilization, including the highest levels of education, income and status; they are usually educated abroad and well travelled. Taking into account that no more than 2% of Nicaraguans are members of families with incomes of more than 48,000

Cordobas per year (U.S. $6,857),[22] that 42% of the land under cultivation belongs to 1.6% of the land owners,[23] that only 2.1% of the working force of Nicaragua is composed of professionals or qualified technicians,[24] and that no more than 2.4% of the houses in Nicaragua have more than 6 rooms,[25] this upper class can be estimated as comprising between 2 and 3% of the population.

Between this upper layer and the lower sectors of the population we find a relatively thin group of middle sectors of the population, composed of small manufacturers and merchants, some professionals and technicians, most of the employed people both in private and public enterprises, industrial supervisors, industrial workers, and some independent artisans and farmers. These groups are characterized by their attempts to imitate the customs and ways of the upper classes with varied degrees of success. This tendency combined with the scarcity of housing facilities and the rising prices of consumer goods, give these middle sectors their characteristic chronic economic strain.[26]

The middle sectors have been estimated by Wolfe at no more than 15% of the population.[27] The income distribution, showing that only 17% of the population of Nicaragua belongs to families with incomes above 14,000 Cordobas a year (U.S. $2,057)[28] as well as the educational statistics already mentioned above and other factors seem to confirm this estimate.

The lower strata of the population are composed in the main of industrial and agricultural workers who live in very poor conditions. Together these elements comprise approximately 83% of the population, and perhaps a little more. The income of the urban sector of this part of the Nicaraguan population (there are no statistics available as to the rural sectors, whose incomes are certainly lower) do not rise, in the upper levels beyond U.S. $2,000 a year for each family unit. Some 13% of them have family income of less than U.S. $200.00 per year and more than 38% get less than U.S. $800.00 per year.[29] Some housing and sanitation figures can give an added picture of their condition. There are in Nicaragua 174,888 (70% of the total number of houses) substandard one

and two room houses.[30] The median of occupants per house is 5.4 for the one room houses and 6.3 for the two room ones.[31] Seventy percent of them do not have any hard floors.[32] There are only .42 physicians and .20 nurses per 1,000 inhabitants,[33] and 48% of the people who die do not get any medical assistance at all.[34]

Although it is impossible to find any reliable information as to social mobility, it would seem reasonable to suggest that the social structure of Nicaragua is far from being a caste system. The avenues to climb from one sector to the other are open to those who can get the necessary money and education. The boundaries between the sectors are not clearly defined and people in the upper middle and lower upper are not clearly differentiated. The same is true of the low middle and upper middle sectors. The class or sector lines are not color lines and the customs and speech of the different sectors are not clearly separated along class lines.

Regional Differences

Excluding the notable contrast between the Atlantic and Pacific regions, the local differences that were so important in the past seem to have lost a great part of their influence. The small size of the Pacific zone, and the relatively high development of the communications network seem to have lessened the regional contrasts. There are in Nicaragua 5,195 kilometers (3,221 miles) of all weather roads[35] and 403 kilometers (250 miles) of railroad, all of them, save for some 300 kilometers of roads, in the Pacific area. The number of motor vehicles per 1,000 inhabitants is 13, also relatively high for an underdeveloped country.[36]

The Economy

Economically, Nicaragua is definitely one of the underdeveloped countries of the world. The per capita gross national product of Nicaragua was estimated to be only $320.00 in 1965.[37] A great part of the gross national product is obtained directly from agriculture in which 59.4% of the economically active population is engaged. This sector of the economy

however, accounts only for 39% of the gross national product. The rest comes from industry (15%) and services (45.6% in which 16.4% and 24.2% of the economically active people are engaged).[38]

The average productivity of the economically active population is very low, considered as a whole they produced in 1963, U.S. $935.5 per capita. The per capita productivity in the agricultural sector was only U.S. $595.8 and that of industrial and services sectors U.S. $1,024.1 and U.S. $1,709.9 respectively.[39]

The economic activity of the country is oriented to a great degree toward foreign markets. The ratio between the total volume of exports and imports and GNP in 1966 was 33.6.[40] Furthermore, this productivity for exportation is concentrated around a few crops, mainly cotton and coffee, which together account for 70% of the volume of the exports of Nicaragua.[41] In addition to that the geographical situation of Nicaragua and the development of air travel and the road facilities for traveling to the rest of the Central American countries and Mexico have produced a great flow of tourists that go to several foreign places, San Jose, Miami and Mexico, being the principal ones. For the Easter Holidays of 1967 alone, the Immigration Offices reported to have extended more than 5,000 passports.[42] There are also many students in foreign universitites and high schools. In 1963, there were 782 Nicaraguans studying in universities outside of Nicaragua[43] (26% of the student population). Figures as to students in high school were not available, but are also known to be high.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Aboriginal Population

When the Spaniards came to Central America at the beginning of the XVI century, they found in what today is Nicaragua, a relatively small number of inhabitants grouped into several politically independent tribes and with a degree of advancement as to civilization which can be considered as very low if compared with that of certain other regions of America. Although there are not reliable statistics as to population

before or immediately after the Spanish conquest, it can be safely assumed that the total population of the region could not have been in any event greatly in excess of one hundred thousand inhabitants. The first, somewhat reliable census, taken in 1778, gives 131,932 as the population of Nicaragua.[44]

The Conquest

The taking over by the Conquistadores and the establishment of a colonial administration was lacking in dramatic events if we do not count the internal fights and rivalries among the Spanish themselves.

The main colonial centers of Nicaragua were founded in the Pacific region and in the lowlands around the lakes. Thus, Leon and Granada were founded in 1524 on the shores of Lake Managua and Lake Nicaragua respectively. The criteria for the location of the first urban centers of Nicaragua seems to have been in the main, the availability of a sufficient water supply, good soil, and a sufficient number of Indian workers. It should be remembered at this point that the Spanish colonization in this area was geared principally to exploit the natural resources of the areas with the use of forced Indian labor. This condition seems to have determined the present geographical distribution of the population of Nicaragua around the lakes and in the Pacific plains where the main Indian centers were located. From the main centers, Leon and Granada, the Spanish extended their control towards the less accessible and less populated highlands of the Sierra and later on at a much slower pace and with little success to the main river valleys of the Atlantic Coast, where the Indian population was nomadic and difficult to control.[45]

The relatively low level of civilization and cultural and political integration of the small number of native inhabitants of the area did not permit the persistence of the Indian ways and customs for a period as long as was true in Guatemala and parts of Mexico and South America. The Spanish ethnic and cultural characteristics were mixed with the aboriginal ones at a much quicker pace in Nicaragua. This circumstance would seem to account for the relatively high degree of ethnic homogeneity

of present day Nicaragua.

The violent nature of Nicaraguan politics seems to have been present since the very beginning of its political unity. During the first years of Spanish rule, Nicaraguan history was dominated by the rivalries between the conquerors. Conflicts arose between Gil Gonzalez and Hernandez de Cordoba, both under the jurisdiction of Pedrarias Davila, the Governor of Panama, who had sent them. They were the first to fight for the control of the country as early as 1524, the year of the founding of Granada and Leon.[46]

The brothers Contreras subsequently rebelled against the control of the Spanish crown but failed in their attempt to found an independent kingdom. Finally however, the situation became relatively stable and Nicaragua was organized as a province of the Captaincy-General of Guatemala, with the rest of what is now Central America and parts of Mexico.

The Colonial Rule

The relative peace and order of the later years of colonial rule were altered only by the perennial menace of the pirate raids and the attempts of the British to occupy the Atlantic Coast as a way to control the possible inter-oceanic route. As early as the first expedition of Gil Gonzalez this route was an object of interest to the conquerors due to the narrowness of the isthmus of Rivas separating the Pacific Ocean from Lake Nicaragua, which is connected to the Atlantic by the San Juan River. The Canal issue has since been an important determinant of the history of the country and this will be discussed later in this work.

The issue of the British occupation was not permanently settled until 1895, when by taking advantage of the British-American rivalries, the Nicaraguan government under President Zelaya took possession of the last remains of English influence on the Atlantic Coast. The occupation left its mark in Nicaragua in the form of groups of English speaking

Negroes who still preserve some of their cultural characteristics and their language.[47]

The Central American Federation

The ties between the different provinces and towns of the Guatemalan Captaincy-General, whose affairs were theoretically controlled directly from Spain, were very loose. This became quite clear when the former Spanish colony became independent. After a period in which Iturbide attempted its annexation to his Mexican Empire, the region became the Federal Republic of Central America. The annexation issue divided Central America to such an extent that a civil war erupted. It fed on the differences among the principal cities of the several provinces. Some were for total independence, others for becoming a part of the Mexican Empire, and still others for remaining as a Spanish colony. Leon and Granada the two main cities of Nicaragua in the 1820's, were in opposition with respect to this issue,[48] and they became the centers of operation of the two rival factions that later on developed into Nicaragua's two traditional parties.

The Traditional Parties

The Civil war continued after the Federal Republic was formed and slowly became ideological, centered mainly around the religious issue concerning the position of the Catholic church *vis-a-vis* the newly formed state. The local ideological division left its mark in Nicaragua where the two factions formed at the time, eventually became the two major parties that still dominate the politics of the country. The liberally-oriented groups were centered around Leon and the conservative ones around Granada.[49]

This state of civil war lasted for a long time and eventually produced the demise of the newly formed Federal Republic that officially dissolved in 1838. The concept of Central America as a Federal Republic, with Nicaragua as a part, has not totally disappeared from the culture of the area and has influenced its politics producing the several attempts to go back to the Federation by treaty or by force of arms. The failure

of diplomatic and military efforts to achieve reunification has encouraged the more recent functional approaches that have culminated in the Central American Common Market and other international cooperative programs.

When the Federation dissolved, the uti possidetis juris of 1821 was supposed to determine the boundaries of the newly formed states. However, the lack of accurate maps and the easy ways of the Spanish colonial administration did not permit the determination of such boundaries with precision. In the case of Nicaragua, the boundaries issue created disputes with Honduras and Costa Rica. The problems with Honduras remained unsolved until 1960 and were an important factor in the politics of both countries.

Nicaragua became an independent state in 1838 and inherited the factionalism and chronic state of Civil war of the Federation, which did not end until 1858. The war became violent in 1854. The position of Nicaragua between the two oceans and the facilities for travel between them via Lake Nicaragua and the San Juan River during the California gold rush, attracted the attention of William Walker and his falange. They became a part of the Nicaraguan civil war as mercenaries hired by the liberal faction. Taking advantage of the chaotic situation produced by the civil war, and with the support of the Compania de Transito, which organized the inter-oceanic travel, Walker and his men succeeded in controlling the country. Walker proclaimed himself as President of Nicaragua and established slavery. The danger of a permanent take over by Walker[50] finally united all Nicaraguan factions and brought aid from the rest of Central America. Walker was defeated and had to flee the country after he also lost the support of the Compania de Transito. The war against Walker is known in Nicaraguan history as the National War.

The union of the parties to fight the invader with the support of the rest of Central American forces did not last long and soon the conservative forces and the liberal groups were at each other. However, the country was so exhausted after the civil war, that the conservatives,

organized as an oligarchy, were able to remain in power during a long period of relative peace, which is known in Nicaragua as "the thirty years". The peace was not total, however, and the period was not without some attempts on the part of the liberal dissenters of the Conservative party to overthrow the regime.

The Liberal Revolution of 1893

An internal power struggle among the conservatives brought an end to their control of Nicaraguan politics. Taking advantage of conservative infighting, a revolutionary movement headed by General Zelaya took over in the name of the Liberal Party and brought about several important reforms in the legal structure of the country.

Most of these reforms were those proposed by the traditional liberal parties of Latin America and concerned the Church issue, universal suffrage, education and freedom of commerce and contract. However, in practice, this reform did not extend to the electoral process. Elections were conveniently manipulated by Zelaya in order to get re-elected several times until a civil war, the last among several previously unsuccessful attempts, forced him to resign under pressure of the United States Department of State which for several reasons had become interested in the overthrow of the President of Nicaragua.

The Conservative Regime and the American Intervention

After an interim liberal government the country came under the control of the Conservative Party which had organized the revolt with the financial,political and military support of the United States. This time the Conservative government produced in a chaotic condition in which civil strife became chronic, in part because of dissension within the Conservative Party and in part due to strong popular opposition to the people in government and to the American intervention. In order to protect their own investors who had acquired important interests in Nicaragua, banking, railroads, etc., and in order to assure the canal rights obtained from the new government, the Americans continued to intervene in Nicaragua politics using for this purpose the U.S. Marine Corps, which in varying

numbers was stationed in Nicaragua from 1909 to 1933.[51]

A revolutionary movement however, broke out in 1926 triggered by the coup d'etat of Emiliano Chamorro, the conservative leader, against the conservative President Carlos Jose Solorzano, who was a part of a conservative-liberal coalition sponsored by former President Bartolome Martinez in order to establish a National Government. The liberals were able to get control of most of the country notwithstanding the support given to the government by the American troops.[52]

The Americans finally decided to mediate in Tipitapa. They were able to pressure the military leader of the revolutionary forces, General Moncada, into accepting the promise of the American Government to carry on free elections and he decided to abide by their results. Meanwhile, the American troops were to train and organize an army, to be called the Guardia Nacional, similar in structure to the occupying troops, and which would eventually take over the control of the country when the Americans left. Under the conservative president Adolfo Diaz, but with the Americans controlling the polls, the elections took place and the leader of the revolutionary forces was elected and eventually inaugurated as President. During his regime the American troops still controlled Nicaragua and were supranational in their influence. The Nicaraguan army was being organized and used to fight the rebel troops of Augusto Cesar Sandino, who had been one of the leaders of the revolutionary movement, but had refused to accept Moncada's agreement and did not surrender his weapons to the Americans. He began a successful stand against the combined forces of the Marine Corps and the newly organized Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua using guerrilla techniques and getting support from within and outside of the country, from people who considered his rebellion as the only correct and patriotic stand in the face of the American intervention.[53]

End of the Military Operation

Eventually a second election was held in 1932, another liberal politician won and was inaugurated in January 1933. This time it was

the civilian leader of the revolutionary forces, Dr. Juan Bautista Sacasa, a physician. Having organized the National Guard, and as a result of the changes in the international policy of the United States which resulted in part from the Good Neighbor Policy, the American troops pulled out of the country in January 1933, shortly after Sacasa's inauguration. To manage the Guardia Nacional, several Nicaraguan officers had been trained, and one of them, Anastasio Somoza, a liberal politician who had rapidly become an army man and a General, was chosen as its commander under the title of Jefe Director.[54]

The designation of General Somoza was apparently the result of a compromise in which the interests and desires of the main actors of Nicaraguan politics were considered. The choosing of General Somoza made at the end of Moncada's administration, at least insured the acceptance of the President, of whom Somoza was a political protege; of the President-elect Sacasa, who was an uncle to Somoza's wife; and, of the American Ambassador and Commander with whom Somoza had worked closely as an interpreter because of his proficiency in the English language.[55]

The Guardia Nacional was given the control of all armed services that existed or were to be created in Nicaragua. All governmental functions that required the use of force were assigned to the Guardia Nacional. Thus the Guardia was given rural and urban police, traffic, customs, and other duties.

Somoza continued to organize the Guardia Nacional with the aid of some American officers who remained as technical advisers and proceeded to create a group of commissioned and non-commissioned officers on whose loyalty he could count. At the same time he slowly began to eliminate those who could be his rivals in the control of the army. He also took advantage of the severe socio-economic problems of Nicaragua and of the relatively inactive Sacasa regime to create for himself the image of the man to whom everybody had to turn for everything. At the same time he slowly began to take control of the Liberal Party machinery.

Sandino meanwhile had looked for peace after the American troops pulled out and had sought an agreement with President Sacasa

by which he could have a certain degree of autonomy and could possibly become an important and powerful political leader. Taking advantage of the fact that Sandino had come with several of his lieutenants to Managua to talk to President Sacasa, some Guardia Nacional officers under Somoza's direction prepared and carried out his assassination and that of a number of his principal followers. Those who could not be apprehended at the time fled and were forced to remain in exile for many years.[56]

General Anastasio Somoza as President

Because of the fact that the Nicaraguan Constitution barred him from seeking election as President, given his close family connection with President Sacasa, Somoza, already in control of the army, and taking advantage of the deteriorating prestige of Sacasa, forced him to resign in 1936. Somoza was subsequently elected president under a provisional government headed by Camilo Brenes Jarquin. He was inaugurated in January 1, 1937.[57]

As President, Somoza obtained the support of several important politicians of the Liberal Party and of a faction split from the Conservative Party. He offered several interesting administrative programs which included educational and labor reforms that attracted the attention of several young intellectuals, the incipient workers organizations, and later on even the newly created socialist party.

At the same time, Somoza tightened his control of the army and through manipulation began to accumulate a great fortune which gave him some degree of control in practically all areas of the Nicaraguan economy.[58]

With the support of the army, the young intellectuals and workers' organization, and with the increasing power of his newly acquired fortune, he did not have great difficulty in calling for elections for a constitutional assembly. This assembly drew up a new Constitution that prepared the way for a future labor code and included several principles of the new-constitutional movement initiated by the Constitutions of Queretaro and Weimar. At the same time the Constitutional Assembly gave him a new

term as President by including article one of the transitory disposition of the new charter. This new term was to end on May 1, 1947.[59]

The failure of Somoza to fulfill some of his promises as to new programs, charges of administrative corruption, the use of violent repressive methods, and the announcement of his intentions to seek re-election for the 1947-53 term, brought continuous and increasing opposition to his regime.

After some violent popular uprisings in 1944 he announced his decision not to try for re-election and the liberal convention under his control selected Dr. Leonardo Arguello, an old liberal leader, as the party candidate. Apparently Somoza planned to remain as Nicaragua's strong man from his post as Jefe Director of the army, but Arguello opposed Somoza beginning with his inauguration address and the latter directed a coup d'etat which forced the President to seek asylum in the Mexican embassy and eventually to leave Nicaragua to become a political emigre in Mexico City.

A constitutional assembly created a new fundamental charter and selected a new President, Victor Roman y Reyes. Somoza remained as the most powerful political figure of Nicaragua from his position as head of the army. The death of the President before his term had ended gave Somoza the opportunity to become president again--this time as Provisional President to finish Roman y Reyes' term.[60]

At this stage, Somoza sought agreement with the main branch of the Conservative Party, the traditional enemy. A Pact was signed between himself and General Emiliano Chamorro, the Conservative leader. Somoza wanted to consolidate his position and the Conservatives wanted to obtain positions in the legislature, the judiciary, and the administration. The pact contemplated the enactment of a new Constitution and a new election in which Somoza was to be the winner in order to serve from 1951 to 1957.[61] Shortly after that, the Conservatives announced that Somoza planned to get re-elected although the Constitution forbade it. The coalition was

broken in 1954 following a rebellion attempt in which the Conservative Party leadership was accused of having taken a part in the agreement. Somoza announced his intentions of seeking another term. For that, he forced a reform of the 1950 Constitution.[62] After the convention of the Liberal Party that nominated him, however, he was shot by Rigoberto Lopez-Perez and a few days later, on September 28, 1956, he died in a hospital in Panama.

Immediately after his death, his son Luis Somoza Debayle, who was the President of the Chamber of Deputies was elected by it to serve the rest of his father's term. His brother Anastasio Somoza, Jr., continued as head of the Guardia Nacional, the post in which he had succeeded his father when the latter resigned to become the presidential candidate in 1956. At this point, the period which will be the center of attention of the rest of the dissertation begins.

Continuation of the Somoza Regime

Luis Somoza was nominated by the Liberal Party as its presidential candidate to replace his deceased father. He was elected in February 1957 and inaugurated as President in his own right on May 1, of the same year. He served his full term, reformed the Constitution again barring himself from re-election,[63] and was succeeded by Rene Schick, the Liberal Party candidate, who died in office, on August 3, 1966 to be succeeded by provisional President Lorenzo Guerrero.

The Liberal Party convention at the end of Schick's term selected General Anastasio Somoza Jr as candidate. After the February 5 elections the Consejo Nacional de Elecciones officially declared him President-Elect on March 22, 1967. He was inaugurated the following May 1 to serve a five year term in accordance with the Constitutional amendment enacted in 1966.[64]

III. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

The formal legal structure of Nicaragua is relatively simple.

It is contained in the Constitution of 1950 and its five subsequent reforms, the Electoral, Martial and Amparo Laws of 1950, also with some amendments, and several statutes pertaining to the organization of the four branches in which the Nicaraguan Government is divided.

Nicaragua has a unitary system of government, (see chart on following page). That is to say, there are no separate state and central legislative, executive and legislative branches. In contrast to federal governments like that of the United States, two separate legal systems for each member state--federal and state Constitutions, federal and state criminal law, and also different police and judicial jurisdictions--do not exist. On the contrary, all of the central agencies of the government of Nicaragua have authority over the whole territory of the country in all matters. There is only one Constitution and one legal system. The same is true of electoral matters, centralized in the Tribunal Supreme Electoral, and of the police forces organized within the Guardia Nacional as will be explained below

Local Autonomy

There is nevertheless, some degree of local autonomy for the 125 municipal councils which usually are limited to administrative matters and are under the supervision of the central executive and the other branches of the Central Government. There are also several autonomous institutions in charge of some of the aspects of public administration. These institutions or agencies however, are organized on a functional rather than a territorial basis and their authority extends, in matters of their competence, to the whole country. There are sixteen of these institutions, the Central Bank, the National University, and the Institute of Social Security, could be mentioned as examples. The Central Executive has different degrees of control over these institutions in accordance with the Constitution and the corresponding by-laws.

The Four Branches of Government

The Constitution recognizes the existence of four branches of

TABLE I

GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA

ORGANIZATION CHART



government.[65] The three classical ones of the American model and the Electoral Branch, which is in charge of organizing, controlling, and deciding on all popular elections for governmental officers. This includes municipal elections.

The Legislative branch is composed of two chambers. The Senate and the Chamber of Deputies are formed at present by 17 senators and 56 deputies respectively.[66]

The existence of a bicameral legislature in a unitary country with no social class representation, is a remainder of an old tradition initiated by the Constitution of 1826 which organized Nicaragua as a State within the Central American Federation. This Constitution included a bicameral legislature on the model of the Federal Constitution of 1824 which in turn was modeled on the American Constitution and its bicameral legislature reflecting the Federal nature of the nation. Bicameralism has been justified in Nicaragua by the assumption that two revisions of any proposed bill by two different bodies would allow for better legislation.[67]

The Supreme Court which is the official head of the Judicial branch is made up of seven members elected by the Legislature for life and good behavior. It has powers of revision in constitutional matters by means of the Recurso de Amparo which gives the Court jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of all legislation and of decrees and acts of the executive branch under the conditions determined by the Ley de Amparo.[68]

The Executive is headed by the President who appoints his Cabinet without having to seek the consent of the Senate or any other political body. The President and his Cabinet are given very wide powers by the Constitution and such powers can be extended enormously when there is a state of emergency under the terms of the Martial Law as mentioned above.[69] The existence of a state of emergency is determined solely by the President and his Cabinet and there is no other authority that can review or render decisions on executive actions taken during a state of emergency.

The Supreme Electoral Court heads the electoral branch. It is composed of five members elected, one by Congress, one by the Supreme Court and the other three by the parties that are to take part in the elections. It has the power of final decision over the elections of all popularly elected officials including those in the municipal councils.[70]

Predominance of the Executive

In Nicaragua, it has been traditional since 1858 for the Executive branch to predominate among the several branches of government.[71] Such predominance is reflected in the institutional arrangements and can be seen by studying certain characteristics of the constitutional and legal structure of the country which are peculiar to Nicaragua. The more important ones will be analyzed in the following paragraphs because it is necessary to understand them in order to understand the mechanics of Nicaraguan politics.

The Army

It is of primary importance to examine the position of the army. The Guardia Nacional was created as a result of the agreement between the Nicaraguan government and the American Presidential Delegate, Colonel Henry L. Stimson in 1927. It was trained by the occupation forces and was left as the only remaining organized governmental force when the occupation forces pulled out of Nicaragua.[72]

According to the Constitution, the Guard is given a monopoly over the use of organized armed forces in Nicaragua. If any institution requiring the use of arms to fulfill its functions is established in the country, it is placed by constitutional provision under the legal control of the Guard.[73] As a result of this, the National Guard is the institution in charge of all police functions in Nicaragua. This includes urban police, traffic, customs, and rural police, keeping the order and guaranteeing the electoral process. In addition to these, certain other ordinarily civilian functions have been assigned to the Guard since its creation. Such is the case with immigration and emigration control, care of the airports and control of civil aviation and communications,

which in Nicaragua are under governmental management.

Although there are several Constitutional rules referring to the civilian control of the several functions of the Guard,[74] this control is limited, not only by the factual monopoly of force and the traditional attitude of Latin American armies, but by the legal privileges afforded by the Constitution to the army. Military crimes are to be judged solely by the army tribunals.[75] However, in accordance with the Constitution, police and other activities related to everyday life are a military function, and the excesses committed by officers or soldiers while on police or electoral duties, have been interpreted as falling under military jurisdiction. The decision as to what is a military or civil crime or misdemeanor is left to military courts of inquiry organized ad hoc for each case. Thus, the possibility of the use of sanctions against the military to enforce court or other civilian orders is very limited.[76] This feature: monopoly of the use of weapons and special jurisdiction, gives the army its special position in Nicaraguan politics.

The Party System

A second important characteristic of the Nicaraguan government concerns the structure of the party system recognized by law. Only two parties can exist permanently. The party that obtains the third place in an election is automatically dissolved as is a party which decides not to take part in an election. The result is that any unsuccessful or new party that wants to participate in an election is forced to go through the complicated process of collecting signatures (five percent of the total number of votes in the preceding election) in order to be able to file a petition with the Supreme Electoral Court, which has the final decision on the matter, and which can through technicalities, such as the authenticity of the signatures, or the legal qualities of the signers, easily delay its decision beyond the deadline for the filing of candidates names.[77] During this process, only the two principal parties have a representative in the five member Court; the third party is allowed one, only after it is recognized. If there are two or more parties filing

petitions to be legally recognized, only one of them can appoint a representative to the Electoral Court. If there is a fourth party, the representative is allocated to the party that was able to collect the larger number of signatures accepted by the Court.[78]

In addition, and in accordance with the party by-laws,[79] the nomination of candidates for all offices is centralized so that all names are presented by the national party officers. This includes candidates for municipal offices. There is no possibility of nominating local candidates outside of the officially recognized parties. There can be no write-in campaigns.

A single-ballot system exists in which one vote is counted for all national officials, all of whom are elected at the same time. Split ballots are not permitted. It is only possible to vote separately for municipal candidates who are elected at the same election as all other national officers.[80]

The Bureaucracy

A third important characteristic of the system refers to the national bureaucracy. The central bureaucracy is very important because of its size. There are 22,000 employees with salaries that add up to some U.S. $34,000,000.[81] To this total, the personnel of the fifteen autonomous institutions or agencies should be added. They include 5,200 employees who collect salaries which total approximately to U.S. $9,500,000.[82] The lack of an organized civil service and of legally guaranteed tenure for governmental employees gives the executive a great amount of power which is widely used because of a tradition of patronage. This power is direct in the case of the employees of the central government and indirect in the case of the autonomous agencies, which are organized so that the executive retains a great degree of control over them. The only exception to this rule seems to be the National University which because of its peculiar clientele, the University students, has maintained a high degree of independence vis-a-vis the executive--even before its

autonomy was officially recognized by the Constitution.

The judicial and electoral bureaucracy and the administrative members of the Legislative branch do not escape from executive patronage. There are 1,026 such employees with salaries of U.S. $2,100,000.[83] This condition exists because of the peculiarities of the Nicaraguan System. The Constitution accords representation in the Judiciary (including the Supreme Court) to the majority and minority parties so that members of the courts are divided between the parties and so are the judgeships throughout the country. This division is proportionate with the number of votes received in the last election. Since the President of the Republic is the official head of the majority party, this position gives him considerable influence in the appointment of the greatest portion of the members of the Judicial Branch.[84] It should be added that only Supreme Court justices are appointed for life. All other members of the Court system have short terms (1, 2, and 4 years). By controlling the majority party, which for the last 39 years has been the Liberal Nationalist Party, it is also possible to exercise direct control over Congress because of the fact that all candidates for congressional offices are nominated by the central authorities of the party. In turn, the fact that the majority party is composed mostly of public employees, permits the person with the power of appointment to exercise his discretion in the selection of the members of the national Directiva of the party which is, according to the party by-laws, presided over by the President of the Republic, the de jure president of the party. The national Directiva is the organ of the party that selects all candidates for election or appointment.[85]

The control of the nomination of candidates for members of Congress permits the exercise of considerable indirect influence over the appointment of Supreme Court Justices and over two of the five members of the Electoral Court (one elected by the Court and the other by Congress). The fact that the third member is appointed by the majority party itself, provides another opportunity for further influencing the decisions of the Electoral branch of government.

Party Finances

Another important feature of the system is that because of patronage, it is assumed that all persons accepting public office (save those who are appointed as representatives of the minority party) belong because of their acceptance, to the majority (liberal) party and all are assessed a contribution to the party treasury amounting to 5% of their salaries. This amount is deducted directly from their paychecks each month and delivered by the Department of the Treasury to the party. Although this is not a principle contained in any statute, it is compulsory due to the fact that refusal to pay (which is theoretically possible) would be practically interpreted as resignation from office. The only exceptions are public school teachers and professors who are not assessed this contribution by strongly established tradition. Members of the judiciary, on the other hand, do contribute to the party treasury. This gives the head of the party, who is also the head of the executive enormous financial power not enjoyed by any other political group in the country.

It should be added here, that the Somoza brothers, Anastasio Jr. and Luis, who have controlled the party in the last ten years, inherited from their father the enormous fortune which the latter acquired in the years after he became an important factor in Nicaraguan politics in 1933. This has enabled them to exercise added political pressure, by uniting the power given them by their great investments in practically all important business and industries in Nicaragua to their power as army and majority party leaders.[86]

Classic Characteristics

Throughout the political history of Nicaragua it is possible to find five tendencies which in addition to the legal-formal party and financial characteristics discussed above, shed some light on the pecularities of the type of government which prevails in the country.

The Principle of Constitutionality

The first of them refers to the high degree of importance which

is attached to the principle of constitutionality on the one hand and the facility and frequency with which Constitutions are abrogated or amended on the other. After each of the several unconstitutional changes of government which have taken place in Nicaragua, an attempt was made to restore constitutionality by calling for elections of a constituent assembly in order to establish a new constitution. This tradition goes back to the first days in independence when delegates were summoned to write the first Constitution creating the Federal Republic of Central America after the ties with the Spanish were severed. Since then, Nicaragua has had eleven constitutions, two of which were enacted but for de facto reasons never became effective.[87]

Besides, the procedure for amending the Constitution has been widely used as a means of obtaining momentary political advantage or in order to make some projected political action constitutionally acceptable. For example, the Constitution of 1893 was amended to permit the re-election of President Zelaya. The present Constitution (1950) has been amended five times. The first was to permit the re-election of President Somoza, Sr.; the second time to forbid re-election as a demonstration of the expressed intentions of President Luis Somoza to democratize the country; the third to introduce some changes in the electoral system and to shorten the presidential period to four years, after President Somoza ended his mandate which lasted six years; another to introduce some changes in the fiscal structure; and finally, in 1966 to lengthen the Presidential term again to five years. The first five year term begins in 1967 and General Somoza, Jr., was elected last February to serve this term.[88]

2. Elections in Nicaragua

The second historical tendency concerns the electoral process. Ever since Nicaragua became an independent nation, elections have been contested by the opposition as being fraudulent. Government officials have been accused of exercising pressure, even of using violence, to influence the nominations, to force people into voting, or to impede some people from voting. The sole exception to this tendency is the case of the 1924 election and the elections which took place in 1928 and 1932 under the control of the American occupation forces. Even then, however,

there were complaints because of the impediments to the possible organization of third parties.[89]

In spite of this, the electoral process is given an extraordinary importance as the only means of legitimization. There has been no period in Nicaraguan history in which elections have not been scheduled every two, four or six years, depending on the length of the corresponding presidential or legislative term. Sometimes the presidential elections have been indirect, made by Congress or a constituent assembly as in 1939, but nevertheless, an election was scheduled and took place.

To illustrate the point, since 1947 there have been five elections, all of them carried out either with the abstention of the major opposition parties, as in 1957 and 1963 because of charges of prepared fraud or with the concurrence of the major opposition parties (1947 and 1967) but with their protest because of the use of fraudulent practices and violent means in order to alter the results of the elections; or, finally, with a previous agreement as to what were to be the results of the elections regardless of the voters (1950) because this was the way in which the elections were planned in the pact signed by the two principal leaders of the traditional parties.[90]

3. Civil War and Revolutionary Movements

As a consequence of the electoral characteristics described above, a third tendency is evident. Ever since the period of anarchy following the separation from Spain, which ended in 1858, there has not been a change of the party in government which was not the result of an armed movement. Thus, the Liberal Party took over in 1893, the Conservatives regained power in 1910, and the Liberals again in 1928 as a consequence of armed revolt after which elections were scheduled to legitimize the results of the armed contest.

In the time between the successful elections, the opposition groups scheduled unsuccessful revolts which in greater or lesser degree endangered the stability of the regime. Thus, during the conservative rule after the National War (the thirty years) there were several such revolts. General Emiliano Chamorro reports in his memoirs continuous subversive activities

against the Zelaya regime.[91] The period on which this dissertation concentrates has been no exception and this manifestation of demands for the control of power will be examined in due course.

4. The Organization of the Parties

The political arena of Nicaragua has been dominated by two traditional parties whose origins, as has been said above, go back to the early years of the Central American Federation. Although they have maintained a continuity that has lasted to the present, they have been characterized by a tendency to split because of problems of leadership. However, the readition has been to consider people from the various factions as still being members of the main party and to leave open the possibility of reunification. Finally, the membership of the parties has to a great extent been determined by family connections.[92] At present, however, this tendency has apparently begun to break because of two reasons. First, the Liberal Party has become increasingly a party of public employees and less a party of members by tradition; secondly, new parties have been created. Some have grown as a result of a split and have, later on, become permanent. Such is the case with the Independent Liberal Party.[93] Others are the result of the creation of new organizations; this latter is the case with the Socialist Party of Nicaragua, the Social Christian Party (1957)[94] and the Republican Mobilization Party (1956).[95] There have been in addition to these, several other movements to create new parties which have not lasted very long. Such is the case with the Union Nacional de Accion Popular (UNAP) movement, and the Revolutionary Action Party. The first has totally disappeared, and the second, a continuation of the National Renovation Party (1952), seems at present to be inactive.[96]

In 1967 a new party, the Social Christian Party, took part for the first time in an election. However, it went to the ballot under the name and emblem of the Conservative Party with which it formed a coalition (The National Opposition Union (UNO) together with the Liberal Independent Party) because coalitions are not provided for under Nicaraguan electoral laws.[97]

The majority party, the Liberal Nationalist Party, has profitted from this tendency to split. While the other parties split, and thus diminish in size, the Liberal Party, centered around a system of patronage in the public bureaucracy has tended to increase along with the bureaucracy that has been constantly growing both in absolute numbers and in the percentage of the population that it employs and of the gross national product that it uses. It has used the system both to consolidate the links which tie its members to it as well as to separate members of the other parties from their political loyalties by offering patronage or the possibility of minority representation to groups within the opposition parties when the main organization has decided apted for abstention from the electoral process.[98]

5. Modes of Political Participation

In any event, and although precise statistics are not obtainable, it would seem reasonable to suggest that the percentage of people taking an active part in party organizations is very limited. According to the fragmentary information gathered from interviews with activists of the several parties, this percentage lies somewhere between one and two percent of the population of 18 years of aga or older.[99]

Civil Strife.-- However, the interest of Nicaraguans in political matters is aroused from time to time and it is possible to organize demonstrations in support or against certain leaders or policies which can be of considerable size given the population of the country. Thus the conservative leader Fernando Aguero has been able to schedule meetings in the plaza de la Republica in Managua which have been estimated at between 30,000 and 60,000 people on two different occasions. Somewhat smaller demonstrations have also been organized by the Liberal Party. There is a tendency during the demonstrations to carry out acts of violence, sometimes triggered by the action or the presence of the police forces of the National Guard. These violent actions can become quite dangerous and have been used as a means of protest. Demonstrations of a smaller size with overtones of violence have also been staged by students whose interest in active politics is a Latin American tradition, and by

labor unions and other pressure groups which use demonstrations as a means of opposing the enactment of undesired legislation or some other governmental policy.[100]

In this respect the existence of underground organizations dedicated to the promotion of violence and terrorism should be mentioned. Some of them have had a short life. Among them Juventud Patriotica (Patriotic Youth), Juventud Democratica (Democratic Youth), and Movimiento Nueva Nicaragua (New Nicaraguan Movement) could be mentioned. One of them is still active, and has publicly acknowledged responsibility for several hold-ups against banks and other businesses staged to obtain funds for revolutionary activities. It is known as Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional. Its initials FSLN can be seen everywhere in the streets of Managua, Leon, and other towns painted on the walls in red.[101]

Sporadic nature of political activities.-- However, it would seem characteristic of such political action that it has been of a sporadic and disorganized nature. More enduring activities which require organization, such as strikes, and maintained and continuous propaganda seem to have been absent from the political arena save for the slightly more organized propaganda activities of the Liberal Nationalist Party during the last electoral campaign. For the last electoral contest, these activities began from the very first year of the Schick administration--that is to say, more than three years before the elections took place. Organized Opposition party activity, however, practically disappears in between elections save for sporadic action caused by particular incidents or problems.

Press and Radio.-- A final feature which would be important to review, concerns the activities of the press and radio. Most of the time, there exists in Nicaragua a great degree of freedom of expression, broader in the case of the written press than in radio broadcasting. There are, however, several enacted laws which give the Government wide powers to control or even censure and suppress newspapers and other media but which are seldom used.[102] They are used, and abused (that is to say, even action beyond the authority given by the laws is taken) when violent demonstrations, revolts, or guerrilla or revolutionary movements take place or

are about to take place and are viewed as dangerous by the government officials. At this moment the government, by the use of decrees and police force, suppress from print or from the air those items which are defined as inciting further opposition action.[103]

IV. SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER

The political system of Nicaragua functions within the geographic, ethnic, and economic characteristics which describe Nicaragua as: 1) a very small underdeveloped country with, 2) predominantly agricultural economy, 3) having a population highly homogeneous as to linguistic and ethnic characteristics with 4) a very low educational level and great differences as to economic and social status, living 5) in a territory still not heavily populated and 6) with relatively fertile soil and accommodating climatic conditions.

This political system has subsisted as a unit ever since the Spaniards organized the Guatemalan Captaincy-General in the XVI and XVII centuries but has suffered several changes in regimes.

The historical data presented indicate that: 1) Independence from Spain in 1821 was followed by a period of indecision which culminated in 1824 in 2) the organization of the Central American Federation of which Nicaragua was a state until civil war broke out resulting in 3) the establishment of Nicaragua as an independent state in 1838 after which it fell into a period of anarchy culminating in the National War which was ended in 1858; 4) this was followed by the establishment and consolidation of the conservative period known as "the thirty years" which ended after a revolutionary movement succeeded; 5) the "liberal" dictatorship of Zelaya begun in 1893 and was substituted after a long civil war by 6)the Conservative regime and the American occupation which lasted until 1933; 7) in that year the contemporary regime begins in which the Liberal Party and the National Guard were the dominant elements.

The contemporary regime has certain pecularities which can be summarized as follows: 1) it is a unitary and highly centralized government

divided into four branches of government among which the executive branch predominates; 2) there is a small but relatively well-organized army that monopolizes all governmental functions that require the use of army; 3) there is a relatively large bureaucracy loosely organized by the "official party" which dispenses patronage including positions to an "official opposition" party or coalition of parties and is opposed by one big but disorganized traditional party as well as by several minority parties; 4) political participation and political activity are relatively low-level and discontinuous, characterized by sporadic outbreaks of violence in the form of riots or invasions of emigre armies; and, 5) there is a great degree of freedom of press and radio interrupted by relatively short periods of repression usually coinciding with outbreaks of violence.

CHAPTER III

THE GROWING FLOW OF DEMANDS AND THE ADAPTATION OF THE SYSTEM

When a political system attempts to fulfill what according to Easton is the central function of political systems (authoritatively allocate values in society),[1] it is faced with demands for the allocation of the products of the economic and social systems in accordance with the diverse interests of the various sectors, groups, and individuals that are an integral part of society. But demands do not flow into a system at a constant rate. On the contrary, the rate at which they flow changes as a result of variations in the intra and extra-societal environments. A situation of rapid change, as the one in which developing countries find themselves in the 20th century, is likely to produce great increases in the amount of social wants that may potentially be transformed into effective demands. In accordance with our theoretical framework, however, political systems do manage to subsist even under conditions of rapid change because there are certain structural conditions and cultural norms that act upon the process of conversion of wants and demands keeping the system from getting into a demand overload condition that it could not successfully process. In addition if a system is to survive under such conditions, it has to adapt to the changes in the flow of demands and the environment by giving different and appropriate responses to different stimuli.

As the data discussed in the first part of this chapter will show, the years between 1950 and 1957 were years of continuous and rapid changes for Nicaragua. If the theoretical framework is correct, we should be able to find structural and cultural constraints acting upon the process of conversion of wants into demands and in ways which permit these demands to be processed within the system, so that their rate of flow is considerably reduced. In addition we should find also a series of important adaptive changes in the political and administrative

structure of the country. The second part of the chapter looks into the structural and cultural constraints while the third part analyzes the overall responses of the system. The examination of the specific demands that entered the system and the outputs into which they were processed are left for chapters IV and V.

I. ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES AND THE FLOW OF DEMANDS

Population Growth

As Hauser points out,[2] the rate of increase in the population of the world has accelerated dramatically in the last twenty years. This increase has led to concern over the possibilities of solving the problems presented by the increased need for food and other goods necessary to human subsistence. Nicaragua, together with the rest of Central America has been among those countries with higher rates of growth. While it has been estimated that the yearly rate of growth of the population in Nicaragua was somewhere between 1 and 1.5 per cent during the XVIII and IXX centuries, the corresponding figure for the first half of this century was 1.75%. This rate of growth has risen to 2.98% from 1950 to 1963, the years of the last two censuses.[3]

Current evidence indicates that this high rate has persisted from 1963 to the present. The Department of Statistics estimates that as of February 28, 1967, Nicaragua had a population of 1,757,914.[4] This figure can be expected to increase even more rapidly in the near future if birth control programs are not initiated with success. This has already happened in Costa Rica where better sanitary conditions resulting from governmental and private action, coupled with an undiminished birth rate have produced a yearly rate of growth of 4.0% in the last thirteen years.[5]

As Currie has demonstrated,[6] a rapid population growth rate is by itself a source of increasing pressure for a political system which must constantly strive for the development of its economic resources as a means of maintaining the same per capita level of need satisfaction.

In the case of Nicaragua, it should be pointed out that the population growth is due almost exclusively to the favorable ratio between birth and mortality rates, and not to immigration. This natural growth of the population affects its age distribution with the consequences that will be explained below. That immigration accounts for only a small portion of the population growth of the country is clearly demonstrated by the exceedingly low number of foreign-born people contained in the last census.[7] The immigration-emigration ratio seems to be negative rather than positive in Nicaragua. While it is reported than an average 595 persons per year have been accepted as new residents in Nicaragua in the last five years, an average of 867 have left the country to take residence abroad.[8]

Age Distribution

The conditions of stress that a rapid population growth rate by itself produces in a political system is considerably increased by the fact that any population growth-rate that results from the ratio between birth and mortality rates rather than immigration, effects the relationship between the economically productive segment of society and the total population. This effect occurs because the older and economically productive portion of the society decreases in size, while the younger and economically unproductive but demand-generating portion of the society rapidly increases in size. This is the current condition in Nicaragua where the population is becoming younger. Its median age was 15.9 years in 1963 and 18.2 in 1950; 65.8% of the population was younger than 25 years and 48.2% younger than 15 years. In 1950 the same age groups comprised only 63.2% and 43.3% of the total population. A comparison of the figures in the two censuses shows that not only is there a greater proportion of young people, but that the differential between the percentages of the several age groups is greater for the younger group. Thus, in the case of the group younger than 25, this difference was 2.6, while in the case of the group younger than 15 years, it was 4.9.[9]

The effect of these changes in age distribution on education alone, can be shown in part by the fact that the population between the ages of 6 and 13 years (primary school children) has grown at an

average yearly rate of 3.9% during the last thirteen years, 0.92% faster than the total population.[10]

Rural and Urban Population

The demographic picture of the country has also been altered with reference to the distribution of people between the urban and semi-urban centers and the countryside. These changes have a great impact on the flow of demands because, as Scott points out in Mexican Government in Transition, a politically active life begins for the people of underdeveloped countries only after they have come to the urban centers.[11] It is in the urban centers where the concentration of people in a very small area and their separation from the direct sources of the basic goods required for human life produce a greater interaction and an increasing need for complex social and economic organization. This process in turn gives place to a greater need for political allocation. In short, an increasing percentage of people living in urban centers require not only food, housing, and social integration, but also better sanitation, education, and local administration of the laws which lend order to society. These needs lead in turn to increasing demands made on the political system.

The percentage of people living in what the Census Department classifies as urban centers has in Nicaragua been increasing especially in the last 13 years. In 1950 the percentage of people classified as urban was 35.2%. This figure grew to 40.9% in 1963. The urban population underwent a growth of 70% during this same period, while the rural population grew by only 35.5%. The yearly rate of growth for Managua, the only urban center with more than 100,000 inhabitants, was 5.8% between the two censuses. This figure can be compared with 2.98% which corresponds to the rate of growth for the entire country.[12] According to the estimates of the Department of Statistics the changing distribution of the population between urban and rural centers has continued in the same direction after the census was made in 1963. The current estimated population of Managua for example was 284,087 as of February 28, 1967, while only 234,580 inhabitants were counted in 1963.[13] This rapid growth

of the urban centers is due mainly to immigration from the countryside since the average size of the urban families is slightly smaller than that of the rural families.[14]

In addition to the fact that a greater proportion of people are living in the urban or semi-urban centers those who remain in the countryside are being brought into contact with the urban centers through a considerable growth of the road system in the country. This system permits more interaction between the inhabitants of the city and countryside and between inhabitants of different cities. This development has resulted in the incorporation into the overall economic and social life of great sectors of the population which previously were self-sufficient and basically separated from national political activities and, therefore, did not serve as a source of demands made on the Nicaraguan political system.

While the railroads have remained without substantial increases in mileage of track and have become relatively less important as a means of transportation both for people and cargo, the length of the paved and all-weather roads have increased notably in recent years. In 1963, there were 5,441 kilometers of roads and some 640 additional kilometers were built after 1963. By contrasts there were only 970 kilometers in 1953.[15] At the same time, the number of passenger vehicles carrying people and cargo over these roads has grown notably: from 5,113 in 1953 to 22,270 in 1964.[16]

The effect of the development of the roads has been intensified by the growth in the size of the telephone network. In 1957, 6,332 telephones were installed. The number increased to 11,701 in 1963. There were also changes in the quality of service. In 1957 only one city, Managua, had automatic telephone service. By 1966 there were 11 cities with automatic installations including direct dialing services.[17] Statistics as to intensity of the use of city communications are not available. However, the following incomplete data may throw some light on this subject, showing that the telephone network might not only be used to capacity but actually could be working at overload capacity. First in Managua,

two extensions of telephone facilities have been necessary, one in 1958 and the other one still under completion. Secondly, the inter-city dialing service is such that during peak hours call-backs are required to get through from any one city to any of the other cities in the network.

It is practically impossible to obtain a reliable figure as to the number of radio receivers in use in Nicaragua. The system of accounting used in the Customs Service and known smuggling make estimates a matter of conjecture. However, as Lockley points out, the number has been multiplied several times over since the introduction into the market of the cheap portable transistor radio.[18] These radios sell for five or six dollars and can be seen everywhere both in towns and country. These radios along with the improved highway network and telephone system have created a communications network unique in the history of Nicaragua. This technological improvement has also made it easier to communicate more information at a more rapid rate; the net effect has been an increase in the volume and rate of demands made on the political system.

Education Factors

At the same time that communication facilities have produced an ever-growing percentage of people participating in the over-all social process, the educational structure of the country has also changed the level of participation in the system for the average person. However, the changes in this area have not been as rapid as the technical changes in communication. In a country with a level of development as low as that of Nicaragua, substantial increases in the number of educated people can be expected to produce at least corresponding increases in the level of participation in the social and economic life of the country. Consequently, the flow of demands presented to the political system can also be expected to increase.

An examination of the corresponding statistics shows that the level of education in the country as a whole has indeed increased in the period under study. In the first place the portion of the population considered to be illiterate has decreased from 62.6% to 49.2% from 1950 to 1963.[19] The percentage of people that have not completed as much as a

single year of school has diminished from 65.2% to 49.2% of the population older than 10 years of age. Furthermore, the percentage of the total population attending secondary schools and universities has in the same period increased from 0.75% to 1.23% for the secondary schools, and from 0.1% to 0.38% for the universities.[20] As small as these latter figures are, they nevertheless are an indication of the fact that changes are occurring at all levels of education.

Demands for Hospital Care

Demands for hospital care are also relevant. Although there are no available statistics for years prior to 1955, data indicating the number of patients seeking hospital care in that year can be compared with the figures available for 1962 and 1966. In 1955 there were 33,937 patients seeking care. This number increased to 62,084 in 1962 and to 76,540 in 1965.[21] It should be pointed out that this indicates a growth-rate considerably higher than the growth-rate of the total population and this, of course, creates an increase in the demand for the number of beds and other hospital services currently available.

The Economy

The demographic, educational, and communications factors discussed in the preceeding paragraphs do not of themselves account for the total flow of demands. The rapid growth of the Nicaraguan economy has also produced a multiplicative effect on the demand-rate of the political system. The gross national produce has grown rapidly and therefore the resources available for allocation have increased. This growth has been more rapid than that of the population, thereby increasing the amount and types of goods and services available for per capita distribution. The gross national product which had been growing at an average yearly rate of 5.5% between 1950 and 1960, has accelerated its yearly growth to an increase of 8.4% in 1963 to 1964 and an increase of 9.7% for the following year. The per capita gross national product on the other hand has grown at an average rate of 2.9% between 1950 and 1963. This rate went up to 3.26% for 1965, the last year for which figures are available.[22]

The increase in the growth of the different economic sectors in the national economy has been uneven. The average yearly growth from 1950 to 1963 of the service, industrial, and agricultural sectors has been 6.7%, 7.5% and 4.3% respectively.[23] It should be pointed out that the service and industrial sectors have grown considerably more rapidly than the agricultural sector. This is very important from the point of view of the increases in demands to the political system for the same reason that the growth of the urban population is important. The service and industrial activities are the signs of modern society and imply more complex and more intense social interaction. Consequently the need for political organization and allocation can be expected to grow at the same time.

As the Informe Anual for 1965 of the Banco Central indicates,[24] the rapid growth of the economy has produced a modern monetary economy with its attendant political consequences including the regulation of currency, tax and fiscal management, and the problems of trade and employment. This, coupled with the effect of the growth-rate of the communication network discussed earlier, produces an increase in the magnitude of political demands as well as an increase in the variety of sources from which these demands emanate.

The economic development of Nicaragua can be accounted for principally by the great increases in the production of cotton. The sale of this commodity on the world market has made cotton the main source of international currency.[25] In addition, cotton has had a tremendous impact on the social organization of the country because of the fact that it requires modern machinery and increased skill levels for its successful cultivation and marketing. The effect of this technological innovation can be seen everywhere beside the main roads crossing the Pacific and lake plains and even in some of the more remote areas, such as San Isidro, Sebaco and parts of Chontales. The main social impact of a cotton economy has been that of transforming the relationships between landowner and peasants into a monetary one. The colono system (in which land is lent to the peon in exchange for part of the crop produced on it) has disappeared from the Pacific belt, although it still exists in other parts

of the country such as Boaco, Matagalpa, Chontales and Jinotega where cotton is not an important part of the economy.[26] This has, so to say, liberated the peon from the haciendas increasing his ability to move from one place to another and to go to the urban centers to buy goods and to get in touch with more modern forms of life.

The number of manzanas of cotton under cultivation has grown from 23,945 in 1950 to 192,252 in 1965.[27] The high degree of modernization in agriculture that has been the result of the increase in cotton cultivation can be seen in the number of tractors and airplanes now in use in Nicaragua. In 1950 there were only 87 tractors; by 1964 there were 900 tractors.[28] The dusting and spraying fleet of small aircraft has grown from 0 to 123 in the same period of time.[29]

Advertising

The rapid economic growth has led to a great increase in advertising. The effect of advertising on economic demand is a matter of general knowledge. Its indirect impact on political demands however, deserves consideration. The constant repetition of slogans and other means designed to induce consumption can be expected to have a marked effect on the people who are subject to a continuous flow of publicity. This publicity produces desires for greater income, as a means of obtaining the products and services advertised. In Nicaragua there is evidence of a constant pressure for higher wages which manifests itself in the form of strikes in the main urban centers and in the form of unorganized walk-outs from work among the agricultural workers. These problems will be discussed specifically in the subsequent chapters. They are mentioned here only to make the point that advertising has an impact on the increase in the flow of demands. This pressure eventually reflects on the political system, even more greatly in an underdeveloped country than in a developed one, because the existing level of consumption is minimal. The fact that most of the advertised products are made in foreign countries creates problems relating to balance of payments, and these problems are generally assumed to require governmental action. In this way what is essentially economic becomes a source of political demands.

Advertising has grown dramatically during the period under consideration. It was impossible to get data as to the percentage of the gross national product invested in advertising, but it is possible to obtain a picture of this growth by means of other indicators. For example, the use of major advertisement displays along the main roads was begun after 1950 and has grown with the road net ork. At the same time, but beginning much earlier, there were ready evidence of all kinds of advertisements pasted or painted everywhere from the walls of houses and buildings to the roadways, streetcurbs, telephone and electricity poles, and even roacks along the roadways.

In 1950 there were only two specialized advertising agencies in the country; by 1965 there were 24 such agencies. The importance of the development of advertising can also be shown by the fact that in 1964 there were 50 private radio stations and two television stations obtaining practically all their revenue from this type of activity. When this is compared to conditions in 1950, one finds that there were only eight radio and no television stations. The fact that radio receivers are widely used in Nicaragua makes it clear that the whole population is within the reach of commercial and political advertising.[30]

External Environment

The reception of information about the way of living in industrialized countries is an important factor in generating the social unrest which characterizes life in the underdeveloped countries in the twentieth century. This reception is transmitted through advertising, the movies, travel, study abroad, and tourism, to list a few sources. The focus on life in the industrialized nations is enhanced because the majority of goods advertised are foreign-made consumer goods.

The number of students going out of Nicaragua in order to attend universities and high schools in other countries is considerable. The number of students in foreign universities was estimated at 250 in 1950 and had grown to 782 in 1964. In 1960 the number of students in foreign universities accounted for 42% of the total number of Nicaraguan students. In 1964 it had decreased to 25%. These figures give an idea of the demand

for higher education that exists in Nicaragua.[31]

Movie attendance has grown at an average yearly rate of 8% between 1950 and 1965. In 1965 there were 158 movie houses in the country. It is appropriate to note that since there is no movie industry in Nicaragua, films come from foreign countries more highly developed than Nicaragua. The main sources for movie films are the United States (45%), Mexico (30%) and Europe (18%).[32]

Travel facilities have also grown considerably. At the same time, passport and visa requirements have been eased as a result of international agreements and the pressure coming from tourists desiring entrance and exit from the country. In 1950, the personal authorization of the President of the Republic was required before a Nicaraguan could get a passport to leave the country. At the present time passports may be obtained with minor bureaucratic delays directly from the Migration Office in Managua. Travel agencies may also secure them for the traveler. There are at present 14 travel agencies in the country as compared to two such agencies in 1950. Air passenger movement between 1960 and 1963 rose 25%. The country was served in 1950 by two airlines; and by 1963, 15 airlines carried passengers and cargo.[33] At the same time, the Pan American Highway was built during the period, connecting Nicaragua with the rest of Central America and North American countries. This facility has increased travel and trade notably. Within the Central American region alone, intra-regional trade has grown from 8.3 million dollars in 1950 to 141.9 million in 1965.[34]

Central American Integration

The trade figures just cited point to an added factor in the development of the flow of demands in Nicaragua. The increase in intra-regional trade in Central America has been the result of the Common Market effort which has created problems for the political system of the country because of the divergent interests of those who expect to benefit from the Common Market and those who think otherwise.

International Missions

Another factor relating to the role of external influence, is that

of the continued presence of international missions in Nicaragua. At present there are several of them ranging from the Agency for International Development and the UNESCO mission for education to the Military Aid Mission of the United States to the National Guard of Nicaragua. They bring a great number of people to the country who together with the numerous representatives and technicians of foreign industrial companies accentuate the impact of foreign influence on the flow of demands. As examples of the latter, Siemens and Bayer, German producers of electric and telephonic equipment, the Campagnie de Grand Travaux de Marseille builders of the Mancotal Dam, Esso Standard, producers of gasoline and other oil products, several companies engaged in the sale of insecticides and fertilizers such as Diamond Alkali and Olin Mathieson could be mentioned. They have established factories or shops in Nicaragua, training many Nicaraguans, and therefore have an effect on the ways of life of the country.

Political Influences

The reception of influence from more highly developed societies is not limited to the economic technical and cultural aspects that have just been discussed. It also affects the political and ideological aspects of the system. In the case of Nicaragua, the reception of foreign influence could be seen very early in its colonial and independent history as evidenced by the influence of the liberal credo in whose name the very first revolutions were fought dividing the country into those who were for universal education, confiscation of the land of the Church and generous provisions in favor of civil rights and those who thought these changes would be against Nicaraguan traditions and would even destroy the country they were trying to save. The Guerra Nacional was in great part fought around these issues that were not settled until the 1893 Revolution.[35] The influence of the socialist ideologies and connected movements began to be felt in a relatively recent period as evidenced by the starting of the first workers' organizations in the early 20's, the foundation of the Socialist Party of Nicaragua and the inclusion in the 1939 Constitution of several principles tending to permit the regulation of labor relations and the establishment of land reform.[36]

The impact of constant ideological propaganda cannot be easily

dismissed in Latin America; in Nicaragua this seems especially significant. The period during and after the end of the second world war saw a series of democratically inspired coups and popular revolutionary movements. Some of them like those in Brazil, (against Vargas) Venezuela, (against Medina Angarita) Guatemala, (against Ubico) and El Salvador (against Hernandez Martinez) were successful. Some, as the 1944 movement in Nicaragua did not succeed. Their occurrence in proximity with the propaganda supporting representative democracy which developed during the war cannot be overlooked.

Two factors have recently accentuated the impact of the ideologies and their effects on the concept of the role of the state in the social and economic development of non-industrialized countries. The Cuban Revolution is one of them and the Alliance for Progress is the other. Both of these gave rise to intense propaganda campaigns that have accelerated the rate of flow of political demands. Their impact is still being felt.

This impact is clearly shown by two significant recent examples: 1) The inaugural address of President Somoza Debayle was dedicated to demonstrating that his programs are in accordance with the ends of the Alliance for Progress and that in fact during his campaign he even anticipated the Declarations of the American Presidents signed in Punta de Este on April 14, 1967.[37] 2) There are in Nicaragua several pro-Castro organizations. The Republican Mobilization Party and the Nicaraguan Socialist Party among political organizations and the Sandinist Front of National Liberation, among insurgent organizations, the Student's Revolutionary Front (FER) within the student organizations and some of the labor unions.

Both of these movements have stressed in different ways and by different means, the need for rapid growth and a just distribution of the products of society; the responsibility of the people and government in obtaining both of these goals, and; the paramount importance of political action and ideologies in the process of development of the Latin American countries. Their effect on the flow of political demands can be noticed

everywhere in the area. They have added speed and strength to what has been called the revolution of rising expectations.

Recapitulation

In sum, the data examined in this part of the third chapter has shown that there have been in Nicaragua between 1950 and 1967 rapid internal demographic, educational and economic changes that together with the reception of the technical, cultural, economic, and political influences coming from more developed societies have produced the structural conditions that support a considerable increase in the magnitude and rate of flow of social needs and wants and of demands entering the political system of the country.

Since it has been shown in Chapter II that the Nicaraguan political system has subsisted during the period discussed here and continues to exist at this time, the next questions of concern relate to the constraints that work at the periphery of the system. How does the periphery of the system lessen the flow of demands reducing the possibilities of excessive strain? Can we find in Nicaragua factors such as difficulties in communications, lack of education, or cultural norms that would tend to negate in part the effects of the socio-economic ghanges undergone by the nation? In what way do they affect the flow of potential and actual demands entering and being processed by the political system? These questions are taken up in the following part of the chapter.

II. STRUCTURAL AND CULTURAL CONSTRAINTS

The socio-economic conditions of Nicaragua that were just discussed indicated the existence of a changing environment characterized by a rapid development of the conditions that can be expected to produce a considerable increase in the amount of social needs and wants and consequently in the flow of demands entering the political system.

The fact that the political system of Nicaragua has been able to tolerate this condition points to the existence, in accordance with our theoretical framework, of certain characteristics of the socio-economic

structure and the political culture of the country that tend to lessen and retard the process of conversion of wants into demands and the rate at which the resulting demands are processed by the political system.

Structural Constraints

In the first place, we found that the process of conversion of wants into demands is affected adversely by the level of development of Nicaragua that is still very low. The changes that have been described acquire their importance as sources of stress only when compared with the extremely low level of development found in 1950 and to which the political system was adapted initially.

Demographic structure.-- In effect, an examination of the figures cited in the second and third chapters shows that the population density of Nicaragua is not high, except for the more important urban centers like Managua, Masaya, and Leon. The majority of the population still lives in the countryside or in semi-urban areas. Low percentages of urban dwellers and a low population density do not give rise to the complex social structure characteristic of highly urbanized societies and for which high levels of political allocation are necessary.

Economic development.-- Even if the per capita gross national product of Nicaragua has risen sharply in the last seventeen years, its economy is still that of an underdeveloped country. The greatest part of the population lives within an economic structure characterized by low productivity and primitive levels of organization which do not compare favorably with those of more developed societies nor with the production and organization levels of the industrial and service sectors of the Nicaraguan economy which are still comparatively of a low level. This means that the degree of active participation of most of the population in the overall economic system of the country is not high even today. Consequently, the percentage of people demanding action from the political system cannot be expected to be high.

Level of education.-- The educational structure aids also in keeping the flow of political demands at a low level. It acts by reducing the rate of conversion of wants into demands because people with little or no education tend to keep from complaining or acting even if they are aware

of their needs. That this is true with respect to Nicaragua was confirmed by the results of the survey explained in page below. Nicaragua has in reality a high proportion of illiterate people and of persons with no formal education at all. The number of people who have completed primary and secondary school is very low. This same is true of the number of graduates from the universities.

Communications deficiencies.-- Although the communications network of Nicaragua has undergone a considerable growth in the last seventeen years, it is still quite deficient as a means of promoting participation in the political life of the country as a network of more developed societies would. The number of telephones, motor vehicles, newspapers and other indicators is still very low. The same is true of the network of roads that cross the national territory. These factors do not of themselves permit the technical, cultural and political reception of foreign influence to have the full effect it could have if it were to reach all segments of the population more effectively.

Political organizations.-- As it is explained in Chapters II and IV[38] in Nicaragua there are only small cadre or unorganized caudillo parties, whose basis consist of loyalty to their leader and not to specific programs. Our survey confirms that there is little participation by the people in political organizations or in what may be called pressure groups. That means that in Nicaragua the appropriate vehicles for effective and continuous political action are missing. These vehicles are missing because of, 1) the lack of adequate structures for channeling demands to pressure the political system for action; and 2) the deficient demographic, economic, educational and communications structures which act as structural constraints reducing the flow of demands, by slowing down the rate of conversion of wants into demands, or by failing to provide the adequate means to present demands to the political system for processing into appropriate outputs.

Cultural Constraints

In accordance with proposition 2-a of our theoretical framework, structural constraints are not alone in explaining why the Nicaraguan

political system has been able to subsist in the face of a changing environment. There are also certain cultural norms that considerably reduce the flow of demands presented to the system diminishing even more the probabilities of a demand overflow that could become dangerous from the point of view of the system.

In order to investigate the existence of such cultural constraints, a survey was conducted in one of the cities of Nicaragua under the conditions and specifications that are explained below.

The survey.-- In the preliminary research stages, it was thought that a survey of the whole Nicaraguan population might be attempted. However, the serious difficulties of administering a survey in the countryside and remote areas of an underdeveloped country which made Almond and Verba reduce their Mexican survey to the urban areas of that country, also required in this case the elimination of such a country-wide approach. The alternative chosen was the administration of a survey in a middle-sized town with a social and economic periphery of rural elements.

It was assumed that conclusions could be drawn from a sample of this urban and semi-urban population and that this data would be useful especially since the rural population participates minimally in the political life of the country.

The town of Leon is of medium size, smaller than Managua but larger than all other small urban centers. It does not have the serious population problems of Managua, but it already has the complexities of urban life made evident by traffic jams, modern department stores, banks and a university. It provides a cross-section of urban and semi-rural life. Thus a sample drawn from its inhabitants could be considered a representative of the varieties of life which combine to produce the Nicaraguan polity.

As of January 31, 1967, the population of Leon was 57,180 inhabitants. The universe of the survey was not however the whole population, it took into consideration only those who were older than 18 years of age which on that date amounted to 28,428.[39]

The sample size was fixed at 309. This figure was determined in order to obtain a level of confidence of .95 at 3 , with a± 6% margin of tolerable error, and on the basis of a 50% distribution for all questions. It also included a 15% security margin for possible refusals and other contingencies which, as will be seen below, did affect the response rate.

A questionnaire of 49 questions was submitted to the subjects that were chosen. A copy of the questionnaire is available in Appendix B. The survey was carried out with the aid of three full-time and three part-time interviewers and a field supervisor who was a graduate student of the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales of Santiago, Chile. The survey was prepared and the interviewers trained and briefed from December 26, 1966 to January 5, 1967.

During that period the questionnaire was pre-tested. In the pre-test stage, tentative questionnaires were submitted to two groups of thirty individuals each chosen at random from within the city. Several corrections were made, some questions added and others eliminated in order to minimize the ambiguity of individual questions, to eliminate or re-word questions that could cause a negative attitude on the part of the subjects and to secure the type of information which the questions were designed to measure.

The final version of the questionnaire was submitted to the selected sample during the weeks from January 6 to February 1, 1967. It had been originally planned that the survey would be completed by January 25. However, the violent and bloody political events which took place in Managua on Roosevelt Avenue and at the Gran Hotel on January 22 (described in Chapter IV, p.130), made it advisable to suspend the interviews for a few days during the crisis.

The sample was drawn using random numbers in order to select 103 blocks out of the total number of blocks (288) of the city of Leon. Three housing units were clustered in each block. Each housing unit was then selected by random numbers on the basis of block maps drawn by the

interviewers during the preparatory stage of the survey. This substitute procedure was used in view of the fact that it was impossible to obtain data about the number of housing units in each block of the city because these were not computed during the 1963 census and were therefore unavailable.

Each questionnaire began with two preliminary questions that permitted the selection of the respondent in each of the chosen housing units with the use of a key (see Appendix B, page 2) taken from Backstrom and Hursh's Survey Research manual.[40] There were no major incidents during the survey except those already mentioned and the suspension which did occur was due to circumstances not connected with the survey itself.

There were 38 refusals and two voided questionnaires. These figures added to vacant houses and persons not found reduced the number of answered questionnaires to 251. (See Table 2 below) This number of useable responses was 16 short of the 267 required by the confidence level and margin of error fixed in the planning stage. The latter were computed on the basis of an expected 50/50 proportion in the possible answers to give the survey the highest possible security margin. The actual answers however, were far from being divided in accordance with such proportion (see Table 6 containing the survey results in Appendix A) and therefore, the number of respondents needed to obtain the same level of confidence and margin of error for each individual question was smaller than anticipated. The final return rate was 81%.

TABLE 2

General Results of the Survey

Total number of questionnaires submitted	309
Vacant houses	8
Refusals to answer preliminary questions	18
Persons not found after required number of calls	10
Refusals to answer questionnaires	20
Void answered questionnaires	2
Questionnaires answered satisfactorily	251
Sample size required for a confidence limit and margin of error set for a 50% distribution	267
Return Rate	81%

The Survey Results and the 1963 Census

Some of the questions included in the survey related to the general characteristics of the respondents. They could be compared with the corresponding figures obtained by the Statistics Department during the 1963 census in order to test for the representativeness of the sample.

The respondents were classified by sex. Of these, 36.6% were males and 63.4% females. This distribution differs slightly from the data in the 1963 census which found 40.8% to be male and 59.2% to be female. However, if the persons who could not be found and those who refused to answer the questionnaire properly are considered, the two sets of percentages become so close that their differences are negligible, given the confidence limit and margin of error of the sample. Utilizing these figures, the sex distribution of the respondents become 39.9% males and 60.1% females. See Table 3 for comparisons of the corresponding percentages.

TABLE 3

Sex Distribution of Respondents and of the Population of Leon

	(1963 Census)	Survey	Refusals and not found included
Males	40.2%	36.6%	39.1%
Females	59.8%	63.4%	60.9%

Except for secondary school and university graduates the distribution of the respondents by levels of education corresponds closely with that of the population of Leon according to the census. For a comparison of both, see Table 4 below.

TABLE 4

Educational Level of the Population of Leon

	1963 Census	Survey
Literate	84.3%	88.4%

TABLE 4 continued	1963 Census	Survey
No School	17.6%	16.7%
Some Primary School	68.8%	64.2%
Secondary School Grads.	2.0%	10.3%
University Graduates	1.3%	1.6%

The divergence as to the percentage of people with secondary and university education may be explained to some extent by two factors. First, the figure given by the census is computed on the basis of people 10 years or older, while the sample is based on people 18 years or older. Obviously there are very few secondary school graduates and no university graduates among those between the ages of 10 and 18.

Secondly, the fact that the census was taken in April 1967 when the National University and the high schools were on vacation while the survey was made in January, 1967, when students were attending classes is also quite relevant. It should be noted that 63% of the students in the Leon section of the University of Nicaragua come from other cities.[41]

The age groups found in the survey also showed negligible differences in comparison with those found in the census. The results of the survey, those of the 1963 census and the differences in percentages can be found in Table 5.

TABLE 5

Age Groups found in Survey Compared With Those of the 1963 Census In Percentages Over Total Population

Age Group	1963 Census	Survey	Differences in percentages
18-24	24.3%	26.7%	2.4
25-29	13.5	11.9	1.6
30-34	10.0	9.9	1.0
35-39	11.4	13.9	2.5
40-44	8.4	9.1	.7
45-49	7.0	5.9	1.1
50-54	5.8	4.8	1.0
55-59	4.6	4.4	.2
60-64	4.8	2.7	2.1

TABLE 5 continued

Age Group	1963 Census	Survey	Differences in percentages
65-74	5.5	4.4	1.1
75 or more	3.8	2.7	1.1
Average difference in percentages for all age groups			1.3

A few comments about the refusal rate and the refusal to answer some of the questions are appropriate before the substantive results of the survey are examined. The percentage of refusals to answer the preliminary questions was not high (6%). Only 7.2% refused to answer the rest of the questionnaire after the preliminary questions had been answered. This is not a high refusal rate.

It should be noted here, that the percentage of refusals was higher after the interruption of the survey on January 22. Approximately 4% of the subjects refused to be interviewed before that date; more than 10% of them did not want to answer the questionnaire after the events. This was undoubtedly the effect of the fear of possible reprisal or general uneasiness intensified by the security measures taken after the events.

If one takes into account the number of respondents who refused to answer or said they had no opinion on the questions related to social and political issues included at the end of the questionnaire (questions 39 through 49), it would seem that Nicaraguans have a relatively high rate of interest in political questions. Of the 4.4% who did not give an answer, 3.2% did not have an opinion and 1.2% did not answer the 11 questions mentioned above. The same is true of the questions related to the state of affairs in the municipality and the central government (See Table 6 in Appendix A).

The survey also discovered that a large majority of the respondents had registered in the electoral rolls in November 1966. Eighty-four percent of the respondents answered Question 35 in the affirmative. However, it should be noted that 72.5% of them said that they were <u>not</u> planning to vote in the February elections even though they had registered,

(question 37).

Attitude Toward Government-Intervention

The attitude of the people seemed favorable toward government intervention to solve social and economic problems. In effect, 91.1% of the respondents agreed that the government should do more than it is doing for the people (question 41). The respondents took the position that the government should, for example, distribute land among the peasants - a position with which 92.3% agreed (question 42); 82.4% did not think that if the government left the people alone things would be much better, and 60.9% disagreed with the statement that the government should limit itself to keeping the peace and protecting property (questions 49 and 43).

A great majority, 97.5% agreed with the proposition that governmental action should be directed to enforcing existing labor legislation to protect the workers (question 44), 95.2% to keep immoral movies from theaters, and 88.4% to force landlords to keep rental houses in good repair (questions 45 and 48). Only 56.9% on the other hand agreed that the government should force employees to fulfill their duties rather than helping them to force employers to pay them compensation for the several conditions established in the labor code. A scant 35.9% agreed with the statement that government should see that tenants be forced out when they did not pay their rent (questions 46 and 47).

This set of responses suggests a relationship between the socio-economic characteristics of the respondent and their responses. The attitudes of the subjects in reference to work, compensation and houses for rent, could be expected from a sample taken from an urban population in which a majority of the people belonged to low social strata where compensation and rent are part of their everyday experience. It would have been interesting to correlate such figures with data such as whether the respondents were self-employed or not and whether they owned the house in which they lived. However, such questions were not included in the questionnaire.

On the question referring to land reform however, the strong agreement that was found was not expected from a sample composed of urban dwellers containing only 4% of farmers. Only 4% of the respondents (three out of ten farmers included) disagreed with the question and only 3.7% either refused to answer or did not have an opinion on the subject. Although the number of responses is small, this suggests some relationship with the insistence that agrarian reform is a panacea for social and political problems, which is characteristic of modern Latin America politics on all sides of the political spectrum and is an example of the influence of the external environment on internal political demands.

Dissatisfaction with Government Performance

In addition to the general attitude measured by these questions, the survey showed that most people were dissatisfied with the state of public affairs both in the case of things which are within the purview of municipal government and those which are of concern to the central government. Some 70.1% of the subjects were dissatisfied with the services rendered by the municipality in Leon; 17.2% thought that such services were in a critical state and 52.9% thought they were bad. Only 21.7% were somewhat satisfied with the state of affairs and 6.3% considered themselves quite satisfied with the service situation (ques. 10).

A large majority of the respondents, 78%, felt that the actions of the central government did not benefit them directly and 7.8% thought that they were actually harmed by the actions of the central government. Only 7.2% thought they received some benefits, and 12.4% considered themselves benefitted by central government action (ques. 19). The reaction against taxes was even stronger, 82.4% thought that they were getting nothing or much less than was given in return for their taxes. Only 11.2% thought the balance between service and taxes was satisfactory (ques. 20).

Willingness to Act

Exactly 83.6% of the subjects agreed that it was proper for newspapers to publish and radio stations to broadcast in their news programs

complaints about the treatment received by people in the government offices and about the attention received or lacking from officials in charge of public affairs.

The people who were interviewed were also willing to initiate action to obtain satisfaction of their wants. Seventy-five percent said they would try to do something to get better service from the municipal authorities in Leon (ques. 11); 84.8% to avoid unwanted taxes, and 86.9% to acquire certain things like new schools or roads which are matters involving the central government (questions 21 and 22).

Most people considered organizing groups of neighbors, friends, or interested persons as the preferred means for getting things done. The second choice was: 1) to visit the appropriate office for local affairs, and 2) to sign a petition for business relating to the central government (questions 12, 13, 23 and 24). This difference in the second choice corresponds to the fact that most central government business would have to be personally transacted in Managua, and the inconvenience and cost makes such contact less desirable.

Actual Demands

Almond and Verba[42] in their cultural survey of Mexico found similar conditions, and tried to check as to how many of those who were ready to act and who were dissatisfied with actual conditions had in reality done any of the things they suggested they were ready to do by their responses to the Almond-Verba Survey. We expected similar results in Nicaragua, and tested for this factor. All 77.1% of those who reported readiness to act said they had never done anything in relation to the municipal government (ques. 15), and 83.3% said the same thing in relation to the central government (ques. 26). Only 3.0% and 1.8% respectively had actually done anything four or more times. It was also found that most of the respondents who mentioned talking to a public employee as the means they would use to get something done, mentioned when asked to identify him, officials who were not connected with the matter under question (ques. 14) such as mentioning the Jefe Politico for agricultural

matters or the Sanitation officer for educational matters. In addition to that, the respondents who said they would talk to somebody who could help them mentioned influential friends rather than public officials when asked to identify the kind of person they would contact to "get something done". In the case of the central government, 56% did mention friends rather than public officials (question 25).

It was mentioned earlier that the organization of groups was one course of action which the respondents preferred. However, when asked whether they actually belonged to some organization (question 7), only 44 of them, or 17% of the sample, acknowledge being members of any group at all. When these 44 were asked to place the organization to which they belonged in political or non-political categories (question 8), only 3 persons (1.2%) belonged to a political organization and scarcely 7.1% of the sample were members of what may in the broadest of forms be considered as pressure groups. These figures tend to confirm Almond and Verba's conclusions that in small developing countries the number of organizations and the size of their membership is low as compared to the situation in the more developed countries. Almond and Verba found for example, that 24% of their sample in Mexico belonged to voluntary organizations while 57% of the United States' sample did. As was just mentioned, only 17% of the Nicaraguan sample were members of such organizations.[43]

When the respondents were asked whether they went to any governmental offices in Leon or Managua for things like complaining about the state of streets, getting information about agricultural activities, etc., they answered for the most part that they never went to these offices (61.8% for Leon and 69.8% for Managua). Only 2.4% said they often went to such offices in Leon and only 2% did so in Managua. The rest said that they had been to them just occasionally (question 30 and 32). Furthermore, the governmental offices that had been visited most in Leon were those which rendered certain services for which advertising campaigns are made. For example, 70.8% of the persons asked to identify the offices they had been to, mentioned the sanitary station where vaccination-campaigns and free X-ray diagnosis for tuberculosis were available. Just

a few mentioned agricultural extension, the Jefatura Politica or the Public Education inspectorship.

The effect of education on the flow of demands was evident because all of the university graduates were among those who acted in order to get better municipal or central governmental services. The same effect was evident among those who often went to governmental offices. All of those who had often gone to government offices were persons who said they could read and write well, and of this group 80% had at least finished primary education. This seems to confirm the hypothesis that a low level of education produces a correspondingly low rate of flow of demands.

Reasons for the Lack of Action

The questions designed to investigate the reasons for this apparent contradiction between disposition and action did not provide conclusive evidence. Questions 18 and 29 seem to us now to have been incorrectly designed in this respect and consequently cannot be used for this specific purpose. Question 24 introduced a second contradiction in the answers of the respondents. All 72.1% of those who were asked why they did not visit government offices said that they had never needed anything from government offices. This obviously does not fit with the fact that most of them had previously complained about the sad state of affairs both in the central government and the municipality and about how little they received in exchange for their taxes. This response would seem more a ready made excuse than a real answer to the question presented.

Many of the respondents (questions 18, 29 and 34) thought that they would not get any attention and therefore that there was no use in complaining because public officials did not pay any attention to public demands made individually. This would seem to point to a process of feedback in which information about the inefficiency of the system or its lack of sympathy for the population serves as a barrier that reduces the demand for services southt from the system. This proposition however, needs further investigation in a subsequent study. The evidence

presented here suggests that this is a hypothesis worth testing.

Conclusions of the Survey

The findings of the survey seem to confirm the hypothesis that there are in Nicaragua cultural constraints which affect the process of the conversion of wants into demands by the political system. They add their effect to the conditions in the demographic and social structure of the country which also affects the process of conversion, so that together they keep the system from being stressed beyond its capabilities. These cultural constraints inhibit the full effect of the rapid changes in the population and economic development, and other factors which tend to increase the size and rate of the flow of demands.

In Nicaragua there also is evidence that even though a majority of people are aware of the importance of government action in social and economic matters and of the unsatisfactory performance of government offices, they do not seek to satisfy these needs through political means. In short, they see government as important but not as an effective agent to meet and process their most pressing needs. Only a small percentage of the people, usually those with a relatively high level of education do in reality take action. In addition, there seem to be very few political structures which are sufficiently organized to translate this action into effective demands. The lack of organized structures is a result of the fact that only a small percentage of people belong to organizations. Those who do belong tend to be joiners, and consequently even if they seem to be willing to act, they do not know how to translate their groups into effective vehicles of pressure and demand.

In the second chapter it was stated that Nicaraguan political activities tended to be sporadic rather than sustained or permanent.[44] This may also result from the lack of organizations available to sustain countinuous pressure or action. So it is that action seems likely only when an effective grouping procedure is present to take up this absence or permanent group activity. In Nicaraguan history, this grouping seems a function of catalysts like caudillos such as Maximo Jerez, Jose Santos

Zelaya, Emiliano Chamorro, or Fernando Aguero or crisis events such as those of July 1944, July and August 1959, and January 1967.

III. THE ADAPTATION OF THE SYSTEM

The structural and cultural constraints just described were not the only cause for the subsistence of the Nicaraguan political system. If it is possible to find that the system responded to the rapid changes in the population, the economy, and the social conditions of the country, with corresponding changes in the amounts of money invested in public services, in the organization of public administration, and with the enactment of a considerable amount of legislation, intended to cope with these problems, then proposition 2-b (page above) would be confirmed.

The National Budget

An examination of the national budgets for the years between 1950 and 1967 shows considerable changes both in the amount of money spent, and in the distribution of public expenditures.[45] They grew from 81.4 million cordobas in 1950 to 527.6 million in 1966. The current budget authorizes 673.4 million cordobas for the government to spend during 1967. If we relate these figures with those corresponding to gross national product for the same years the changes are still more impressive. Thus, in 1950 the GNP of Nicaragua was estimated at 1,481.6 million cordobas and consequently the budget for that year was 4.4% of the corresponding GNP. With a GNP of 3,786.2 million in 1966 the corresponding percentage is 13.9%. If we add these figures to the budgets for the autonomous agencies existing at the time, the percentages become 4.8% and 19.2% respectively. In relation to the demographic growth of the country the increase in budget expenditure is also quite considerable. The per capita expenses of government agencies in 1950 were 60 cordobas. In 1962 that figure had grown to 170 and in 1966 to 300 cordobas.[46]

Important changes have also taken place as to the distribution of the expenditures of government. While in 1950 under the headings of education, public works (mainly roads) and health only 26% of the total

budget was allocated, in 1960 that figure had grown to 37.5% and to 43.2% in 1966. The current budget allocated for the three above-mentioned headings 51.2% of its total authorized expenditures. This does not include the amount of money spent for health purposes by the Social Security Institute, which did not exist in 1950. Its inclusion raises the last mentioned percentage to 56.3%.[47]

For education the changes have accelerated somewhat in the last five years or so, due perhaps to the influence of the Alliance for Progress programs that have insisted on education as an investment for development rather than as an expenditure.[48] Thus, as in 1961 the budget used for education was 13.9% of the total national expenditures. In 1967 the budget allocated 17.77% for the same purpose.[49] As a consequence of this, while there were 1,946 primary public schools in 1962, there were 2,300 in 1965.[50]

Public Debt

In order to provide for these great increases in public expenditures the Nicaraguan government and governmental agencies have had to considerably increase their public debt. It amounted to 51.0 million cordobas in 1950. In 1966 it had gone up to 669.0 million.[51] Most of this money, 77.7% has come from abroad, that is to say, from international banking institutions and foreign governments. While in 1951 Nicaragua had a foreign public debt of 2.6 million dollars, it owed 74.4 million in 1966. This figure does not include the 32.7 million dollars owed at the time by private Nicaraguan debtors.[52]

To a great extent this discrepancy determines the position that Nicaragua takes in foreign policy in order to keep open the credit it so badly needs. This position usually is tied to the policies of the United States.[53] This is exemplified by the following figures: of the 74.4 million dollars cited above, 39.8 million had been loaned by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and other international institutions and 28.3 million by financing institutions of the United States.[54]

Tax Increases

Another source of financing for public spending have been increases in the amount of money collected through taxes. This amount has grown automatically as a result of the increases in GNP and the ever greater amount of it spent to buy foreign goods. This has been so because: 1) the main single source of income of government in Nicaragua are taxes on imports (31.9% of the 1966 budget income),[55] and 2) because the ratio imports/GNP has gone from 11.7% in 1950 to 33.6% in 1966.[56]

This has not sufficed however, and several specific new taxes on consumer goods were enacted. As examples of the latter, taxes on the bales of cotton ginned (1952), coffee sacks (1953) and slaughtered cattle (1961) could be mentioned. In addition some other indirect taxes have also been increased such as those imposed on contracts (1962), cigarettes (1953, 1961, 1965), sugar (1962), cement (1962) and air travel (1965).[57]

The trend to increase taxation became more evident after 1961 because import duties decreased a little as a result of Central American Common Market agreements. However, a tendency to rely more on direct taxes began. In effect while in 1950 indirect taxes amounted to 78.1% of the total government budget, they accounted for only 62.1% of that amount in 1966. In 1962, the income tax (established already in 1952) was raised. In the same year the taxes on real estate and inheritance were increased and a new tax on chattels was established.[58] These increases, by the way, caused considerable turmoil, a condition which will be analyzed in Chapter V.

One of the problems that had to be considered was that of the efficiency of the tax collecting agencies of government that were dispersed in several dependencies of the Ministry of Hacienda. This was dealt with in June 1957 by reorganizing these units into one single tax collecting office called the Direccion General de Ingresos and by subsequently enacting a General Internal Revenue Regulating statute.[59]

Administrative Organizations

The problem of which agency and how each agency spent public funds was also a problem dealt with by the system during the period studied here. Faced with great problems of inefficiency, that in turn were made issues by the opposition parties and some pressure groups, the government responded by creating several separate governmental agencies, that work with a relative degree of autonomy. Such agencies are called, entes autonomos and their establishment was legally authorized by the 1950 Constitution.[60] Faced with problems of inefficiency, the system has reacted in most cases with the establishment of new, autonomous agencies probably because it is easier than attempting to reorganize or change the procedures of existing ones.

In 1950 only three such agencies existed, the National Bank, the Pacific Railroads (bought from its American owners in the 1920's) and the Caja Nacional de Credito Popular (CNCP) established to provide loans for poor people. On the other hand, by 1967 there were sixteen operating autonomous agencies, and two more were in the process of being created. They have operational budgets of 201.7 million cordobas amounting to 5.3% of the gross national product.[61]

The succession of new autonomous agencies began in 1953. In that year the National Institute for Development (INFONAC) was created.[62] It actually works as a bank and was set up to provide for long-term and somewhat risky loans designed for development rather than profit, and for situations that the existing regulations and working routines of the National Bank did not permit. In 1966 it had loans for 91.2 million cordobas and investments in development projects of 23.1 million.[63]

In 1954 the National Power and Light Enterprise (ENALUF) was set up to regulate and eventually take over the production of electricity in the whole country.[64] At present, it produces 74.0% of the electricity used in Nicaragua (66.8% in 1963). It accounts for practically all of the increases in electrical power of the country (from 35.9 MW in 1954) to (135.9 MW in 1966). Public investment is necessary because private investments have remained stationary because of the eventual takeover by

ENALUF.[65] In 1956 the National Social Security Institute (INSS) was established.[66] It began by covering only a small sector of the employed population of Managua. At present, it covers several adjacent towns and is scheduled to extend its services soon as the towns in the Northwest part of the country. In 1957 there were 11,706 registered members, in 1953, 35,144 and in 1966, 53,047.[67] Three years later, in April 1959, the Nicaraguan Institute for Housing was set up in order to organize the construction of housing developments and the canalization of funds for the building of housing mainly through loans. It was subsequently reorganized, (to meet the requirements that the Interamerican Development Bank put forward to get Alliance for Progress funds) into the Housing Bank in June 1966.[68] It has invested, since its foundation, 74.1 million cordobas, mostly in low cost loans, in the building of 4,223 houses covering a population of approximately 26,182 persons.[69]

In 1960 the Central Bank and the Nicaraguan Institute for Internal and External Trade (INCEI) were founded.[70] Both of them took over the functions that had been the province of the National Bank but had been the target of heavy criticism particularly after the financial crisis that begun in 1955 and which in the case of imports and exports culminated in the cotton pool scandal in 1958.[71] The Central Bank took over the issuance of money, the control of the Nicaraguan foreign reserves, the control of the rate of exchange of the cordoba and the supervision of the credit institutions of the country. The latter function had been under the Ministry of Economics. From the same ministry the Bank took over in 1967 the Department of Statistics and Census. The INCEI in addition to its function of looking for favorable prices for Nicaragua's export commodities was assigned that of controlling the problems created by the cyclical nature of food production, requiring storage to avoid the periods of scarcity and excess of supply that had previously been causing serious problems.

In 1964 an Institute for Coffee (INCAFE) was created in order to regulate the production of this commodity which is very important to the Nicaraguan economy.[72] The Institute of cotton is one of the two autonomous agencies that rea in the process of being established. It would

have the same functions in relation to cotton that INCAFE has in relation to coffee. The other agency is the Banco Obrero y Campesino which will eventually take over the functions of the already mentioned Caja Nacional de Credito Popular.[73]

Also in 1964 the National Agrarian Institute (IAN) was established and the Law for Agrarian Reform enacted in order to provide for the distribution of national unused lands, some privately owned land and the organization of farm machinery pools and cooperatives.[74] To date it has established nine agricultural colonies covering 866 families and given tital to some other 384 farmers not organized in the form of agricultural colonies.[75]

Some other agencies have been set up in Nicaragua. One of them, the National University, was reorganized in 1958 in order to separate the control of university students traditionally active in politics from the Ministry of Education, and to satisfy heavy pressure from faculty, students, and professional organizations, for a long overdue change in the administration of higher education by the state. This will be considered later because of the special political conditions pertaining to its institution.

The other agencies which have been set up refer to specific projects and were responses to specific problems. Among these are, the Corinto Port Authority, (CPA), the Managua Water Enterprise (EAM), the Managua Milk Processing Plant (ENPL) and the Rivas Irrigation Enterprise (ERR).

The Need for Planning

The programs of Alliance for Progress proclaimed in Punta del Este on August 17, 1961, required that the member governments applying for funds set up advanced planning of investments to be done for the purpose of social and economic development. The rapid growth of the foreign debt in the last 16 years, shows clearly the importance of such funds for the Nicaraguan system. In addition, there had been serious criticisms leveled at government for spending public funds at random, without a clear plan and with little conscience of the needs of the country and of the

areas in which the results of the investment of its financial resources could be maximized.

As a response to this problem the Government of Nicaragua set up, in August 1961, the National Office of Socio-Economic Planning and Coordination as a dependency of the Ministry of Economics. In February of the next year, its name was changed to that of National Planning Office and it was given greater power--powers which its director had demanded to be able to obtain the necessary information from reluctant government and private enterprise personnel, and to (eventually) enforce the decisions of the office. Later, in November 1963, the Office was integrated with other functions, into the National Economy Council, this time directly under presidential authority and therefore out of the purview of the Ministry of Economics. It has produced some studies of the Nicaraguan economy, an integrated Plan of Development and has also served as a coordinating agency with international and United States agencies.[76]

Industrial Development and Natural Resources

Nicaragua has relatively abundant natural resources. However, the exploitation of these resources has been accomplished in an undiscriminating manner, for immediate profit, and without due concern for their preservation. This has been one of the main themes of criticism of the Nicaraguan Government. In order to satisfy this mounting criticism, the Government enacted a general Law for the Exploitation of Natural Resources, and several specific ones such as the Law for Exploitation of Fishing Resources and those for the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas and mines and quarries.[77] It also set up a dependency of the Ministry of Economics in charge of enforcing the above-mentioned statutes.

A similar problem was presented by the lack of planning and help for new industries, which was considered very damaging in view of the importance of industry for the developemtn of the country. For this purpose the Law for the Regulation of Foreign Investments was enacted in 1955 and the Law for the Protection and Stimulus of Industrial Development in 1958.[78] Another dependency of the Ministry of Economics was set up for the purpose of enforcing the percepts of these two laws. This dependency has

already given, under the authorization of the new statute, fiscal and other types of privileges to new industries and to established ones with new programs.

Central American Integration

The political union of Central America has been one of the constants of Nicaraguan politics. The traditional party divisions were in part a result of this issue. Since the late 1940's however, the Central American unionistas began to take the functional approach which proposes that it is first necessary to create economic and cultural ties and then proceed to the establishment of political bonds .[79] The Nicaraguan political system has reacted favorably to it in great part because Central American integration has been defined as the panacea for many of the economic ills that afflict the area. It is generally accepted that a bigger market will provide for quicker development and that the more ample resources of the five Central American countries pooled together could reduce the incidence of the problems created by the cyclical shortages resulting from the agricultural characteristics of the area.

After many meetings, coordinated by the Organization of Central American States (established in 1953 and reorganized in 1962) a series of treaties tending toward the economic integration of the area have been signed by Nicaragua. They have been put into effect to a degree which is surprising when compared with the usual standards of law and treaty enforcement in Nicaragua. The main documents are the Multilateral Treaty of Free Trade and Economic Integration of Central America and the Agreement for the Central American Integration Industries (Tegucigalpa June, 1958), The Central American Agreement for the Standardization of Custom Duties (San Salvador, September, 1959), the General Treaty of Economic Integration of Central America and the Agreement for the Creation of the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (Managua, December, 1960), the Agreement for Standardized Fiscal Incentives for Industrial Development (San Jose, July, 1962), and 15 protocols signed in order to enforce, regulate, and clarify the treaties and agreements. Several specific agreements have been also signed, they include among other things communications, higher education, roads and common defense.[80]

Economic Emergency

The 1950 Constitution includes, as a consequence of the "Generals Agreement" that served as its basis,[81] a guarantee of freedom of contract and trade that does not permit the regulation of prices or the control of exports and imports.[82] The same constitutional provision however, authorizes Congress to suspend for one year the application of such guarantee when it considers that there is a "state of economic emergency."[83] The Nicaraguan political system faced with the demand explosion described in the first part of this chapter has reacted by having such a state of economic emergency declared yearly since 1953 in order to be able to regulate prices, imports and exports. This has permitted the system to satisfy, or reduce, certain types of demands that could otherwise have been the cause of added stress. The last suspension of the trade and contract guarantee was promulgated on October 14, 1966. The previous ones had been enacted on October 2, 1965, November 23, 1964 and so on.[84]

Under the authority given by the suspension decrees, the Government has been able to freeze the rent of houses under 700 cordobas in Managua, under 400 in other towns, and under 200 in the rest of the country. It has set prices for medicines, milk, flour and other consumer goods. It has also prohibited the importation of hides and the exportation of corn, rice, cattle and other products.[85]

IV. SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER

Environmental Change and Social Wants

Internal factors.-- The data analyzed in the first part of the chapter showed that in accordance with proposition 1 of our theoretical framework, the last seventeen years were years of rapid and continuous changes in Nicaragua. The demographic, economic, and educational structure of the country, as well as its communications network, underwent important changes that indicate a considerable increase in the gross amount of social needs and wants of the Nicaraguan population. The need for schools, teachers, hospital beds, telephones, food, housing and other

important goods and services grew at a very rapid rate.

Extra-societal influences.-- The effect of these structural changes in the rate of production of social needs and wants was enhanced during those years by influences coming from the extra-societal environment. The most important factors in this area were, a) the reception of modern technology; b) the influence of cultural attitudes coming from more developed countries through Nicaraguans studying or traveling abroad, foreigners working in Nicaragua and training nationals of the country, foreign movies, magazines, and other means of communication; c) the impact produced in the country by foreign ideological movements of which the Cuban revolution and the Alliance for Progress were the more important.

The Reduction of the Flow of Demands

System survival.-- Since the Nicaraguan political system was able to subsist during the period, we looked for certain factors that, according to proposition 2-a of our theoretical framework, should be found in the social structure of the country acting to reduce the flow of actual demands that the increase in the amount of social needs and wants could be expected to produce.

Structural constraints.-- The first type of factors that were found to effect the flow of demands reducing it to the extent that the system has been kept from being stressed beyond endurance consisted of the deficient demographic, communications, educational, and political structures of the country, that, together with the present low level of economic development of Nicaragua, tend to: a) inhibit the process by which social needs and wants are converted into demands and, b) make it difficult for demands even when they are effectively converted to reach the political decision-making centers.

Cultural constraints.-- The attitudes of the Nicaraguan population towards politics and government which were described by the survey in the second part of the chapter added their effect to that of the structural constraints discussed in the preceeding paragraph. It was shown by the survey that: a) people tend to withhold actual demands made on the government because, even if they are unsatisfied, they see no reason

to press the issue in part because they feel that government officials are insensitive to their problems anyway; b) people tend not to join organizations which are the effective vehicle for channeling and maintaining political demands. These two sets of attitudes serve as filters that stop the conversion of potential demands into effective demands. Besides, the tendency not to join organizations gives rise to the sporadic nature of political activities that is characteristic of the Nicaraguan opposition parties and that will be discussed later.

The Adaptation of the System

Finally, it was possible to show that the political system of Nicaragua as postulated in proposition 2-b of our framework, responded to the socio-economic changes and to the increasing flow of actual demands that the structural and cultural constraints could not control. Important changes were found in the structure of the national government. They were: a) considerable increases in the national budget, in the percentage of the gross national product spent by government, and in the per capita expenditure of governmental agencies; b) increases in the public debt (mainly foreign public debt) and in taxes to provide the necessary operating funds; c) administrative reorganization including the creation of several new agencies; d) initiation of new governmental programs; e) attempts to increase production and to more effectively use the natural resources of the country by legislation, governmental action, and by developing a bigger market through membership in the Central American economic integration programs and; f) price controls under the "state of emergency" decrees.

CHAPTER IV

DEMANDS FOR THE REPLACEMENT OF THE AUTHORITIES AND THE REACTION OF THE REGIME

In spite of the structural and cultural constraints and the general adaptive changes described in the preceding chapter, the Nicaraguan polity in the last ten years has faced a series of issues which were the cause of considerable stress for the political system. The nature of these issues, and the responses by which the system, the regime, and the authorities were able to solve them insofar as the regime was able to endure throughout the period, will be discussed here in two sections. This chapter will refer to those demands, petitions, and responses that referred to the replacement of the regime and the authorities. Chapter V will take the demands and petitions of what may be called pressure groups interested in getting specific responses rather than in arguing about the issue of legitimacy. In both cases the analysis will, in the main, refer to the events that took place between the presidential inaugurations of Don Luis Somoza Debayle (May 1, 1957) and General Anastasio Somoza Debayle (May 1, 1967).[1]

I. RECENT HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Liberal-Conservative Agreement

The formal political structure of Nicaragua was based, since 1950 on the Constitution promulgated on November 6 of that year. It had been the result of an agreement signed in Managua on April 3, 1950 by the leaders of the two traditional parties: General Anastasio Somoza Garcia, at the time Provisional President because of the death of President Roman Reyes, and General Emiliano Chamorro the old caudillo of the conservatives. The agreement, known as the "Pacto de los Generales" because of the military titles of its subscribers, was designed to legitimize and stabilize the Nicaraguan regime after several years of internal turmoil

and international problems which began following the coup d'etat staged by General Somoza against President Leonardo Arguello on the evening of May 25, 1947.[2]

As established in the pacto (ratified by Congress two days after it was signed) Congress was dissolved and an election called for May 21. It took place on schedule and General Somoza, as expected, was confirmed as President by a majority of 153,297 against 49,401 votes. A constitutional assembly was elected at the same time. It was divided into a liberal majority of 40 and a minority of 20 which included the defeated conservative candidate and Emiliano Chamorro in his own right as Ex-President (1917-1921) of Nicaragua.[3] This distribution had been accorded in the pact.[4]

The assembly, presided over by Luis Somoza Debayle, the eldest of the two sons of President Somoza, and one of the members of the liberal majority, drew up the 1950 Constitution by closely following the text of the Generals' Agreement. Before ending its sessions on November 1, 1950 the assembly transformed itself into the regular congress which was to function during the six-year congressional period scheduled to begin on the next April 15 (as accorded in the pact), and divided itself into two Chambers (Deputies and Senators), It also set the new presidential term to be served by General Somoza at six years, to be counted from May 1, 1951. It finally decreed that General Somoza was to continue to serve as provisional president during the time between the closing of the assembly and May 1.[5]

The Constitution of 1950

The Constitution of 1950 had certain characteristics which are of importance to understand the political events of the decade that shall be discussed here: 1) it established a party system limited to two legally recognized parties giving a representation of one third in both chambers of Congress, the Supreme Court, and in all multipersonal government bodies to the minority party; 2) it provided that members of Congress were to be elected in a single district comprising the whole country with a substitute for each of them elected on the same ballot; 3) the two traditional parties were expected to take part in the first election scheduled

under the new Constitution (February 3, 1957) and in the subsequent ones. If one of them failed to file candidates in any election, it would lose its character as a party and could be replaced by a new party filing an application signed by a number of citizens equal to one tenth of the votes cast in the preceding election and 4) it barred re-election of the President and the election of his close relatives.[6]

The Breaking of the Agreement

In May, General Somoza was inaugurated and began his regular presidential term with the close collaboration of the conservatives. However, the agreement did not last very long. In 1953 rumors that General Somoza was planning to push through an amendment to the Constitution in order to be able to run for re-election began to circulate. This was against the terms of the pacto signed by Chamorro and designed precisely to keep Somoza and his family out of the 1957 elections in the hope of giving the Conservative Party a fair chance at winning them.[7]

The crisis in the alliance reached its climax in April 1954 when a group of twenty-six insurgents tried unsuccessfully on three occasions to seize or kill President Somoza Garcia. The group was disbanded by the National Guard troops that discovered and pursued them. Twenty-two of them were finally captured and sixteen were subsequently shot by the Army. A state of siege was declared; President Somoza made the Conservative Party leadership responsible for the attempts; and, several of the main conservative leaders were jailed. Chamorro and other members of Congress were impeached and their legal immunities were taken away. They, and other conservative leaders, were tried, deprived of their political rights and condemned to banishment in faraway villages.[8]

As a reaction to this, the conservative representation in Congress and other bodies decided to boycott them by abstaining from participation in their sessions. This created a political crisis which was averted by General Somoza when he convinced a few members of the Conservative Party representation that they should break the boycott and attend the sessions. The problem was particularly troublesome in the Supreme Court where the absence of the conservatives considerably hampered the

functioning of the tribunal.

Constitutional Reforms

Immediately after he had disposed of his opponents by these rapid and violent means, General Somoza began the process of pushing through Congress, now fully in the hands of his party, a series of amendments to the Constitution. The amendments were promulgated on April 20, 1955 and their main features were: 1) they abolished the constitutional prohibition for re-election of the President; 2) they established the principle that when any member of Congress could not or refused to take part in its sessions for whatever reason and the corresponding substitute also could not or refused to take part, any substitute from the party to which they belonged could be called to fill his place. However, if all of the substitutes of the corresponding party also refused, any other substitute could be called to serve in his place; 3) they raised the number of members of the Supreme Court to seven, two of them for the minority party, and established that the Court could reach valid decisions with the presence of only five of its members; 4) they provided that if the minority party did not within eight days (counting from the day the authorities of the party had been requested to do so) nominate the three candidates from which the President or Congress, according to the case, were to choose to fill a vacancy in any agency of government in which the party had representation, the corresponding authority could freely appoint any person fulfilling the legal requirements of the job.[9]

During the rest of the year Somoza visited several towns and informally initiated his campaign for re-election. Finally on November 20, in a speech in Esteli[10] he openly spoke of his intentions to seek a new term. However, his campaign was not officially launched until February 12, 1956 in the city of Leon, traditional seat of the Liberal Party. The event took place in a banquet organized by the local party and to which the local public employees were asked to contribute, under a protest which was made public in the local daily El Centroamericano.[11]

The Opposition Campaign

Meanwhile, the fact that everybody became convinced that Somoza

intended to seek re-election, produced progressively intense activities on the part of the opposition. The Conservative Party (PC), with its youth wing Sonservative Youth (JC), the Liberal Independent Party (PLI), the Party of National Renovation (PRN) and the National Union for Popular Action (UNAP) movement began to form a united front to oppose the President's campaign. The front became known as the Front for the Defense of the Republic (FDR). Only one important political organization of those existing at the time was left out of the FDR; The Socialist Party (PS), which was outlawed by constitutional provision.[12] The Republican Mobilization Party (MR) was founded after the FDR was established and it never entered the front.

The opposition campaign, scheduled to precede the announced visit of General Somoza to Leon, began on Feburary 5 and consisted of three Sunday public meetings of protest and of the passing of leaflets and the painting of signs in the streets of the city. The posters and signs condemned the President's visit and accused him of being responsibel for the murder of those killed in the 1954 attempted coup.

The government responded by taking several members of the front prisoner (on February 11, 19 and 24) and by deporting them (February 28) without legal trial and inspite of a constitutional prohibition. They left increasing the already considerable number of exiles living in Mexico and the other Central American countries as a consequence of the events of April 1954 and of previous political causes. Because of this, the last two meetings of the FDR were meetings of protest for the jailing of and deportation of its members.

The Holy Week festivities (March 18 to April 1) brought the traditional slow down and suspension of almost all activities ("politicking" included) which in Nicaragua begins two weeks before Palm Sunday and ends two weeks after Easter Sunday. In May, however, political activities were resumed and the Conservative Party began discussing the possibility of not taking part in the elections scheduled for February 1957 in view of the presence of Somoza as a candidate. There were several factions within the party and the decision was postponed for October to

see if General Somoza was in reality going to be nominated by the Liberal Party or if he was to give in under the pressure that the Conservative Party and the FDR were planning to mount.

To finance its campaign the FDR issued unredeemable bonds that began to be sold on June 8, 1956. The front projected a series of meetings which began on June 3 in Managua. Subsequent meetings were held in Masaya and Chinandega on the 10th, in Granada on the 17th, and so on for every Sunday. The meetings initially attracted relatively small crowds, but they began to grow bigger and louder every week until the ones held in Managua on July 15, Granada and Boaco on September 2 and Leon on the next Sunday (September 9) were of considerable size. The meetings reflected a rather negative attitude in the sense that they were directed against the re-election of Somoza and did not support any party or candidate. However, they also pressed for the immediate return of the exiles asking for a general amnesty. At the same time, and beginning August 18, posters against re-election, signed by the FDR, began to appear all over the country.

The National Guard tried to obstruct the opposition campaign arresting (July 29, August 12) some of the local organizers of the meetings or those who were found with FDR posters. However, it did not dissolve any meetings or attempts to actually impede them from taking place.

Somoza's Nomination

General Somoza did not back out in spite of the mounting pressure. In July he began transferring his military functions to his son Anastasio Somoza Debayle by appointing him Chief of the Air Force on July 5, and Chief of the National Guard (Jefe Director) on July 31. This was made necessary because the Constitution barred from the presidency those persons who were on active military duty six months before the election. Since the election was scheduled for February 1957, the appointment of Anastasio Somoza, Jr., was made just in time to legalize his father's nomination.

The convention of the Liberal Nationalist Party was scheduled to meet in Leon on September 21, 1956. General Somoza was to attend the convention. In view of a) the mounting opposition pressure, b) the strong resentment caused by the shooting of the insurgents of April 4 and the harsh treatment of the opposition leaders accused of being involved in those events, and c) in general, the climate of intranquility that prevailed in the country, great security measures were taken. Patrols were placed in the corners of downtown Leon, the whole block containing the houses where Somoza was to stay was closed off by the security police for the duration of the convention, and known opposition leaders were put under close surveillance.

The convention met in the Teatro Gonzalez in Leon, and in the first session (which began at 10 a.m. of the 21st) nominated Somoza as the party candidate. However, during the celebration party that was held that evening in the Casa del Obrero (a workers club) General Somoza was shot and gravely wounded by a then unknown young man called Rigoberto Lopez Perez who died under the bullets of the President's body guards.

A plot which later proved not to exist, was suspected. The response of the regime was strong and rapid. All of those who were in the celebration party, with the exception of well-known government officials and those who were able to flee during the confusion originated by the shooting were arrested. The Central Park in Leon was improvised into a concentration camp to hold prisoners. Known opposition politicians were taken prisoner all over the country and a state of siege was declared at 12:30 a.m. on the 22nd. A military commission was set up to investigate the shooting, its connections, and its possible consequences. In all some 3,000 persons were held as prisoners in the early hours of the 22nd of September.

Luis Somoza Debayle as President

President Somoza died in Panama on the night of the 28th. On the morning of the 29th Luis Somoza Debayle was elected by Congress (of which he was a member) to finish his father's term. Anastasio Somoza

Debayle was immediately confirmed by his brother as Jefe Director of the National Guard. On October 2, President Luis Somoza announced that the Liberal Party, whose President he had become when he assumed the Presidency of the country, would nominate another candidate to substitute for his father. He called for the convention to meet again on the 9th. It did, and, as expected, nominated Luis Somoza as the party candidate for the February elections.

Meanwhile, the Military Court of Investigation had been releasing prisoners by groups. On the 22nd and the 23rd their number was reduced to around 300. Subsequently, some 35 Conservative Party leaders were released (November 10)[13] in order that the convention of the party could meet. Seven journalists were set free on November 20.[14] The process continued through the rest of 1956 until the number of prisoners was reduced to the twenty-two whom the investigation court indicted to be tried by a military court (January 8, 1957).[15]

President Somoza had been holding talks with several conservative leaders whom he convinced that they should press for a meeting of their Party convention to decide whether it was to nominate candidates for the coming elections. The convention did meet in Granada, traditional seat of the Conservative Party, on the 28th of November. It decided not to participate in the coming elections in view of the fact that fair elections were not to be expected under the conditions and circumstances reigning in Nicaragua at the time. The main elements of decision were that: 1) President Somoza himself, in control of the National Guard and the electoral machinery, was the Liberal Party candidate; 2) there were, at the time the convention met a number of political prisoners and a general climate of terror; 3) two of the most important departments of the country (Managua and Leon) were still under a state of siege and consequently under martial law. For the rest of the country martial law had been suspended on November 18 in order to give leverage to those who wanted the party to go to the elections.[16]

The group of conservatives who wanted the party to go to the elections, and who had been in talks with President Somoza decided immediately after the adjournment of the convention, to organize a new, ad hoc, party

to be called the Nicaraguan Conservative Party.[17] They rapidly collected a few signatures, filed a petition, and were officially recognized by the Electoral Council a few days before the deadline for filing the list of candidates (December 5, 1956). They were able to do the latter on time and were able to participate in the elections.

The 1957 Election

The electoral campaign was indeed very dull. All important opposition activities had practically ceased since September 21 of the last year. The Nicaraguan Conservative Party accepted beforehand the fact that it was to be a minority party (with one third representation insured).[18] It was rumored that the party received some money from the Liberal Party treasury to put up some posters and schedule a few meetings. The biggest one was staged in Matagalpa with no more than 300 persons in it (January 12, 1957).

Finally the elections took place as scheduled, on February 3, 1957 just a few hours after martial law had been suspended for Managua and Leon.[19] Very few people were seen at the polls, but the Electoral tribunal declared Don Luis elected by a majority of 435,184 votes to 55,216 cast for his opponent Eduardo Amador. This gave a total of 490,400 votes out of 573,370 registered voters (a surprising 85.3% turnout.)[20]

II. VIOLENT INPUTS

Presidency of Don Luis Somoza

The Presidency of Don Luis Somoza, inaugurated on May 1, 1957 faced serious problems as to its acceptance as a legitimate government. For the first years of his administration the opposition concentrated its attacks on this issue. It was argued that: a) Luis Somoza had assumed his office in the first place as a consequence of his father's death and amidst great displays of military and police action; b) his subsequent election had taken place under the critical conditions described above and were not considered free or fair. From the start his regime was termed a "dynasty". It was generally accepted among opposition leaders that only the retirement from Nicaraguan politics of the

Somoza family, especially Luis and Anastasio, could give the country a legitimate and democratic government.

Opposition Activities Begin

Because of the massive and violent repressive measures taken after the shooting of General Somoza, opposition activities began moving into the open at a very slow pace. They consisted, at the beginning, primarily of petitions and pressure for freeing the political prisoners held by the regime and for the return of the exiles with guarantees that they would not be molested or prosecuted. Open criticisms began to appear in the press: La Prensa, La Noticia, El Gran Diario, and Impacto in Managua; and El Centroamericano in Leon were the opposition dailies with national circulation. The same was true, although at a much slower pace, of the several radio programs that functioned at the time. The written and spoken press was slowly beginning to awake from the after-effects of censorship and the repressive measures taken against journalists as a consequence of the September events. At that time all of the directors of the newspapers mentioned above were jailed, with the exception of the director of La Noticia who was a very old man (however, the Vice-director was jailed). One of them, Pedro Joaquin Chammorro, director of La Prensa, was still banished in San Carlos as a consequence of the decision rendered against him in January by the Military Court that tried him.

The opposition political parties also began to reorganize. There were four of them not including the Socialist Party that was outlawed: The Republican Mobilization Party, the Party of National Renovation, the Liberal Independent Party, and the Conservative Party. In addition, the Social Christian Party was founded in the first year of the new Somoza administration (September, 1957). All of these parties, with the exception of the Conservative Party, were small cadre parties, "sofa parties" to use the picturesque label applied to them by Don Luis Somoza.[21] The Conservative Party still was a caudillo party, capable of moving, at the spur of a political crisis, great masses of people under the leadership of Emiliano Chamorro (or Fernando Aguero who later appeared in the Nicaraguan political arena as Chamorro's successor).

Subversive Activities

Some talk of an anti-Somoza union of the opposition parties began to be heard in February 1958, but the open political campaign of the opposition did not really begin until 1960 under conditions that will be explained later. Before 1960, the activities of the enemies of the regime or its authorities, tended to be rather subversive in nature and were a reaction to the violence and oppression which started on September 1956. Only the ad hoc Nicaraguan Conservative Party tried to mount an appearance of parliamentary opposition, although with small success as to the degree of influence that it had in the decisions of Congress because of the well-commanded unity of the liberal majority.

Rumors of the possibilities of an army coup d'etat began to circulate soon after Don Luis' inauguration. On November 2, 1957 a group of army officers who had been meeting with some civilian opposition leaders and were planning to overthrow the regime was arrested (together with the civilians) and the first serious conspiracy failed.

Shortly after that, emigres began to gather in the neighboring countries of Costa Rica and Honduras. In March 1958 a group of 200 of them under the command of Colonel Manuel Gomez (a former member of the National Guard) was reported to be about to cross the boundary into Nicaragua. They were unable to do so because the corresponding zone was heavily reinforced by the Guardia Nacional. On April 7, they were surrounded by the Honduran army and taken as prisoners to Tegucigalpa where they were disbanded.[22]

Some of them gathered again in Honduran territory. Two former pilots of the Nicaraguan Air Force, involved in the November 2 attempted coup, took a La Nica Air Lines plane from the Miami Airport on April 26, loaded it with arms and flew to the gathering place of the emigres. The plane was located by the Honduran Army and the pilots and their followers arrested and subsequently disbanded. The plane was seized and eventually returned to La Nica.

A third group was formed shortly thereafter. This time the group was able to penetrate into Nicaragua some time in September 1958. The expenditionary force was estimated at 50. It was under the command of General Raudales, a former Sandino follower, in exile since 1934. The National Guard moved; it was able to surround the group; and a military bulletin, published on October 17,[23] reported that Raudales had been killed in combat and the expedition totally disbanded.

The Fall of Batista

The fall of Batista on December 31, brought considerable excitement to Nicaragua. He was identified as a close friend of the Somoza's and the guerrilla warfare mounted by Fidel Castro in the Sierra Maestra was taken as a symbol of rebellion against all dictatorships. The latter was particularly true of the young people in the opposition. Since early in 1958, Fidelista flags had been showing up all over the country. They were placed on top of the Managua Cathedral on March 20; in the National University central building in Leon on the following 27th; on April 8, in San Juan del Sur (a popular beach filled at the time because of the season); again in Leon on the following 10th; and so on. The flags were rapidly taken down under request of the military authorities or by their own men. A demonstration of considerable size was staged in Managua on January 2 to celebrate the fall of the Cuban dictator and was rapidly dissolved by army action.

The success of the anti-Batista forces in Cuba inaugurated one of the tenser periods in recent Nicaraguan politics. Rumors of all kind began to circulate. It was assumed that Castro, who had condemned the Somoza regime in a speech in Havana, would help the opposition to bring it down. Invasions and coups were expected any moment. Opposition members fled the country and several governmental employees resigned. Among them were three well-known diplomats: Leonte Herdocia (Ambassador to Costa Rica), Otto Somarriba, and Agustin Torres, who had been, before entering the diplomatic corps the attorney for the prosecution in the 1957 military court. In sum, a general climate of insecurity prevailed up until the rumors materialized in the Olama and Mollejones expedition.

The Olama and Mollejones Expedition

Exiles began to concentrate again. This time it was in Costa Rica. Several of the opposition leaders that had been jailed in September and later on released, or sent to their homes on parole, fled the country and went to San Jose. Such was the case with Enrique Lacayo Farfan, Emilio and Tomas Borge, Rodolfo Abaunza, Adan Selva, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, and Jose Medina, among others. On April 8, Captains Ubilla and Rivas (the pilots who had taken the La Nica airplane from Miami) were reported to be in Costa Rica.[24] On the 24th, it was rumored that a general strike was beginning to be prepared to coincide with the invasion of insurgents that was to come from Costa Rica.[25] On May 5, it was reported that the opposition leaders who were in Costa Rica were talking openly about a period of insurgency to be started soon in Nicaragua.[26] On the 28th, the opposition announced the formation of a Committee for Civic Revolutionary Action and, finally, on the early morning of May 31, 114 rebels disembarked in Olama and Mollejones in the Departments of Matagalpa and Chontales. They had been flown by plane in two groups from their not-so-secret training camp in Punta Llorona, Costa Rica. A general strike was planned for initiation on the 1st of June. But the strike was not successful; the rebels' airplane was destroyed on the ground by the Nicaraguan Air Force; and the invaders surrendered in groups until all but two had been brought to Managua as prisoners. The two who did not surrender (Captains Ubilla and Rivas, pilot and co-pilot of the rebel plane) were pursued and shot by the army. A wave of terrorism that exploded at the same time however, was not immediately controlled and lasted for several months.

Another group of rebels under the command of Carlos Fonseca Amador was trying to enter Nicaragua from the North. It was caught in El Chaparral by the Honduran Army and disbanded. On that occasion, several university students died and others were bounded (June 27.).

Students demonstrations were staged in protest because of the El Chaparral incident and, when on July 23, some two hundred students were parading in mourning in the streets of Leon they were stopped and fired

upon by a National Guard patrol. Four were killed and forty-one wounded. This led to a great protest funeral and several demonstrations both in Managua and Leon. A University strike that lasted until the following October started after the incident.

After the strike ended, October and November were months of relative calm under martial law. There were only a few sporadic terrorist explosions. But in December a group from Costa Rica began harassing the border posts of the National Guard. Since the group went back into Costa Rican territory after each attack, the Costa Rican Civil Guard was sent to patrol the border when the Nicaraguan Government protested. The group, under pressure from the Civil Guard, dissolved and its leader, Indalecio Pastora, left for El Salvador on February 12, 1960. The following March another group entered from Honduras under the command of Haroldo Martinez Saenz but it was quickly dispersed by the National Guard.

Civil Strife

In May, the shooting to death of two political prisoners who were reported to have been trying to flee La Aviacion penitentiary caused new demonstrations and a second wave of terrorism. The same happened on occasion of the commemoration of the anniversary of the students' massacre on July 23, 1960, and after the shooting of another political prisoner held on charges of terrorism on September 8, 1960. The latter was also reported dead after trying to flee La Aviacion penitentiary. His funeral became a violent demonstration, during which several cars were overturned and burned and the offices of the daily Novedades (property of the Somoza family) were attacked by the crowds who ranged as far as the El Hormiguero police station to throw stones at the sentries before they dispensed.

Jinotepe and Diriamba

While two groups were threatening to enter the country from Honduras (under Julio Alonso Leclaire) and Costa Rica (under Leonel Cabezas), and under the assumption that several coordinated rebel movements were to be staged on the same day, a politically-mixed opposition force attacked and took the headquarters of the National Guard in Jinotepe and Diriamba on the afternoon and evening of the 11th of November

1960. The groups from abroad could not enter Nicaragua because of close harassment from both the Honduran Army and the Costa Rican Civil Guard and the coordinated coups failed to materialize. As a consequence, the National Guard could move in full strength against the Jinotepe and Diriamba rebels who were forced to surrender shortly thereafter.[27]

This seemed to be the last important attempt of the opposition to violent overthrow of the regime. Save for a relatively unnoticed guerrilla action in the North, officially reported as terminated on September 28, 1963,[28] some demonstrations triggered by specific events, and a few and aporadic terrorist explosions, the opposition became centered on political maneuvers from the Jinotepe and Diriamba coups up until the bloody events on January 22, 1967, which will be discussed later.

III. THE REGIME'S RESPONSES TO THE VIOLENT INPUTS

The responses of the regime to these violent inputs were of several kinds. In the first place, the new Somoza regime tried to gain the support, or at least the cessation of the hostile attitude of the governments of Costa Rica and Honduras, the two countries with which Nicaragua has common borders.

The Honduran Border Dispute

Nicaragua had been in conflict with Honduras for decades. The boundary between the two countries had never been set permanently and several incidents had taken place on account of this. On the day of his inauguration President Luis Somoza faced a new incident; thirty-five Nicaraguan soldiers were reported killed in a border skirmish with the Honduran Army. Although the report proved later to be false, the regime seized the opportunity to call upon the Organization of American States for mediation. A Commission came and the Nicaraguan government abided by all of its recommendations, which included the submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice. On July 21, an agreement was signed in Washington by the two governments submitting the case to the jurisdiction of the Court which eventually gave a resolution favorable to

Honduras (on November 18, 1960).[29] The settlement of the boundary problem was a major factor in the cooperation which the Honduran army gave to the Nicaraguan army in the control of the rebel groups that threatened the regime at various times.

In addition, the occurrence of the conflict was used by President Somoza as an opportunity to schedule several meetings with opposition leaders in order to gain the support of the Conservative and Liberal Independent parties for his government's position in the matter. Eventually, members of both parties were appointed to the commission that requested Nicaragua at The Hague.

The Costa Rican Problem

The government of General Somoza had been involved in a constant feud with the government of Costa Rica because of the several interventions of the former in the internal affairs of Costa Rica. There had been accusations, counter-accusations, repraisals, and the interventions of the Organization of American States on two occasions.[30] President Luis Somoza tried to settle the conflict from the start by announcing in his inaugural address, and repeating it several times later, that the intentions of his government were to keep hands off Costa Rica.[31] The cooperation of this country however, was not fully obtained until after June 1959 when Nicaragua required the intervention of the Organization of American States on charges that the rebel invasion of that date had come from Costa Rica's Punta Llorona. After that the Echandi Administration cooperated with the Nicaraguan government in the keeping of the boundaries. This same was true of the next Costa Rican Administration (Orlich, 1962-1966).

The National Guard

The regime also proceeded to consolidate its control of the National Guard. It was already mentioned in Chapter II that the Nicaraguan army is the only armed organization of the country and has the urban, rural and traffic police functions in addition to those of a regular military organization.

Soon after President Somoza's death in September, 1956, several of the better known and prestigious officers of the Guard, who were possible rivals of Anastasio and Luis in the control of the armed forces, were either court-martialed, on charges of conspiring against the regime, or sent abroad on diplomatic missions to faraway governments. As an example of the first, Colonel Lisandro Delgadillo, commander of the Fifth Army Battalion (stationed in Leon) could be cited. As an example of the second procedure, the case of Colonel Manuel Gaitan, Chief of Staff of the Guard could be mentioned, because he was appointed as Ambassador to Argentina in 1957.

Besides, the mandatory retirement regulations of the army began to be applied strictly, forcing officers of more than 30 years of service into retirement. Thus, the army gradually fell into the hands of the young officers, more loyal to the Somoza brothers than the older ones who felt that they had a right of their own to control the army.

Preventive Measures and the Marshalling of Military Force

The Somoza administration also responded with the use of force. On November 2, the army siezed 25 civilians and military officers on charges of conspiring to overthrow the government. The civilians were immediately banished to several villages by Presidential decree given in accordance with Article 196 of the Constitution and the military submitted to a martial court which eventually (December 31) condemned nine of them to different prison terms. On the 10th of November the weekly Movimiento, a political publication of Conservative Youth (JC), was closed down and Mario Cajina, its director, was jailed for a few days on charges of encouraging the conspiracy.

Responding to the presence of those groups of rebels on the Honduran border (April to September 1958) the National Guard was mobilized and the help of the Honduran army was asked (and given). Some of the rebel groups were controlled in Honduras and the one that entered was distroyed in Nicaragua (Raudales).

After the fall of Batista, the Nicaraguan government began to take all precautions in view of the increasing rumors of rebel invasion. Demonstrations were dissolved (January 2); and, President Somoza on January 21 on his weekly press conference[32] declared that in case of revolt his government was ready to take drastic measures. In effect, several detentions and searches for arms were made in the following days. These measures were intensified on March 13 to the point that by the 14th, several members of the opposition took asylum in the foreign Embassies in Managua. The frentes populares, a para-military organization of lower level public employees set up by General Somoza to be used for this type of action or whenever he did not want to display the regular army, started personal attacks on well-known opposition politicians (Adan Selva and others) but were stopped after great protests on the part of the newspapers and radios.

On March 18, President Somoza again spoke of the dangerous situation[33] and said that reprisals would be taken against those who were trying to stage a revolt against his regime. On the 21st, several persons were arrested and their houses searched (without success); this occurred again on April 8 and 17. One student leader, Carlos, Fonseca, was arrested and expelled from the country on the 8th.

A few days before the announced general strike and invasion took place, President Somoza had been in talks with the principal leaders of the General Confederation of Labor. As a result, they presented to the President on May 21, a series of petitions. It was reported that the President agreed to push the necessary legislation if the labor unions did not support the general strike.[34]

Finally, on the 31st, the state of siege was declared, and martial law imposed. On the next morning and in view of the general strike that had been declared by the opposition leaders, the army took control of downtown Managua placing patrols on every corner; an important group of businessmen meeting in the Chamber of Commerce building to support the strike, was arrested; and, the government threatened all of those who did not open their stores with the cancellation of their import licenses

and those who were foreigners, or foreign-born, with expulsion from the country. Furthermore, and in order to avoid the worsening of the opposition climate, La Prensa, El Gran Diario and Impacto were closed and severe censorship imposed on all other newspapers and radio programs.

The National Guard was mobilized with a great number of forces and sent to the zone of disembarkation of the invaders from Punta Llorona. The orders were to locate them; surround them if possible and harass them continually to force their surrender, avoiding to the utmost the killing or wounding of the rebels (it should be mentioned here that the group was integrated by young men of the more important families of the country and included very well-known political leaders and a Catholic priest).[35] The army was able shortly thereafter to capture most of the rebels except two who were killed when they were about to cross the border into Costa Rica.

The captured rebels were submitted to a martial court and eventually convicted on December 21. Six of the accused were condemned to eight years of prison. The rest were given prison terms of eight months. The latter were immediately released because they had already served their terms in accordance with the way in which Nicaraguan penal law computes the number of days that a person is under arrest awaiting trial.

The National Guard was mobilized and sent to the Honduran border to await the invasion of the group that had gathered in El Chaparral. The government at the same time asked for the help of the Honduran army which moved to the place and dispersed the rebels.

In addition to these activities the National Guard was kept busy in the principal towns of Nicaragua, mostly in Leon and Managua, patrolling the streets and important government buildings, dissolving the several demonstrations that were staged, enforcing the press and radio censorship, travel restrictions and curfews imposed on the principal cities and investigating the several terrorist explosions that took place during the months of June, July, August and September, 1959.

Some of these activities were the result of feedback from previous government outputs to control disturbances which themselves became inputs that created further disturbances. Such was the case of the El Chaparral killing and wounding of university students by the Honduran Army by request of the Nicaraguan government. It caused demonstrations which, in turn, were dispersed, causing more dead and wounded on July 23. This caused a wave of demonstrations which were also dispersed with the result that one more student was killed in Managua; this in turn was the cause of more demonstrations. The situation was not completely under control until October, when the university strike that had begun in July expired when the army gave scholarships to the officers who were university students in order that they continue their studies abroad and they resigned from the University in Leon. This was done because the strike had been directed against them in its last weeks.

The army moved again in December to stop the infiltration of the small group led by Indalecio Pastora. Besides, the Government also asked the help of Costa Rica in order to control them. In March, 1960 the National Guard mobilized against the group commanded by Haroldo Martinez Saenz and quickly dispersed it.

In May, July and September, 1960 the National Guard had to face the several violent demonstrations that took place during that month and when terrorist explosions and rumors of conspiracy started again in June it began searching homes and interrogating suspects and it was able to capture some weapons. The several suspects that had been caught were delivered to the ordinary judges for trial.

Immediately after Jinotepe and Diriamba were captured on November 11, 1960, martial law was decreed and the National Guard mobilized some 500 men with heavy artillery and tanks in order to recapture the cities. The rebels fled and eventually surrendered. They were put under the jurisdiction of a military court. After a few months forty-eight of them were released (March 23, March 24 and April 4) and eight handed over to the ordinary courts for trial.

Projecting a Democratic Image

At the same time that the National Guard responded with military force to the inputs of a violent nature presented to the system by several opposition groups and the military and civilian authorities applied sanctions to those who were captured, the Somoza government worked at polishing its image in the face of both national and international public opinion. To accomplish this, President Somoza had from the beginning expressed his intentions of abiding by the rules of non-intervention in other countries affairs and of peaceful settlement of international disputes. In addition, President Somoza, starting with his inaugural address, began to talk about a process of democratization. In one of his press interviews he went as far as to say that his was to be a "transition government" from the strong system prevailing during his father's administrations to a future democracy. He said that the conditions that had made necessary his father's "paternalistic method of government" had been slowly disappearing in the last years and that, if such conditions continued to disappear, the Nicaraguan government could progressively become a fully democratic one. He insisted however, that such a process could not be carried out in a hurry, that a few years were necessary, but that he felt confident that during his six year term the transition could be accomplished if only the Nicaraguan people, and particularly the opposition would cooperate.[36] In several speeches, and at several of his bi-weekly press conferences, he continued to insist on the subject all during his administration.

The following March, on the 18th, President Somoza called several leaders of the Liberal Independent Party in order to begin talks about the reunification of the party. However, the talks did not lead to any agreement and the PLI leaders reported that Somoza insisted in keeping tight personal control of the party which was unacceptable to them.[37]

Somoza then promised in a speech to the Liberal Party convention meeting on April 17 in Leon, that he would see that the Constitution be reformed barring himself from re-election and the members of his family from running for the presidency in the 1963 election.

During that same year the constitutional amendment began to be processed by Congress. It was approved by the two chambers meeting together, sanctioned by the President, and returned to Congress for a second review. After it was ratified by Congress, in the second review, it was promulgated on August 25, 1959. Its principal feature was that it barred from being elected as President; 1) the President elected for the preceeding term; 2) any person having been provisional President even if for a few days; 3) relatives of the President within the fourth degree (including uncles and first cousins) either by consanguinity or affinity.[38]

On the day the constitutional amendment was promulgated, President Somoza persisted in talking about his determination to democratize the country and to permit free and fair elections. This was slow to permeate the political system, and did not cause immediate effects. This was undoubtedly the result of a feedback effect in which information about the performance of the previous Somoza regime created a barrier of incredibility against the President's affirmations. Nevertheless, he continued to insist on his position, and on January 28, 1960, in his press interview he again reiterated his promises of fair and free elections.[39]

As a demonstration of the intentions of the regime, the government released from the jurisdiction of the military courts those who had been arrested as a consequence of the events of Jinotepe and Diriamba. President Somoza offered, in still another press conference held on April 27, a general amnesty for political crimes and pardons for those who were still in jail as a consequence of the death of General Somoza. On July 3, he again assured the nation that it could count on his word and that no relative of his was going to be the Liberal Party candidate for 1963.[40]

IV. THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGNS

The Opposition Electoral Activities

In 1960 the opposition parties began to get involved in electoral activities after it had become obvious that the Somoza regime could marshal the necessary military support to control subversive activities and that

it could handle the most pressing socio-economic and political issues presented to the system. Demands for the release of political prisoners, university reform, and land distribution as well as labor strikes and other problems were successfully dealt with by the regime in the manner that will be discussed in the following chapter. The 1963 elections began to be regarded as the only chance that was left for the opposition parties and they started to get ready for these elections.

There had been talks on several occasions of the possibilities of a new united opposition front (they were started by the Liberal Independent Party on February 11, 1958),[41] but the Conservative Party began its campaign alone. First, the Party was reorganized beginning at the May 28 convention during which Fernando Aguero was elected as President of the party. After a few months of internal changes a series of public meetings were staged starting on October 2, 1960. On October 16, a banquet was presented for Aguero in Granada. The new Conservative leader delivered a speech and demanded that the coming elections be held under the "observation" of the Organization of American States as the only way of securing their fairness. He did not, however, define exactly the extent of the "observation". In subsequent meetings Aguero continued to demand the presence of the OAS, speaking sometimes of technical assistance, sometimes of electoral observation but without defining exactly what he meant by either. The meetings were suspended as a result of the state of siege declared on November 11, 1960. They were resumed in May, 1961 and became more and more violent in their demands. Aguero said that if the OAS presence was not requested by the government his party would not take part in the 1963 elections. He said that he was convinced that this would result in national tragedy of unforseeable consequences.[42]

On June 14, the situation had become so tense that the Church hierarchy, speaking through the Archbishop of Managua, made public its preoccupation that if the electoral problem was not solved through an understanding of the two traditional parties a Cuban-type communist takeover could take place in Nicaragua. Such an understanding would have been a resort to the same formula of bipartisan agreement that had been used in 1950. The Archbishop offered its mediation to put Aguero and Somoza in

contact. The mediation was accepted by both parties and a meeting was arranged in the Vatican Nuncio's residence. During the meeting Aguero demanded the technical assistance of the Organization of American States and Somoza refused. No agreement was reached.

While the PLI was proposing a united opposition front once again (July 21), the Conservative Party began organizing a large demonstration to be scheduled in Managua as a show of force. It took place on August 13. This time, Aguero talked of "electoral supervision", without defining it, and announced weekly demonstrations to be scheduled in the different towns of Nicaragua.[43] He continued to insist on the OAS presence during the elections as a condition for the Conservative Party to take part in them in a succession of demonstrations scheduled every Sunday in Leon, San Marcos, Jinotepe, Masaya, Chinandega, Subtiaba, Matagalpa, Tisma, Nandaime, Ometepe, and Juigalpa during the rest of the year, 1961.[44]

After a brief interruption for Christmas, the demonstrations began again this time in Esteli on January 7, 1962. They were gaining momentum and the ones in Leon on January 21, Granada on February 25 (with a reported crowd of 20,000 in a city of 28,400 inhabitants at the time),[45] and Ocotal on March 11, were of impressive size. After the recess traditionally scheduled before and after Holy Week (April 15-22), Aguero went to the United States to negotiate before the Human Rights Commission of the OAS in order that it placed some pressure on the Nicaraguan government to request the commission's presence during the Nicaraguan elections.

Meanwhile, the Liberal Independent Party had also become active. After having given up on the talks held with Somoza about the reunification of the Liberal Party, its Junta Directiva expressed in a manifesto (August 19) the party's point of view relevant to the coming elections. It did not trust the Somoza Regime or the National Guard but did not want foreign intervention in national affairs. It proposed, a) a general amnesty; b) abrogation of all repressive laws; c) reform of the electoral laws to allow for fair and free elections without foreign intervention. This petition expressed the grievances in twelve specific points, and this is why they became known as the PLI twelve points. The PLI further

proposed a union of all opposition parties to fight the regime during the electoral campaign.

The twelve points caused some internal turmoil in the party. The Directiva then called for the convening of a party convention. It met on September 12 and supported the manifesto. This decision was the cause of a split in the party. A group of the PLI leaders decided to support Aguero and formed the Authentic Liberal Independent Party for that purpose.

After failing to convince the Conservative Party of the necessity of uniting the opposition, the liberal independents went ahead and formed a union with: 1) the Republican Mobilization Party; 2) the Revolutionary Action Party (formerly the National Renovation Party); 3) the Social Christian Party; 4) the Abaunzista Liberal Party (split from the Nationalist Liberal Party after its convention), and 5) the Nicaraguan Conservative Party. This front was called the National Opposition Front (FON) and was formally constituted on June 30.[46]

The front began its activities, even before its formal constitution, with a meeting held in Jinotega on June 10. It continued to schedule meetings in Managua and in several other towns. The meetings never did reach the proportions of the Aguerista demonstrations. The FON even proclaimed a PLI candidate, Humberto Alvarado, but it began to desintegrate slowly because of internal dissension. The Social Christian Party was the first to break with the front (August 3); it was followed by the Abaunzista liberals who went back to the Liberal Nationalist Party. The last public appearance of the front was in Esteli on August 19. After that, it slowly ceased all activities.

The Regime Gets Ready for the Elections

Meanwhile the regime was responding to these opposition electoral inputs, by mobilizing the Nationalist Liberal Party. The mobilization of the PLN began in November 1961. During that month a reorganization of the party was announced, for which an election of representatives to the party convention was called. A campaign was begun for the inscription of

party members. The inscriptions took place on January 7, 14 and 21, 1962. The election for representatives was held on March 25 and the convention met on May 24. During the convention Rene Schick Gutierrez was proclaimed as candidate for the party for 1963. He was a man with a record of faithful support of the Somozas and the party but of humble origin, not a member of the Somoza family and known as an honest administrator.

At the same time, and following the directives of the PLN, Congress passed a second (for the current legislature) reform of the Constitution. This was announced as the way in which President Somoza and the party fulfilled the promises of democratization of the regime and the electoral process.

The main points of the reform, which included changes in the electoral law, were that: 1) it elevated the Electoral Council to the category of one of the Branches of Government, on the same level with the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Branches with its name changed to that of Supreme Electoral Tribunal; 2) it allowed several parties to participate in the elections establishing proportional representation in Congress and other bodies, but it guaranteed a minimum representation of one third to all opposition parties taken together even if they did not get as large a portion of the ballots; 3) it lowered to 5% the number of signatures required to be admitted as a party, but at the same time, it established that only those parties that attained first and second place could remain as legally recognized parties after each election. Third or fourth place parties had to file petitions again for the next elections even if they had minority representatives in Congress; 4) it allowed for the representation of two opposition parties in the Electoral Tribunal--one of which would be the party which had been second in the previous election and the other one the party that presented more signatures on its petition; 5) it changed the rules of presidential succession creating three vice-presidencies; 6) it established the principle that the Justices of the Supreme Court were to be elected for life; and, 7) it reduced the presidential and congressional terms to four years.[47]

While giving way to a series of demands that had been presented to the regime on several occasions by the different opposition parties, the reform: a) kept the control of the Electoral Tribunal in the hands of the regime (one member elected by Congress, controlled by the PLN, one by the Supreme Court, also under PLN control, and a third member appointed directly by the party--as against two representatives of the opposition, one of them nominated, for the 1963 elections, by the Nicaraguan Conservative party); b) did not include any provision referring to the technical assistance or supervision of the elections by international agencies (asked for by the PC); c) did not change either the registration or the balloting systems (cedullation had been demanded by both PLI and the Conservative party as well as the use of automatic voting devices); d) by reducing the presidential term to four years it diminished the authority of the President, who could not be re-elected and also reduced the length of time during which the office would not be directly in the hands of the real party leaders, i.e., the Somozas.

Thus with a non-Somoza candidate having given way (at least in appearance to demands for democratization while keeping the control of the electoral machinery and of course the army) and with a divided opposition, the regime could confidently face the February 1963 elections with the certainty that they presented a minimum of risks.

A Divided Opposition

In effect, the issue of the intervention of the OAS had divided the opposition. While in Washington, Aguero, confident of the success of the possible pressure that he thought the OAS Human Rights Commission was going to exercise on the Nicaraguan regime (apparently under assurances of his representative before the Commission, Dr. Leonte Herdocia, one of the Nicaraguan diplomats who resigned in 1959), ordered the preparation of a giant demonstration for his return from the United States on July 15, 1962. It was indeed a great demonstration. It went beyond the expectations of impartial observers. There were a few incidents with some police patrols but the demonstration followed its normal course. Aguero, however, severly criticized all other opposition groups because of their insistence on keeping the international agencies out of the electoral contest.

Thus, while Aguero insisted on OAS intervention, President Somoza became the defender of national integrity (a very emotional issue because of the history of the country) by refusing again and again to seek the technical assistance of the OAS. The Organization, of course, could not legally come if the Government did not ask it to observe and supervise the elections. The issue not only divided the opposition, it put the conservative party, which had insisted so much on it as a sine qua non of its concurrence in the elections, in a difficult position. It was impossible for the party to file candidates for February without losing all prestige.

It did seek to be recognized as a party by collecting the necessary signatures (24,700) and presenting them to the Electoral Tribunal on August 31, 1962 accompanied by a small demonstration of some 2,000 followers; but it became clear that it was not going to take part in the elections in October of the same year when the party convention met on the 30th. It decided, a) to re-elect Aguero as Party President (which caused a split led by Reynaldo A Tefel who said this violated the no re-election principle for which the party had so ardently fought), and b) not to take part in the elections unless the OAS assistance was called for.

The 1963 Election

Meanwhile the PLN conducted a relatively slow-paced campaign in which candidate Schick attended several meetings and demonstrations in several parts of the country. It culminated on January 27, 1963, with a demonstration of considerable size in Managua. His campaign slogan, that his was to be a government by laws, was constantly repeated during the meetings and demonstrations which he attended. In addition, he made electoral promises including the enactment of a constitutional guarantee of the autonomy of the National University.

The regime had also convinced the Nicaraguan conservative party that it should continue to play the opposition role and file a list of candidates. They did that after pulling out of the National Opposition Front. The Party was able to persuade Diego Manuel Chamorro, son of the

former conservative President Diego Manuel Chamorro (1921-1923), to be the conservative candidate. After losing the election he was appointed to the Supreme Court by Congress.

Aguero had announced that a national tragedy would occur if the elections were not carried out with the technical assistance of the OAS. However, on election day (February 3) he was able to stage only a small demonstration of about 300 persons which was quickly quelled by the army.

Thus the elections were carried out peacefully, and Schick was elected by 408,131 votes against 42,993 for his opponent Diego Manuel Chamorro of the Nicaraguan Conservative Party. The Electoral Tribunal announced a 78.6% election turnout.[48]

General Anastasio Somoza for 1967

Soon after President Schick was inaugurated on May 1,1963, rumors began to circulate that the next candidate for the Nationalist Liberal Party was to be General Anastasio Somoza Debayle himself. He had been in command of the army since the resignation of his father to become a presidential candidate in 1957. His rank was first elevated from Colonel to that of Brigadier General on February 7, 1957 and later on to that of Major General and finally to that of Division General (the highest in the Nicaraguan army). On June 18, 1961, there had already been a considerable demonstration organized by a group of Tachista (from Tacho the General's nickname) liberals; and some rumors circulated, that he would seek the Presidency. This time they were strongly denied by President Luis Somoza, at least for the 1963 elections. In 1963 however, the rumors began to increase. Buttons with the General's portrait were distributed and signs, Somoza for President, began to appear. The General began to visit (under the guise of army inspections) several towns in the departments. For these visits, banquets were organized by the local politicians. This produced protests from the opposition parties, especially the PLI. After a banquet held in Managua and during which political speeches calling for the nomination of General Somoza were delivered (August 31), the protests became louder but the rumors were not denied. The visits of the General were scattered throughout the following year and the beginning of 1965.

Meanwhile, President Schick held talks with the Liberal Independent Party in relation to the unification of the party; these, as usual, failed and were abandoned on November 7, 1965. Luis Somoza also began talks with Aguero about electoral guarantees which did not get anywhere either, and they were officially terminated on December 5, 1965. In the meantime the General's campaign became stronger until September 4, 1965 when Don Luis Somoza openly asked his brother Anastasio to accept the candidacy for 1967.

In order to polish the image of the party, the national convention was called to meet in January 1966. The convention approved a new Declaration of Principles[49] in which it tried to include within the previous framework new ideas about a planned economy, and an agrarian and social reform, placing emphasis on the problem of economic development which the old principles did not talk about. It also approved a Plan of Action which developed in detail the general principles that had been approved previously making several concrete proposals that should be applied in the following liberal administration.[50] These changes were designed with the idea of modernizing the party by updating its programs to meet the new political tendencies that seemed to the party authorities to prevail in Nicaragua.[51]

Constitutional Reform Again

The regime also started a constitutional reform that was rapidly approved by Congress, sent to the executive, signed by the President and ratified by Congress. It was promulgated on May 5, 1966.[52] The reform was presented as the way in which the regime gave satisfaction to demands made by the National University and the Catholic Church (to be discussed in the following chapter as specific examples of demands). The University wanted a constitutional guarantee of its autonomy and a precentage of the national budget assigned to it. The Catholic Church, desired the elimination from the Constitution of the principle that education in public schools should not include religious teaching (article 100).

The reform however, while giving answer to demands made by institutions of considerable prestige and with some organized support behind

them, was also used by the regime to include some other changes that related to the structure of government and which were considered desirable by the liberal party leadership. In this respect, it lengthened the presidential term to five years and reduced the number of Vice-Presidents to two. It should be pointed out that in accordance with the plans of the party leadership the ensuing presidential term was going to be served by General Somoza.

The Opposition Electoral Campaign

Shortly after the reform was promulgated, the electoral campaign of the opposition began. Both the Social Christian and the Conservative Parties started collecting signatures to file petitions to be recognized as political parties by the Electoral Tribunal for the February 1967 elections. But only the petition of the Conservative Party was presented to the tribunal. This was the result of subsequent developments to be explained below.

The convention of the conservative party met in Managua on May 29. It nominated Aguero as the party candidate. The latter started his campaign staging again, as in 1962, weekly meetings and demonstrations in several parts of the country. The conservative candidate did not demand technical assistance or electoral supervision or observation as a condition for his participation in the elections. Aguero's demands this time centered around the nomination of the representatives that one of the parties presenting petitions to the Electoral Tribunal had the right to appoint in accordance with the Electoral Law as reformed in 1962 and 1963.[53] The Conservative Party wanted to appoint them immediately after it was officially admitted to participate in the elections in order to be represented during the citizens' registrations scheduled for November 6, 13, 20 and 27. The Electoral Tribunal, on August 25, refused to admit the representatives on the ground that it was necessary to wait until the last day for filing petitions (December 7) because the right to nominate representatives was accorded by law to the party with the larger number of signatures in its petition.[54] The Conservative Party held that it was obvious that no other party was collecting signatures but the Tribunal refused to review its decision and insisted that until the legal time limit

had passed, nobody knew for sure who had the larger number of signatures. Conservative Party demonstrations followed in protest. They were interrupted because Aguero traveled to the United States for a rest after he was taken ill during a demonstration in Granada (September 11) reportedly because of a minor heart attack. A larger protest demonstration prepared for September 25 had to be postponed.

The National Opposition Union

From June 15, the Liberal Independent Party and two other minor parties (the MR and the PAR) were insisting that the only way to oppose the election of General Somoza successfully was by presenting a united opposition front. The idea was not accepted by the Social Christian Party and the Conservative Party which were planning to enter the elections on their own. Later on however, the Social Christian Party decided to support the opposition union and did not file its petition. A group within the Conservative Party began to schedule meetings of support for the opposition union in order to pressure Aguero into accepting it. One of the meetings, held in the Luciernaga theater in Managua on August 29, resulted in a fist fight among conservatives supporting and opposing the union. The support for the idea grew within the party, particularly after Aguero left for the United States. He came back on October 9 and he was received by a great crowd that staged a demonstration of considerable size. The union plan was presented to him again and this time giving way to the pressure mounting within and outside of his party, he accepted the idea of the union of social christians, independent liberals and conservatives but refused to accept the inclusion of the MR and PAR organizations.

After some argument about the inclusion of the MR and PAR, Aguero's views prevailed and the pact of union was signed on October 23. The coalition formed by the PLI, the PSC, and PC became known as the National Opposition Union (UNO). It was not registered as such before the electoral tribunal because the Nicaraguan electoral law does not provide for coalitions of parties to take part in the elections. As a result, it went to the ballots under the name and emblem of the Conservative Party.

Internal difficulties plagued the UNO. They centered around the distribution of the main elective offices among the member parties. The argument was particularly heated with respect to the offices that were guaranteed for the minority party by the Constitution. This showed not only the lack of inter-party organization of the UNO but, also to an attitude of defeatism in the face of the coming elections.

The November 1967 Registration of Voters

An incident that took place in the National Stadium the day of the inauguration of the professional baseball league (October 27) produced a tragic act of collective behavior. The great crowd attending the inaugural game panicked after some strong police action dissolved a small demonstration of students and the ensuing riot resulted in the death of eleven persons at the doors of the stadium. During the following week violent demonstrations took place. They were triggered by charges that the police brutality in the handling of the small student demonstration in the stadium had been the cause of the panic. It was feared that the demonstrations might interfere with the registration of voters for the coming election. But by November 6 the situation was well under control and registration started on schedule.

There were several incidents during the four registration Sundays. Members of the Association of Pro-Somoza Retired Servicemen, Workers and Peasants (AMROCS) exercised pressure to stop UNO supporters from registering. Fights resulted and a UNO member was killed in Niquinohomo and another one in Jinotepe. It was charged that the AMROCS had the support of both the army and the electoral directories in several parts of the country. AMROCS had been set up earlier that year by the liberal nationalist party as a para-military organization, similar to the Frentes Populares that had been used before but had disappeared. AMROCS members carried light weapons and the UNO charged that they used them freely.

The National Opposition Union also charged that because of the lack of UNO representatives on the electoral boards and nationalist liberals had registered non-existing persons and also registered Somoza supporters several times in fraudulent preparation for the election. The annulment of the registration was asked for after each Sunday by the opposition and each

time the plea was rejected by the Electoral Tribunal.

After another violent demonstration (November 30) caused by the shooting of a UNO leader in a police incident, the opposition electoral campaign started again on December 4. Now, however, the opposition had definitely become convinced that the February elections would bring victory to the Liberal Party. This was clearly the mood of the Matagalpa demonstration on December 18. After Christmas, an opposition organization called CIVES started to schedule daily sit-in protests in the streets of Managua, Leon and Chinandega. After a few days the sit-ins grew bigger and the liberal party organization AMROCS began to harass those who were taking part in them. Several fights resulted until the sit-ins were stopped by army intervention.

The Pro-Somoza Campaign

The regime responded with great vigor to the opposition campaign. The soft approach that had been used in 1962 could not be utilized now. This time General Somoza himself was the Liberal Party candidate for the 1967 elections. After having prepared the stage with the modernization of the principles and programs of the party, approved by the January convention, and with the constitutional reform promulgated in May to satisfy Church and University demands, the electoral campaign for General Somoza started.

The Party convention met again in Leon in July and on the 31st it officially proclaimed General Somoza its candidate. The official inauguration of the campaign had to be postponed for a few days because shortly after the convention closed its sessions, President Rene Schick died of a heart attack (August 3). Congress selected Vice-President Lorenzo Guerrero as his successor (from among the three elected Vice-Presidents). He was sworn in on the same day. The death of President Schick showed to what extent the regime had succeeded in gaining support and a certain degree of legitimacy as a result of the "democratization" and "transition" policies started by Don Luis Somoza. The President's funeral was a great demonstration of public sorrow and all opposition dailies dedicated laudatory editorials to Schick (they were used of course,

to attack General Somoza at the same time by calling his nomination a step backwards in the democratization process).[55]

General Somoza and his party, under the leadership of his brother Luis, mounted a very vigorous campaign. For that, they had tremendous resources at their disposal. The party was the only organization with representatives in all villages and comarcas since the local government functionaries were included in the party machinery. They could be be used to man the local electoral boards. It was the only organization which could penetrate anywhere in the countryside under the protection of the National Guard and without fear of harassment from local leaders. They could also utilize the services of the technicians of the Central Bank and other autonomous agencies for the technical details of the speeches of the candidate. They also counted on the army and Public Works Ministry trucks to carry people to the party demonstrations and meetings. Finally, they had the party treasury at their disposal for use to finance the campaign. Although party financial reports are not published, it can be affirmed without fear of error that the amount of money that had accumulated during the four years of the Schick administration on the basis of the "voluntary" 5% contribution of government employees was in excess of 14,000,000 cordobas.[56] This amount was grossed by specific contributions made during the campaign by both important and less important persons.

Demonstrations were held in all departmental capitals. Masaya, Somoto, Ocotal, Esteli, San Carlos, Bluefields, Juigalpa, Boaco, Jinotega, Rivas, Jinotepe, Granada, Matagalpa, Chinandega, and Leon saw the candidate and his followers in front of good-sized crowds. The campaign closed with a large demonstration held in Managua on January 27, the Sunday before election day. In general, the demonstrations were smaller than the ones mounted for Aguero. This was also true of the Managua demonstration, which was much smaller than the corresponding UNO demonstration held on January 27.

In all the speeches made during his campaign General Somoza stressed that his government was to be a new type of government, a government

of technicians in every field of public administration. The economic development aspects of education, industry, agriculture, and taxation were emphasized by the candidate. Important reforms in the structure of government and the distribution of public expenditures were announced. In general, the campaign promises centered around the changes necessary to make Nicaragua a rapidly developing country with a regulated and supported private enterprise system and within the United States sphere of influence.[57]

The January 22 Demonstration

The final opposition demonstration was scheduled for January 22. At about 10:00 a.m. a great crowd, estimated at between 40,000 and 60,000 persons gathered on Roosevelt Avenue in downtown Managua. At 12:00 o'clock the crowd had not dispersed and began demanding a military coup to overthrow the President and reorganize the country in view of the free and fair elections to be held sometime in the future. The military command in Managua did not follow the suggestion. Instead it sent a patrol to stop the crowd from advancing further up Roosevelt Avenue in the direction of the main military headquaters and the Presidential palace located at the upper edge of the city and of Roosevelt Avenue. The crowd refused to dissolve and was still there at about 4:00 o'clock p.m. when shooting of debatable origin started. As a result, more than 40 demonstrators were killed and about one hundred seriously wounded. The crowd fled, and some 1,000 of the demonstrators, including Aguero, took refuge in the Gran Hotel. An army officer and two soldiers were also killed in the resulting turmoil. The Gran Hotel refugees were surrounded by the army, but since they took some eighty foreign (mostly American) tourists and businessmen as hostages, the army did not enter the hotel to seize the refugees. The Church hierarchy and the diplomatic corps mediated and finally the demonstrators were allowed to go free after surrendering the light weapons that were in their possession. Several opposition leaders were jailed and tortured that evening.[58] After some minor disturbances that took place on the following Thursday, several other opposition leaders were jailed. No further disturbances occurred after that and the final Somoza demonstration scheduled for the next Sunday (January 27) was

carried out without incidents.

The 1967 Elections

With the probable demonstrators safely in jail, the Government went ahead with the elections. This time there were three parties: the Liberal Nationalist, the Nicaraguan Conservative and the Conservative (representing the UNO coalition). The official results showed 420,162 voted for the liberal candidates, 157,432 for the UNO candidates, and 14,650 for the Nicaraguan Conservative Party. Since both opposition parties together were allotted less than one-third of the total vote, they got the guaranteed one-third congressional representation: six senators, including losing candidate Aguero and all of them from the UNO list, and eighteen deputies, seventeen for UNO and one for the Nicaraguan Conservative Party. The Liberal Nationalist Party received its full two-thirds composed of twelve senators, including ex-president Luis Somoza, a senator for life in accordance with constitutional provision (Article 127), and thirty-six deputies.[59]

After the elections, the opposition charged the Electoral Tribunal and the government with fraud and the widespread use of the army and para-military organizations under its protection to impede free access to the polls, not only to the voters, but also to the UNO representatives in the local electoral boards in small towns, villages, and comarcas. Evidence in support of the charges was presented by the opposition, but the Tribunal took no action.

In at least the case of the four central cantones of the city of Leon, the author could ascertain that the results of the elections had been substantially altered by the tribunal when it gave its final report. In the case of the local board in Quezalguaque the UNO representative was not allowed, manu militari, to be present at the counting of the votes. Although it is impossible to determine from a strictly scientific point of view the exact results of the elections, the above-mentioned facts, added to the past performance of the regime in electoral matters and to the comparison of the size of the anti-Somoza and pro-Somoza demonstrations scheduled during the campaign, would seem to lead the objective observer to the conclusion that the great majority of votes reported for the

Liberal Nationalist Party was exaggerated by the Electoral Tribunal.

In any event, on May 1, 1967 General Anastasio Somoza was inaugurated as President. After the elections, and in his inaugural address, he continued to stress the reform and technical characteristics that he intended to give his government in order to provide the country with the necessary impulse to develop rapidly. Whether this is likely to happen is a subject for discussion, and could well provide the subject for a future study.

The Death of Ex-President Luis Somoza

Shortly before inauguration day, ex-President Luis Somoza died of a heart attack. He had been recommended to rest because of previous cardiac problems, but took a full load of work during his brother's campaign and during the preparatory stages for his government. His death introduced a new series of problems and questions for the future of Nicaraguan politics because he was, so to speak, the civilian branch of the Somoza team. After his death the job of controlling the party, the army, and government itself rested on the shoulders of General Somoza.

The importance of the role that Don Luis Somoza played in Nicaraguan politics is clearly shown by the following events. After he fell gravely ill on April 7, President Lorenzo Guerrero called off his trip to Punta del Este where he was expected for the meeting of the Presidents of the American Republics. He finally left Managua after Don Luis was reported by his physicians to be in better condition and he arrived in Punta del Este later for the inaugural ceremony. He left immediately after the news of the Ex-President's death reached him on April 13 to be present for the funeral. It should be pointed out that Ex-President Somoza, from the official point of view was only a Senator and not even the formal leader of the Nationalist Liberal Party, a position occupied by President Guerrero himself. The action of President Guerrero was clearly beyond the ordinary requirements of protocol.

V. SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER

The examination of the main political events that took place in

Nicaragua between the presidential inaugurations of Luis and Anastasio Somoza show that the political system of the country processed a heavy input of demands that referred to the legitimacy of the regime and the authorities that prevailed in Nicaragua during that period.

Violent Opposition Input

These demands were presented in several forms. At first they consisted mainly of subversive and violent action directed at the rapid change of the authorities or regime. The main types of activities in these categories were: a) military conspiracies to overthrow the current authorities; b) threatened and actual invasion by armed groups of exiles; c) the formation within the country of armed groups for insurrection and the attack of certain military objectives, d) violent demonstrations in the cities and e) terrorist activities.

Governmental Control Output

The output of the government also varied in kind. In part it was directed to control and suppress the incidence of the type of activities described above. It consisted of the use of the armed forces to a) investigate the existence of conspiracies against the regime to take adequate measures before they actually exploded, b) patrol the cities and rural areas to avoid the formation of groups or prevent invasions from abroad, c) localize, disperse, capture, or destroy, partially or totally, armed groups, demonstrations, and meetings, d) capture and keep under arrest and sometimes even torture persons accused of participating in different types of political activities, e) enforce censorship or the closing of newspapers and radio programs, curfews, restrictions on travel, and other measures, and f) to search for concealed weapons and other elements of subversion.

In addition, the military tribunals and the ordinary courts prosecuted, tried, and condemned several persons and groups accused of participating in subversive activities. The civilian authorities emitted warnings to the general public about the danger involved in subversive activities, threatened them with possible repressive measures, and decreed

a state of siege and imposed martial law, including censorship, curfews, restriction on travel and other measures.

Reduction of the Violent Input

A second type of government output was directed at creating an acceptable image of the regime in accordance with the prevailing political values of the system. They consisted of a) several public statements of government and party leaders about the "transition" nature of the regime and about progressive democratization, b) the scheduling of periodic elections, c) the offering of nominal participation in government to opposition groups in order to induce them to take part in such elections, d) the enactment of electoral and constitutional reforms tending to give a democratic appearance to the regime, e) the retirement of the Somoza family from the presidency for one term, and f) the adoption of several measures tending to show the liberalization of the regime, such as general amnesties, labor legislation reforms, enactment of different types of social legislation and relatively more humane treatment of rebels.

In turn, these measures produced a) a noticeable slowdown of the subversive and violent input rate, b) a turning of the opposition to electoral activities, c) a corresponding decrease in government control as an output.

Electoral Inputs and Outputs

The demands of the opposition in relation to the 1963 elections concentrated on the issue of electoral honesty. They referred to technical assistance, observation, or supervision by the Organization of American States and to specific changes in the electoral system including cedulation for all voters and the use of electoral machines. The demands were presented with the use of weekly demonstrations and supported by the threat that the main opposition party would not participate in the electoral contest unless its demands were met. For 1967, the demands referred to specific changes in the integration of the electoral boards and were accompanied by a full scale electoral campaign, climaxed at the end by a coalition of parties, and supported by warnings that serious political disturbances would occur if the opposition demands for honesty and

electoral freedom were not properly processed by the regime.

The regime output was to 1) keep control of the electoral machinery, refusing the OAS intervention and a great part of the specific changes demanded by the opposition, 2) continue to give participation in the elections and government to the Nicaraguan Conservative Party in 1963 and 1967 and to the opposition coalition in 1967, 3) mount moderate and very vigorous campaigns in 1963 and 1967 respectively, 4) use the state machinery to support the Liberal Party candidates and to alter in part the results of the elections, and 5) continue to control disturbances by the use of force, specifically when the disturbances would interfere with the carrying out of the elections.

Feedback Effect.-- A feedback effect could be observed when the regime acted to reduce the flow of violent opposition demands. Preventive measures, direct military action, and sanctions applied to those who were caught in subversive activities coupled with the creation of an image of a "transition to democracy" government were outputs of the system which affected the flow of demands reducing it to a considerable degree after 1960 when the opposition turned to electoral activities. Thus, it can be said that these outputs re-entered the system as inputs affecting its future behavior in a process of feedback. In turn, this reduction of the opposition demands permitted the regime to successfully push the candidacy of a member of the Somoza family (output) producing an increase in political disturbances (input) at the end of the period. Here too the inputs of the system were fed back into it and affected its future behavior.

Particular feedback effects could also be observed for instance when the control measures taken by the regime at the beginning of the June-October crisis in 1959 produced more disturbances which were met by more control measures up until the end of the crisis.

CHAPTER V

SPECIFIC POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEMANDS

The Nicaraguan political system was not only confronted with problems concerning the legitimacy of the regime and the authorities. A considerable input of important specific political and socio-economic demands was processed during the time span covered in this dissertation in addition to the everyday flow of demands that is the raw material of day by day governmental activity.

This chapter takes the most relevant issues processed by the system between 1957 and 1967 and analyzes them under four headings: 1) Political Prisoners and Exiles; 2) University Autonomy and Religious Education; 3) Land Distribution, Salaries and Working Conditions and 4) Tax Increases and Subsidies.

I. POLITICAL PRISONERS AND EXILES

The regime and the authorities of Nicaragua faced, from the start of the Luis Somoza administration, a continuous flow of demands for the freedom of political prisoners and for guarantees to the exiles in order that they should safely return to their country.

The events of April 1954, besides causing serious resentment against the regime (on account of the handling of those who were captured by the army after the three attempted coups against President Somoza Garcia failed) had left a considerable number of exiles in Mexico and the other Central American countries. Their number increased as a consequence of the repressive measures taken during the General's campaign in 1956 and still more after his shooting in September of that year, and although the great majority of the prisoners taken after President Somoza Garcia was shot had been already released, there were still in

1957 a considerable number of them serving terms in accordance with sentences handed down by the military court in January 1957 after an investigation and trial which was notorious because of the interrogation procedures employed (including torture), the shaky evidence used to support most convictions and a general lack of respect for due process principles.[1]

For about five months, the heavy repressive measures taken after September 1956 had reduced all action in favor of political prisoners and exiles to the private efforts of those who could approach President Somoza or his brother, the Jefe Director of the National Guard. That the talks around the participation of the Nicaraguan Conservative party provided just such opportunities and that they were amply used to negotiate the freedom of several political prisoners was offered by the leaders of the party as one of the justifications for their having decided to take part in the February 1957 elections.[2]

Almost immediately after martial law was suspended on February 2, the daily El Gran Diario started a campaign for their freedom.[3] It was soon joined by the rest of the opposition and independent press. A recurso de amparo was interposed by a group of lawyers in their favor arguing that the whole trial was unconstitutional on several grounds (the Supreme Court eventually rejected the appeal). A group of political leaders visited the President on May 5 to ask for a general amnesty. On June 5 another petition, this time by civic leaders was presented and on June 8 one of the Catholic Bishops of Managua publicly supported the petition for amnesty.[4]

In July the President announced that he would ask Congress to decree a general amnesty. It was promulgated on October 30. Several prisoners were freed and many exiles could return. But it did not cover those who had been convicted on account of the September events and the persons involved in the campaign for their freedom expressed their unsatisfaction with this half-measure.

On January 11, 1958, however, two of the prisoners who had been convicted by the 1957 military court, Doctors Aguado and Wassmer, both of them important political leaders, were sent to their homes on parole and restricted. They were ill as a consequence of old age and the mistreatment they had received before and during their trial. A rule of

the Criminal Procedure Code (Article 115) permitted this conditional and restricted freedom on account of bad health.[5] The application of this legal device seemed to be the first response of the regime to the demands for the freedom of the political prisoners held from the September events. It was eventually applied to seven of them, counting Aguado and Wassmer, before these seven were pardoned by Congress.

The pressure continued. In January a student committee for the freedom of Emilio Borge, Alonso Castellon, and Tomas Borge (the first two were members of the faculty and the latter a student at the National University) was formed in Leon. More petitions were drawn up, articles written in the press, and in Managua and Leon signs appeared in the streets calling for the freedom of all political prisoners.

An incident that took place in May produced some short-lived problems for the regime. A journalist and student, Diaz y Sotelo was captured and tortured by agents of the Security Office of the National Guard. After he was freed he complained to the journalists union and had himself examined by a committee of physicians. A group of journalists started a boycott of Don Luis' press conferences. The boycott ended when he said that an investigation would be ordered and that those who were found to be responsible for the tortures would be suitably punished. The investigation did not render any results and Diaz y Sotelo one day found himself on the other side of the Costa Rican border. He subsequently was killed when he entered the country as the leader of a small armed group in August 1960.

In July the Student's Association of the National University began anew its campaign for the freedom of professors Borge and Castellon and the student Borge. In addition a National Committee for the Amnesty or Pardon of Political Prisoners (CNPAI) was formed to petition for all political prisoners. It was integrated by non-political and well-known civic leaders from several parts of the country. Local branches were organized in Leon (August 28), Chinandega and Corinto (August 30), as well as in other towns. The CNPAI and its branches began to collect signatures on letters of petition which were sent to the corresponding

authorities. The National University Students' Association declared its support of the CNPAI and helped in the collection of signatures.

Meanwhile, some political leaders, mostly members of the Conservative Youth, had been organizing some meetings to demand the freedom of the military officers that had been tried by a military court on charges of conspiracy because of the November 2, 1957 attempted coup. During one of them, the Frentes Populares Somocistas entered the locale where the meeting was being celebrated (Ratio Theater 590) and a riot resulted. Several persons were injured and the radio equipment in the theater suffered serious damages valued later at 148,693 cordobas.[6] An inquiry was started by the ordinary courts after the wave of protests that followed, but nobody was convicted and the matter was soon forgotten.

University students continued to demand the freedom of the three prisoners connected with the University. Their demands were supported by high school students. Paros, that is short strikes supporting the demands were ordered by the student organizations at the National University on October 8, in the Ramirez Goyena Institute (Managua's main secondary school) on the 15th, and again at the University on December 2. On December 22, Professors Borge and Castellon and student Borge were allowed to leave their jails in accordance with Article 115 of the criminal procedure code. Eventually two of them, both Borges left the country. Castellon remained in Nicaragua until he was pardoned by special act of Congress.

The CNPAI continued its campaigns for the freedom of the other prisoners. However, most of the activities of the committee were interrupted from June to October because of the 1959 political crisis. Soon after they were resumed, Doctor Aguado and Wassmer (paroled in January 1958) were pardoned by Congress. The activities of the committee began to gain momentum during the following January. This time the Olama and Mollejones insurgent leaders who were still in jail were included in the petitions.

The activities of the committee were no longer needed, however, for three of the prisoners held in the Aviacion Penitenciary until May

8, 1960, they were killed on that day in an attempt to flee from jail. They were the three persons whom the regime considered to be more closely connected with Rigoberto Lopez Perez, the man who killed President Somoza Garcia, the father of both the President and the Jefe Director of the National Guard. Their funeral gave rise to several protest demonstrations already discussed and were followed by additional protests caused by the shooting of Ajax Delgado under similar conditions on September 8.

After a long campaign during which signatures supporting the petitions for freedom were collected, and articles recommending the virtues of forgiveness were written, President Somoza using the opportunity given him by an Army day speech, promised to ask Congress to enact a general amnesty decree. A bill was sent a few days later and passed by Congress on June 15, so that on the 18th, political prisoners were freed. However, those who were still serving terms in jail or under parole because of the sentences of the January 1957 military court were not included in the amnesty. It was the interpretation of the correspondin authorities that the amnesty decreed by Congress only covered strictly political crimes, and that these prisoners had been convicted of an ordinary crime.

On June 24, the CNPAI in view of the interpretation given to the general amnesty decree of June 15, started a campaign for specific pardons in favor of these prisoners. It hoped that the precedent set by the pardon accorded in favor of Doctors Aguado and Wassmer the previous year would be followed by the regime.

Eventually the pressure of the committee achieved its goal. All of the September 1956 prisoners except E. Castro, H. Narvaez and C. Silva (who were killed under the circumstances explained above) were eventually released.

R. Martinez and J. Jiron served their full terms (which were relatively short), and pardon decrees were accorded eventually in favor of all remaining political prisoners including J. Calderon who fled from the military hospital (where he was on account of an illness) and took

refuge in the Argentinian Embassy where he remained until the Ambassador negotiated a safe-conduct for him, in accordance with political asylum procedures, and he left for Buenos Aires.

The attack on the army headquarters of Jinotepe and Diriamba again filled the jails. This time, however, after the military court of investigation finished the corresponding inquiry the eight leaders of the group were delivered to the ordinary courts and the rest of the group was released. This was a response to the general condemnation and protest against the military judgment of civilians. The inquiry had nevertheless been quite long (from November to March). The eight leaders were subsequently sentenced on December 13, 1961.

Pressure for a new general amnesty began again soon after martial law was suspended in May 1961. The procedure employed this time was more or less the same as before. A committee integrated by well-known civil leaders was organized . It used the same approach. Forgiveness would bring further peace, repression would produce further disturbances. On April 5, 1962 President Somoza offered again to send to Congress a draft bill for an amnesty decree which was subsequently approved and promulgated on June 21.

The relative calm of the last year of Don Luis' administration and of most of the Presidency of Dr. Rene Schick brought very few political prisoners, and then only for short intervals and only on specific charges. Demands for their freedom were usually made in the form of petitions for writs of habeas corpus presented to the different appeal courts or the defense of those accused in ordinary criminal trials.

Two cases deserve special attention. In January 1964, during Schick's administration, three persons who had been arrested in Chinandega on charges of communist agitation among peasants in that area were found dead in an abandoned field near Quezalguaque. Circumstances seemed to indicate that they had been killed by a Chinandega army patrol and their corpses abandoned near Quezalguaque in the Leon jurisdiction. The discovery of the corpses brought a wave of protests in the press and

radio. The protests were directed against Colonel Juan A. Lopez, commander of the Chinandega military area. A series of small demonstrations were staged to demand an investigation and the conviction of Lopez. Student organizations, political parties and labor unions, expressed their support for the movement. The demonstrations were composed this time of women in mourning led by relatives of the victims.

A military court was set up to investigate. On its recommendation, Colonel Lopez was court-martialed and eventually convicted and sentenced (July, 1964). This is the only case in which a military officer has been held liable for acts committed against political prisoners. Three factors may have been important in this case. 1) pressure from President Shick who was a civilian President and whose campaign slogan had been that his was going to be a government by laws; 2) the evidence in the case which openly and undoubtedly pointed to Colonel Lopez as the responsible person; 3) the continuous pressure brought on the military authorities by the series of pacific mourning demonstrations staged throughout the trial. However, in April 1967, just before President Lorenzo Guerrero ended his ad interim presidency, he as the supreme military appeal authority, in accordance with the military procedural code, reversed the court martial decision and ordered Colonel Lopez's release. He had been under arrest for slightly less than two years. His release was probably related to concern among military leaders about the amnesty accorded to the prisoners held responsible for the January 22, 1967 events during which an officer and two army soldiers had been killed.

The second case was that of Carlos Fonseca Amador the leader of the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional. He was arrested in July, 1964 on charges of communist subversion and of attempts to organize an armed revolt. Immediately after his arrest was known, a University student's committee was set up to negotiate his freedom or at least to guarantee the safety of his person. A march to Managua was started but the army stopped the marchers. Nevertheless, the pressure continued and the students expressed fears that Fonseca could be tortued or killed. The committee sent several messages to President Schick and finally was able to visit with him to discuss the subject. President Schick assured them that he

was going to give strict orders and take all precautions so that the prisoner would be safe, and that the ordinary legal procedure would be applied.[7] Fonseca was tried and eventually sentenced on July 21, 1964 by one of the Managua District Judges. Incidentally, the trial which resulted was very interesting because Carlos Fonseca turned his defense into an open attack upon the regime as a justification of his engaging in subversive activities and this was given great publicity. Eventually, pressure for his release started after his trial but he was deported (de facto) and on January 9, 1965 the news of his being safe and sound in Guatemala reached the country. With that, activities in his favor stopped.

Finally, the disturbances during the last months of the 1966-67 electoral campaign brought the resurgence of the issue of political prisoners and exiles. On November 30, army patrols found some light weapons in the homes of three well known opposition leaders. Two of them took refuge in the El Salvador Embassy and later they left the country with a safe-conduct given in accordance with political asylum procedures. The other one went into hiding and could not be found. On the week following January 22, 1967, several opposition leaders were arrested. Some were released after a few days, but many were held and charged with having incited the riots that took place on the 22nd and the following days. The opposition started to protest immediately and counter-charged the Government with responsibility for the death of the forty demonstrators that had been killed, demanding an investigation. President Guerrero instead, asked Congress for a decree of amnesty covering everybody and after it was promulgated on March 3, political prisoners were free again.

II. UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

The National University and its Autonomy

The control of the universities has been a very difficult issue for Latin American governments. After the Cordoba (Argentine) declaration of 1919, the principle that state universities should be autonomous became generally accepted among university circles as the ideal solution to the

problem.[8] In Nicaragua, however, the issue appeared somewhat later in time. It was not until 1944 that the first important movement for university autonomy was organized in the Central University of Managua. It was intertwined with the very critical political problems which followed the 1944 crisis, and it eventually lost support sometime after the government closed the University in 1945.

In 1951 Granada University was closed because of academic and financial problems and university students were concentrated in the National University with its two branches in Leon and Managua. During 1952, a strong student movement began to be organized. This time it was university-centered, in the sense that one of the principles of the movement was that the problems of the University should be dealt with before thinking of solving national political ones. This tendency became stronger after a political strike beginning on August 4, 1953, closed the University for seventeen days. Only after a personal intervention of President Somoza who overruled university authorities was the institution reopened again.

In that year, several student organizations began talking about the necessity of a reorganization of the university whose academic standards had evidently declined in the past few years. The movement took hold and gained the support of a portion of the faculty, although it had the opposition of the university authorities, the rector, secretary general, and deans who formed the Junta Universitaria.

The more important of the student groups was the Centro de Estudios Juridicos y Sociales (CEJIS) which produced continuous propaganda for the principle of university autonomy. Later in the year, the movement obtained the active support of the student association of the university Centro Universitario (CU) and it commissioned some members of the CEJIS group, with the assistance of two members of the faculty, to make a study of autonomy and formulate a concrete proposal to be presented to the University authorities and eventually to the national government.

The student association after the proposal had been formulated, appointed a permanent committee to fight for the autonomy of the University.

The committee was very active during 1954 and held several meetings. The university authorities, however, continued to oppose the proposed reorganization. In 1955, and after it was evident that no support was to be obtained from the university authorities, the committee organized a national campaign, eventually obtaining the support of all professional organizations. The independent and opposition press also expressed its support. Several favorable editorials were published on the subject.[9] The support of Dr. Eduardo Conrado Vado, a conservative member of the Chamber of Deputies, was obtained. He agreed to introduce a bill in Congress. Several student demonstrations were organized to show support for the bill which was introduced on October 5, 1955, but after an unusually rapid congressional debate the project was rejected by a vote of 23 to 5. All those who voted against the project belonged to the majority party and did so, reportedly, under pressure from President Somoza, who was generally opposed to autonomy of any kind including university autonomy. The rejection caused several student protests and was condemned by all of the opposition and independent press.[10]

The issue was being reactivated again in 1956, after the university vacation period ended in June, when the September 1956 political crisis suspended all politically-oriented activities.

In May, 1957, however, talk about autonomy and about the reorganization of the university began again during the preparation stage of the academic year scheduled to begin in June. There were some relatively important disturbances among the high school population. These were caused by a reform made in the promotion procedure of the state secondary schools (known as the Ley Quintanilla because of its supporter Vice-Minister of Education Pedro J. Quintanilla). The disturbances threatened extension to the university because some students feared the effects of the application of the same reform to university students. The university, it should be noted, was also under the control of the ministry of education. As a consequence, the autonomy issue gained considerable support, even among usually apathetic students, for it was thought that by separating the university from the ministry the application of the Ley Quintanilla could be avoided.

The regime, presided over by Don Luis Somoza, was at the time trying to consolidate itself under pressure from other serious political problems as discussed in Chapter IV. It was trying to soften this pressure which centered on the issue of its legitimacy by presenting itself as a transitory and less oppressive regime. President Somoza had direct information about the existence of general support for the granting of autonomy to the university because back in 1955 he had presided over the session of the Chamber of Deputies during which the project had been rejected. This time not only was the issue gaining support, even before the academic year had started, but it was getting mixed in with the Ley Quintanilla problem.

The response of the regime was to separate the high school from the university problem. The President called Dr. Mariano Fiallos Gil, a very respected scholar and one of the two faculty members who had worked with the CEJIS group on the autonomy project, and asked him to accept the position of Rector of the University. He accepted with the condition that within one year a decree of autonomy would be duly promulgated. In the meantime, he was to reorganize the university in order to prepare the transition to the new autonomous status.

Eventually on March 25, 1958, President Somoza signed the decree.[11] In the following years the university underwent a structural revolution and gained considerable prestige.[12] In addition, it consolidated internal factions. The split between the student body and a part of the faculty on the one hand and the university authorities and the rest of the faculty on the other, practically disappeared when issues external to the university were under consideration.

The decree of autonomy did not end the organized pressure of the university vis a vis the regime. It centered now on two issues: 1) the obtaining of sufficient funds to provide for the operation and growth of the university and, 2) the constitutional guarantee of the autonomy of the university. Activities in favor of both increased financial support and constitutional protection were closely intertwined. The expressed goal of the university was to get a constitutional amendment that would

not only guarantee its autonomy, but would also make mandatory the inclusion in the National Budget of an appropriation in its favor of no less than 2% of the total budget. The pressure was at first exercised directly with the corresponding government authorities and later on by means of continuous propaganda for the issue made in newspapers, radio and university publications.[13] In addition, student, faculty and university board meetings usually included expressed support for both aims whenever it seemed appropriate.

The 1963 candidate Schick, promised at a meeting held in Poneloya, near Leon, that during his administration he and his party would satisfy the petitions of the University by enacting a constitutional amendment to include both of the guarantees that were demanded.

In 1964, the amendment bill had not yet been sent to Congress and it was decided that a full campaign should be mounted. In effect, it began on July 19 with a meeting of the University Assembly composed of faculty and some student representation which commissioned the Junta Universitaria to petition for the inclusion in the Constitution of both guarantees. It was followed by a student body meeting which reached a similar decision. A series of round table discussions were scheduled, and the last one for that year took place on November 6, 1964. After that, the campaign was temporarily interrupted as a consequence of the death of Rector Fiallos Gil and the subsequent election of his successor.

In March of the next year (1965) the campaign was in full swing again. After several months of continued pressure, on October 23, a demonstration was scheduled in order to launch a drive to collect 100,000 signatures to support before Congress, the necessary amendment to the Constitution. There were several other demonstrations, the more important on November 17 in Managua. In less than three months, 111,000 signatures were collected and 100,000 in ten separate dossiers were formally delivered to the President of Congress on January 28, 1966. During this procedure, Rector Carlos Tunnermann remarked that the other 11,000 signatures were not included because 100,000 had been the original goal.[14]

This continuous flow of demands was processed by the regime in a way that satisfied them to a considerable degree. a) From 1957, the year in which the university reorganization started, the state contribution to its budget rose steadily after having been stationary from 1951. In 1957 the state contribution amounted to 1.1 million cordobas (.44% of government expenditures), in 1958 it was 1.5 million (.57%), in 1963 had risen to 3 million (.86%) in 1966 to 5.3 million (1%) and in 1967 8.9 million was appropriated in the budget for the university (1.3% of total government expenditures).[15] b) During the administration of Presidents Luis Somoza and Rene Schick, the government did not intervene in university internal affairs beyond what the Organic Law of the University established as when it included a government representative among the members of the Junta Universitaria, the University's governing board.[16] c) The guarantee of the autonomy of the university and of the state financial contribution were included in the constitutional reform of May 5, 1966.[17] The State contribution guarantee fell somewhat short of the university goals since it accorded an appropriation of 2% of the governmental income received from taxes. This figure does not include income from loans, services rendered by the state, monopolies, etc. If the 2% contribution had been figured on total income, the university would have received from the state 13.4 million cordobas instead of 8.9 for the 1967 fiscal year,[18] and d) candidate Anastasio Somoza insisted several times during his campaign on the importance of the national university for the development of the country and stressed that he had the intentions of helping the University throughout his administration.[19]

Religious Education in Public Schools

Article 100 of the 1950 Constitution said that no religion should be taught in public schools. This had been one of the tenets of the liberal party which included this principle in the 1893 Constitution changing the position of the Church vis a vis the State. The previous constitution, that of 1858, declared that the Catholic religion was the official religion of Nicaragua. Catholicism was required for election or appointment to public office. The church fought bitterly against the secular education principle after 1893, but the liberal party-sponsored constitutions of 1939, 1948 and 1950 included it.[20]

Pressure from the church in order that the principle be abolished started after the 1950 constitution was promulgated. After President Luis Somoza was inaugurated, it gained momentum because, he unlike his father, was a professed catholic. The demands of the church were kept more or less behind the scenes until January 1960. They had been limited to a few strong sermons and pastoral letters. On that date, however, a kind of catholic revival called the Great Mission was organized with considerable success throughout Nicaragua. During that program, the church openly insisted that the principle of secular education for public schools should be abolished from the constitution.[21] The campaign was continued over the channels of Catholic Radio, a radio broadcasting station set up by the church with funds collected from the general public.

However, strong opposition to the ideal of abolishing the principle grew among the liberal party congressmen. A campaign against the church position was initiated in La Noticia, a liberally oriented newspaper. It resulted in a bitter argument, and the 1962 amendments did not change Article 100.[22]

In spite of that, after President Schick was inaugurated, it became the policy of his government (officially implemented through his Education Minister Gonzalo Meneses Ocon) to allow religious teaching in the public schools whenever a religious organization was ready to provide it. Religious education provided by school-paid teachers was also overlooked in spite of the constitutional provision.[23]

When the amendment for the protection of the autonomy of the university began to be prepared, the church got into action to press for the inclusion of a reform to Article 100 as a rider on the proposed amendment which the regime was also using in order to enlarge the presidential term.

The liberal party opposed the move, and in the new Declaration of Principles that was approved by January, 1966 convention, the precept that education should be secular was maintained by a large majority of the party membership. In fact, the Declaration of Principles said that "the Party proclaimed its support for the revolutionary thesis consecrated

by Article 100 of the 1950 constitution and imposed upon itself the responsibility of demanding its strict enforcement".[24] In view of this, the liberal majority in Congress voted against the rider, introduced by members of the Nicaraguan conservative minority party. This provoked serious demonstrations on the part of pro-reform people under the leadership of some militant priests. One of the demonstrations produced a veritable riot in the Congress building and more demonstrations were announced. On that same day President Schick and Ex-President Somoza called for talks with the Catholic hierarchy. The talks took place on March 4 and March 8 in the Presidential Palace. An agreement was reached and as a consequence, the resolution of congress was reconsidered and the secular education principle was erased from the constitution by the 1966 amendments.[25]

The response of the regime in this occasion was quite different from the reaction brought by the demonstrations staged in 1962 to pressure congress against the enactment of a radio controlling law. In 1962 the Frentes Populares Somocistas were used to break the demonstration and several persons were injured as a result of the attack of the Frentes. The situation was of course different. The regime was genuinely interested in the enactment of the radio law and the opposition to it was an unorganized movement that did not include the support of such an important institution as the church.

III. LAND DISTRIBUTION, SALARIES, AND WORKING CONDITIONS

The Distribution of Land Among the Peasants

The distribution of land in Nicaragua has already been referred to in Chapter II. The concentration of land is not as great in Nicaragua as it is in Guatemala[26] but still an estimated 42% of all cultivated land is under the ownership of 1.6% of the total number of landowners. On the other hand, 2.3% of the land is owned by 35% of the farmers.[27] The living conditions of the campesinos are indeed very poor. But, although they are the majority of the population they are not organized and their educational level is very low. Only sporadic demands for better salaries

and working conditions are found among them. There usually are spontaneous outbreaks that take the form of walk-outs from the fields. However, the cyclical nature of agricultural production reduces the opportunities for such action to short spans of time during the harvesting season.

The cyclical nature of agricultural production also affects land distribution problems. Demands for land and to plant corn, rice, or beans reach a peak before the planting season starts. But in the case of certain zones of the Pacific Belt, particularly the Subtiaba and Campuzano areas, in Leon and Chinandega respectively, the pressure of the peasants has been somewhat more constant and has been supported by organization. In these cases the very old comunidades indigenas (Indian communities) have served for the purpose of presenting a continuous flow of demands to the political.

The Subtiaba land problems are very old. Subtiaba is a semi-rural western borough of Leon which slowly disappears into the surrounding countryside. An Indian community has existed there since colonial days. The spanish administration gave title to great extensions of land to the community, but as a result of the liberal reform of 1893 the community was officially dissolved and its land distributed among the individual members. Slowly, most of the land ceased to be in Subtiaba hands either because the owners moved from the barrio when they were successful or because they sold out when they were not. Besides, the progressive extension of the use of barbed wire fences in the farms had slowly been closing off to the inhabitants of Subtiaba who are located about ten miles from the sea, access to the fishing places in the esteros where they pick clams and other types of seafood and cut mangle (mangrove) wood, which is used for construction and its bark which is used for tanning.

But the community never ceased to exist. It claimed ownership of the land given them by the colonial administration and refused to recognize the Nicaraguan legislation from 1893 to date. It got into the news in April 1957, when several hundred yards of fences in the area were

cut during the night. Nothing much happened on that occasion. However, on March 20, 1958 a group of men cut considerable portions of the barbed wire fences on several farms in the Subtiaba area. Other groups, estimated to include about 200 men each continued to cut fences during subsequent nights. On the 28th, the idea was taken over by the Campuzano people in Chinandega and they did the same thing. This caused a considerable reaction among landowners and the general public. The explanation given by the Subtiaba Community leaders was that the cutting of the fences was done by unknown persons who were angry because the roads to the sea had been cut by the fences.

On April 10, 1958, General Somoza declared that he was giving orders to the army so that all roads that had been closed after 1955 be opened.[28] He also said that the farms in the area would be measured by government engineers to see if it was true as the community leaders charged, that land owners in the area had fenced more land than their titles gave them. The contention of the community was that the land unduly taken by the landowners belonged in reality to the community members. Protests and fence-cutting continued. On the 15th and the 18th new incidents were reported as they were again in May and June both in the Subtiaba and Campuzano areas.

President Somoza promised to give the community in Subtiaba some tractors and other farming implements to start a machinery pool and to provide some motor boats to aid them in their fishing. These goods were delivered on April 4th, in time for the 1959 planting season. However, on the 6th the community leaders declared that the tools were useless without land.[29] On the same day a group of peasants estimated at some 250 persons entered the hacienda of "El Polvon" to take possession of a large piece of land. They were ejected by army intervention and after the outcry produced by the incident, President Somoza promised to solve the matter in a permanent and satisfactory form and asked for time to do it. But more incidents were reported on May 19th, this time in Campuzano. On the 22nd the General Confederation of Labor expressed its support of the peasants and included agrarian reform among the petitions presented to President Somoza on that date. On June 2, another

group of people took possession of land in the Hacienda "La Goyena", but this time they were not evicted by the army. Perhaps because the regime was trying to avoid more conflicts than it already had at the time (the day before, the Olama and Mollejones invasion had taken place). All during the remainder of the year fence-cutting incidents were reported. On January 4, 1960 the army tried to evict the La Goyena peasants after the harvest had been collected. Several of them were arrested and their oxcarts confiscated while they were using them to bring wood cut from the lands they were occupying. As a consequence of this, a protest demonstration formed rapidly in Subtiaba and marched towards the National Guard headquarters in Leon. After some negotiation, the campesinos were freed and their oxcarts returned.

On January 8, 1960 the measurement of the farms in the Campuzano and Subtiaba areas was begun to see if there were some public lands being occupied by land owners. On February 3, President Somoza again offered to solve the landless peasants problems and cited the Campuzano and Subtiaba measurement of land as a beginning.[30] During the following May preventive measures were taken in the Subtiaba and Campuzano areas in order to avoid the occupation of more farms. The army patrolled the area. This produced more protests in spite of the security measures taken by the National Guard, and the fences of six farms were cut in the Subtiaba area during the night of June 18. Shortly after that it was announced that land would be bought by the government and distributed among the peasants.

On June 26, 1961 President Somoza came to Leon in order to deliver in a ceremony, titles of small pieces of land in an agricultural colony near Subtiaba to some sixty families, including some of the leaders of the Subtiaba Indian community. The Ministry of Agriculture had previously acquired the land from the National Bank which had in turn obtained it through foreclosure against its previous owner because of unpaid agricultural loans. The same procedure was used several times until some 300titles were delivered to poor farmers in the Subtiaba and Campuzano areas.

At about that time, the enactment of an Agrarian Reform Law and the establishment of the National Agrarian Institute (IAN) to administer and enforce it were announced as the permanent solution of the land problem.[31] All claims would in the future be in the hands of the IAN. The law was formally proclaimed in a ceremony in Los Laureles (an agricultural colony) on April 3, 1963. When there were some Subtiaba protests later in 1965, the President said that he could do nothing about the matter because it was already under study by IAN and that its resolution should be awaited.[32] Eventually, in 1966 IAN gave title of the land in agricultural colonies set up for that purpose to 243 families in Leon and to 361 in Chinandega.

For the moment at least, the output of the system seems to have reduced the flow of violent agrarian demands in the areas of Subtiaba and Campuzano, but the distribution of land and the creation of IAN did not only serve that specific purpose. They also served as the way of a) fulfilling at least in form the offers made by President Somoza to the General Confederation of Labor in May 1959 before his term ended,[33] b) giving the impression that the regime was becoming quite modern in its approach to land problems, c) paying tribute to the generally accepted belief that land reform is one of the most needed and beneficial governmental actions for Nicaragua.

Salaries and Working Conditions

The rapid changes in socio-economic conditions described in the second part of the third chapter produced a considerable increase in the demand input for the raising of salaries and the betterment of working conditions among the urban workers. Some of the demands were processed through the ordinary channels but many were presented to the polity in such a manner that they required direct high level governmental intervention. Most of the demands of the latter type were presented through the sindicatos or workers unions and their federations. They came almost exclusively from Managua and Corinto because the national capital and the main seaport of the country are the most important centers of organized labor in Nicaragua.

There are three labor federations that have a national charac ter. Two of them are splits from the single General Confederations of Labor (CGT) divided as a consequence of different attitudes toward the Somoza regime. One of them is called the Democratic General Confederation of Labor, and it collaborates openly with the regime. The other is called the Independent General Confederation of Labor. The third federation, founded in more recent years (1959) is the Autonomous Nicaraguan Trade Union Movement (MOSAN) that is associated with the Latin American Central of Christian Unions. It works closely with the Social Christian Party of Nicaragua. There are several active unions in the country. It can be estimated that there are about fifteen of them in Managua, ten in Corinto, two in Leon, and one or two in other cities such as Granada and Juigalpa. There are in addition some unions called fantasmas (ghost unions) because they have practically no real memberships and are inactive, they are constituted for purposes of political manipulation.

The Corinto Strikes.-- The administration of Don Luis Somoza was faced with labor troubles from the beginning. As early as March 17, 1957 rumors began that strike preparations were underway in Corinto to ask for better salaries for the longshoremen. Labor and management undertook talks to avoid the strike but they were not successful and the strike was declared on April 21. On the 28th, President Somoza called representatives of both labor and management to the Presidential Palace in Managua. An agreement was reached at about 3:00 a.m. in the morning. The agreement included a small raise in salaries for the workers, and satisfied some of their demands in reference to working conditions. The President pointed out to the union that the strike was illegal in accordance with the decision rendered by the Ministry of Labor's conciliation board. It should be noted here that only three strikes have been declared legal in Nicaragua. They were those staged against Vestex (a garment factory), the Singer dealers in Nicaragua, and Tropical Radio in Managua. The three were small and limited strikes, quite harmless from the political point of view.

The situation remained relatively calm until the following year when another strike was declared on August 29. The longshoremen this

time got support strikes from the other workers of the port. On the 4th the Union of Customs Workers also declared a strike. The personal intervention of the President once again avoided the continuation of the strike. His recommendations were again accepted by both union and management after the strike had been declared illegal by the Conciliation Board in order to force the unions to adopt a flexible attitude.

Strikes against governmental agencies.-- Another strike took place in March 1959, this time against the Roads Building Department of the Ministry of Public Works. The President sent a mediating committee and the problem was rapidly solved without gains for the workers who could not exercise great pressure because the strike was illegal from the beginning because, in 1959 State employees were not covered by the Labor Code provisions referring to strikes.

Shortly after this conflict was solved, the Democratic General Confederation of Labor, with the support of the Independent CGT and the MOSAN organization, presented a series of demands to President Somoza. They included among them, a) the extension of Labor Code protection to employees of the State and to domestic servants; b) the enactment of a provision making mandatory the payment of a seventh day salary after six days of work; c) the establishment of a minimum salary for all Nicaraguan workers, and d) the promulgation of an Agrarian reform law. The demands were presented just before the June-October crisis of 1959 exploded in full and it was reported that the President promised to press for the enactment of the reforms if organized labor would not support the general strike being prepared against his regime.

In April of the next year the reforms had not been enacted and a strike against the Pacific Railroads of Nicaragua (an autonomous agency of the State) was terminated with the use of the same procedure used in the case of the Road Building Department strike just described.

The building industry strike.-- In June 1960 a strike of considerable proportions started. This time it involved the building industry workers who were organized into two main unions. The strike was declared in the Casa del Obrero in Managua on the 21st, in the midst of a crowd of some

2,500 workers who had gathered there in order to hear about the results of the talks that were being conducted. This time the strike lasted a relatively long time in great part because it received economic and moral support from several organizations in the country, including the student union in Leon which organized a march into Managua. The marchers were stopped half way by the National Guard, put into trucks and sent back to Leon. After eighteen days, and having been declared illegal, the strike ended on July 9 when the workers obtained satisfaction for some of their demands.

Labor reforms announced.-- When in October 1960 the CGT leaders complained that President Somoza had not fulfilled the promises he had made them in May 1959, Don Luis announced that a bill to include all of the CGT petitions was under study by his Ministry of Labor and that it was going to be sent to congress very soon.[34]

In 1961 there was only one small strike, in March, staged by the workers in the printing industry. In September, the teachers' federation protested because salaries had remained the same in spite of offers to raise them made by the Minister of Education. There was some talk of a strike but nothing happened until the next year.

Corinto again.-- In 1962 on the other hand, there were two strikes of consequence. On February 22 the port workers of Corinto went on strike. This time after six days and when the movement was starting to gain support, the strike was declared illegal and the National Guard was sent to patrol the port installations because of rumors of sabotage. On March 2, the strike was called off with few gains for the workers after President Somoza intervened.

Operation justice.-- Teachers in the public schools had been organizing for sometime. In 1959 several local unions formed the Federation of Teachers' Unions (FSMN). The Federation was very active since its foundation. It tried from the start to obtain raises in the salaries of public school teachers which were quite low. They started at 3,600 cordobas (US $514.00) a year and went up to some 9,000 cordobas (US $1,285) on account of years of service and other causes. In September 1961 there were protests because salaries had not been raised. In May, 1962, a full scale movement began to be prepared by the Federation. It was called "Operation

Justice" and got considerable support from the press, student organizations, political parties and labor unions. The preparatory stages included a propaganda campaign in favor of the movement and visits by the Federation's leadership to all local organizations.

On June 22, after it had become obvious that no raises would be included in the 1962-63 school budget, a test paro of twenty-four hours was declared. It was so successful that the Federation leadership decided to extend it indefinitely. It was not legally a strike because public school teachers could not go on strike in accordance with Nicaragua's labor legislation. The extension proved even more successful than the first twenty-four hours. It included faraway schools that had not participated in the trial paro because immediately after it had been declared, the regime ordered all radio stations to abstain from talking about the issue and such schools had to be notified of the Federation's decision by other means. By the 24th, the whole public school system was paralized and the movement started to expand to the private schools whose teachers began to declare support paros.

On June 25, President Somoza called the Federation's leadership to the presidential palace and in a long session offered to raise salaries for all teachers with a guaranteed minimum of 7,200 cordobas per year (US $1,030), and the paro was terminated.

Labor code reforms.-- In October 1962 the regime enacted the promised reforms to the Labor Code. The promises, made since May 1959, had produced several statements from the Labor Confederations and the MOSAN organization. These demands had been supported by three shows of force on the part of organized labor. They had been scheduled yearly on the occasion of Labor Day (May 1). In 1960, a big parade was organized; in 1961 it was still bigger. The 1962 demonstration had been really a gigantic one. The demonstrators had proven very militant and had come from several political organizations and not only from labor unions. On the evening of that day and taking advantage of the celebration of the 5th anniversary of his inauguration, the President announced that the Labor Code reform bill was ready to be sent to Congress.[35] It was promulgated on October 13. In March, 1963, a minimum salary albeit minute was established

and the following April the Agrarian Reform Law was enacted. With that, the regime could say that all of the CGT demands had been met.[36]

National guard intervention.-- On June 11, 1963, the Union of Corinto Workers and Employees went on strike. The longshoremen's union joined it on the 13th and soon the port was paralyzed. The regime responded by sending the army as in the February 1962 Corinto strike. The political legitimacy crisis that had lasted through the first four years of the Somoza administration had subsided and the government could act with greater freedom and without fear of having a labor dispute converted into a political problem. The national guard was sent, 200 strong, to Corinto and peasants from the Chinandega area were brought to load the banana shipments that were in danger of rotting. The workers responded by staging some demonstrations and by attacking the peasants. They were rapidly controlled by the army detachment, which had been heavily reinforced. On the 17th the strike ended with no gains for the unions. On the 24th union leaders were fired and the workers protested. President Schick intervened and some of them were reinstated in their jobs.

The National Guard again was called into action for a strike of the San Antonio sugar plantation and mill on December 18, 1964 and still again in September 1965, as a result of a building industry strike. This time the strike lasted eleven days, was declared illegal and several of the union leaders jailed. It ended with no gains for the workers. Subsequent strikes at the Victoria beer factory and the Momotombo match factory were also dealt with by the regime in a similar fashion. They were declared illegal, the army was sent, union leaders were jailed and they ended with no gains for the strikers.

IV. SUBSIDIES AND TAX INCREASES

Subsidies for the Cotton Planters

The 1955-56 cotton crop was very poor for Nicaragua. Climatic conditions, a heavy infection of boll weevil and worms, and the indiscriminate use of insecticides because of lack of technical know-how, brought production from 103 million pounds in 1954-55 to 81 million

(a 21% decrease). Sinking prices, from 32.4 cents a pound to 29.8 added their effect to the bad crop and reduced the cash income of the cotton farmers by 26.6%. The following year brought a small increase in production, to 96 million pounds but still lower prices, 27.8 per pound, offset the gains in great part. The effects were felt in the whole economy and the per capita GNP for 1956 and 1957 was lower than for 1955. This crisis left several hundred cotton farmers accustomed to good crops and prices in debt with the banks (in 95% of the cases, the National Bank). The unpaid balances of the cotton farmers had reached 96 million cordobas in 1958 (37% of the total agricultural loans given yearly by the banks).[37]

The problem reached greater proportions when the National Bank Section for International Trade (Compania Mercantil de Ultramar) one of whose functions was to look for good prices for Nicaraguan products in the international market, organized a cotton pool for the 1957-1958 crop, it advanced to those who took part in the pool, 28 cents per pound. After the cotton prices went down in April the Bank found out that it had given the farmers 4.1 cents per pound more than it had netted from the sale of the pool. The farmers, in accordance with the pool contract signed by them, had to return the difference. The final results were not totally known until early 1959. The total amount, which some 1,200 cotton planters affected by the pool had to pay, was of 12.1 million cordobas. This incidentally was one of the reasons behind the creation of the National Institute for Internal and External Trade (INCEI) the autonomous agency that took over the functions of the National Bank Section of International Trade. Cotton farmers charged, with considerable evidence, that the Section had rejected offers much higher than the ones it had taken.[38]

The cotton planters began mobilizing in March 1957. They called for several Asambleas Generales in Managua, Leon and Chinandega the main production centers. At first they demanded only that the National Bank continue to give loans to the farmers who had not been able to repay on account of the bad crops. For the 1957-1958 planting season their demands were satisfied. On July 19, 1958, a series of meetings against the announced creation of a Cotton Institute to regulate cotton planting

were started among other reasons because it was going to be financed by a special tax on cotton bales, which would be a "further burden on the farmers bad financial situation".[39] The plans for the creation of the institute were called off by the government on July 22nd.

The cotton planters continued to pressure the government for measures in their favor. In November they were asking for a mandatory reduction in the prices charged for ginning cotton and by the port warehouses for the handling of cotton bales. The Ministry of Agriculture sent a project to Congress and it enacted a law regulating the prices of both types of activities on December 28, 1958.

The cotton planters continued holding meetings. Some of them, as the one in Leon at the Teresita Theater, were attended by more than 1,000 farmers. A march to Managua was organized in order to show support for the farmers demands. It took place on March 24, 1959. Several different opinions as to the measures that should be demanded were expressed in the meetings. But the National Cooperative of Cotton Farmers, organized on February 24, 1959 was able to present a united proposal with the support of most active farmers. It included the concession of an eight year term to pay the balances accumulated up to April 1959 (including the debts that had come as a result of the cotton pool operation) and the payment of a subsidy per manzana to each cotton planter.

During July the planters continued to exercise pressure on the government andfinally in August 1959, Congress passed a law authorizing the payment of a subsidy of 40 cordobas per manzana from the general budget to all cotton planters, and the concession of an eight year moratorium on accumulated balances on which no interest would be charged.

Tax Increases

Taxes also were a source of important demands made upon the political system. The first problem arose because of the contribution that was to be paid to the Social Security Institute by the employees and enterprises covered by it. The payments were scheduled to begin in July 1958 for all enterprises within the Managua city limits. It had been

established that the institute would take 16% of the salaries of all employees covered by its benefits--8% to be paid by the employers, 4% by the employees, and 4% by the government.

On July 20, a campaign was initiated by the Chamber of Commerce in Managua pointing out that such a high contribution was excessive and would damage the national economy by burdening several enterprises beyond what could be supported by them. In addition, it would affect the financial situation of the employees who would see their paychecks cut by 4% from one month to the next. It was also pointed out that the services to be received would most probably be defective following a well-established pattern among public services administered by governmental institutions.[40]

On the 24th, several workers unions decided to support the campaign and on the 27th a mixed management-labor committee was set up to fight the Social Security tax. A general boycott of the Institute was established by a committee who decided that the enterprises would refuse payment of the corresponding percentages. Since enforcement of the measures would have been practically impossible without the cooperation of at least a substantial part of the several businesses covered by the Institute, the boycott placed the government in a difficult position. The government ordered all radio stations not to talk about the matter, but the boycott seemed to be ready to go into effect.

President Somoza once again used the device of calling the leaders of the movement opposing the payment of the Social Security contributions to the presidential palace. After several hours of argument the problem ended when a provisional solution was accorded. The determination of the final percentage that was to be paid, went to a study committee that would revise the calculations made in the preparatory stages of the institute. Meanwhile, the contributions of both employers and employees was lowered to 4% and 2% respectively. This solved the immediate problem. After sometime the commission reported its study and the percentages were eventually raised to 3% for employers, 3% for the State, and 6% for enterprises.[41] When in 1961 certain risks were added to those

covered by the institute, the contribution of the enterprises was raised to 7.5%.[42] This time, however, nothing happened.

On August 19, 1961, an increase of fifty cents in the sales tax paid per gallon of gasoline was announced. As soon as the taxi, bus and truck drivers union heard about the raise, it decided to oppose the tax increase. A strike was called and was scheduled to begin on the 24th. A support paro was requested from all drivers in the country, and groups of union members were organized in order to stop any vehicles that were running beginning at 4:00 p.m., August 24. The collaboration of other unions was sought. Some of them agreed to support the strike on the grounds that such an increase in the gasoline tax would raise the cost of living.

When the vehicle stoppage began, a number of serious incidents resulted as a consequence of the refusal of some drivers to stop when requested by the union pickets. Several cars were overturned and burned and a general climate of anarchy seemed to prevail in the streets of Managua. At first the regime tried to stop the problem from extending by the usual device of silencing all radio news; but the problem seemed so serious that in the evening President Somoza went on the air over all radio stations to announce that the projected tax increase had been cancelled.

Soon the Government started looking for new sources of income. A tax structure reform was announced this time. It was heralded as a reform that had to be undertaken because of the Alliance for Progress committments made by the government. It was pointed out that it was necessary in order to qualify for Alliance for Progress funds.[43] Some agitation was started in January on account of the reform, but since the extent to which the new taxes would affect the taxpayer was not known, the movement did not get beyond a few meetings and press articles.

When the taxes were finally decreed in June 1962, to be applied beginning July 1, a strong opposition formed. The tax reform package approved by Congress included: 1) a new tax on movable property; 2) a considerable increase in income, real estate property, and inheritance taxes;

3) an increase in the taxes to be paid on the sale of property and on all contracts to which fiscal stamps should be attached; 4) a complicated system of enforcement that included the obligation of notaries public, before whom most contracts are signed by law, to abstain from authorizing any public deed or document unless proof of the fiscal clearance of the parts in the contract or act was presented.[44]

On July 9, in Leon, the notaries declared that the obligations imposed on them by the new laws were so burdensome that they felt forced to declare a paro of all activities until such laws were repealed. This lead was followed by the Notary Public Colleges in Managua and in other cities. The chambers of commerce of different cities began to talk about the possibility of a general lockout of all businesses and enterprises. They requested the support of organized labor. A car caravan to show support for the paro was organized in Leon. The lockout was scheduled for July 17 but was postponed in view of the talks that were started on the morning of the 16th between chamber of commerce and ministry of the treasury representatives. The talks were not successful and the lockout organizing activities started anew. Finally on the 19th, President Somoza asked that representatives of the movement come to the presidential palace and talk. On August 21, Novedades announced that on the preceeding night a tentative arrangement, to be ratified by the several organizations involved, had been reached.[45] The application of the new taxes was postponed until September 1 of the same year and that of the obligation of notaries for October 1.[46] Subsequently, all new taxes were lowered in what amounted to an average of 50% reduction. Income tax increases and the new notary public obligations were altogether abrogated.[47]

Although the March 1962 incident that will be described here did not refer to taxes, it is a good example of the types of responses given by the system to certain problems. Beginning on March 15, all trucks on the roads of Nicaragua were to be weighed in order to see if they were fulfilling government regulations related to the ratio between cargo and the number of wheels on each truck. The measure was directed at protecting the roads calculated for certain maximum load limits. Some truck owners opposed the measure because they considered it an unnecessary inconvenience. They got support from the drivers' union. It ordered truck

drivers not to allow their vehicles to be weighed. Several incidents resulted when the drivers refused to allow the weighing of their trucks. The problem became serious during the two following days. The government ordered radio transmission about the subject to be cancelled, but the problem continued. On February 19, President Somoza intervened ordering the weighing to be suspended for one month in order to seek an agreement. During the following days a strong campaign was mounted to show the drivers that since they were paid by trip, not by load, it was against their interests to oppose the measure. It was also pointed out that the measure was technically sound and served to defend the taxpayer money invested in roads. On April 15, weighing was resumed with no incidents.

V. SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER

Demand Input

Types of demands.-- The examination of the events that took place during the decade that is analyzed in this chapter has shown that the most important specific political and socio-economic demands presented to the Nicaraguan political system could be classified in three main catagories: 1) Demands for changes in previous governmental output--such was the case of the demands for a) the freedom of political prisoners and the termination of repressive measures taken to control previous demand input, b) changes in labor and educational legislation, c) changes in the administrative structure of the government with reference to university education, and d) the abrogation of new tax legislation enacted to provide funds for the increasing demand input described in Chapter III, part I; 2) demands for desired governmental action as in the case when a) land distribution to the peasants, b) greater appropriations for the university, c) higher salaries for public school teachers and state employees, d) governmental intervention to end strikes or land occupation and, e) subsidies and payment moratorium for farmers were demanded; and 3) demands for the abstention from governmental intervention in the cases of labor strikes against private enterprises and land occupation, by peasants.

Support for the demands.-- The demands were presented in several forms. Usually formal petitions were delivered to the government by existing permanent organizations such as the university, the church, or the general confederation of labor, or by ad hoc groups set up for the specific purpose of filing certain petitions. Such was the case of the national committee for amnesty or pardon and of the farmers groups that visited the president.

In most cases the petitions were reinforced with specific support consisting of a) propaganda campaigns with press and radio editorials, articles, and news items, public statements of group leaders, as was the case of the campaigns in favor of and against the suppression of the secular education provision, the freedom of political prisoners, and the military trials for civilians; b) a great number of collected signatures, as in the case of the petitions for university autonomy and the pardon of political prisoners; c) meetings, marches, and demonstrations organized to impress governmental authorities with the support for certain demands as in the case of the cotton farmers meetings, student marches, the May 1 labor parades and the great mission processions; d) strikes, paros and violent action designed to impress on government authorities the danger involved in not satisfying the corresponding demands as in the operation justice case, the several students paros to demand freedom for university professors and students, the drivers' paro and enforced stoppage of vehicles (including burning of some of them) against the gasoline tax, and the church supported demonstrations for the suppression of the secular education principle.

Government Ouput

When the different types of inputs that were classified above were processed by the political system, two principal types of outputs resulted:

1) The Government took measures to stop or reduce the flow of demands such as, a) warnings to those involved in activities connected with certain demands; b) injunctions to radio stations from broadcasting news related to certain demands to avoid the extension of the state of unrest created by them to unaffected areas of the polity; c) the declaration of

illegality of several strikes; d) the arrest and prosecution of persons involved in agitation in favor or against certain demands; e) the use of para-military organizations to break up meetings or demonstrations; f) the use of military force to disperse demonstrations, break strikes, or control violent outbursts.

2) The government took measures directed at satisfying partially or totally, virtually or in actuality the demands presented to the system for a) in most cases governmental authorities held talks with leaders of the demanding organizations or groups in order to seek a solution to the problems in question--in several cases the talks involved Presidents Somoza or Schick, and after 1963, ex-president Somoza; b) government authorities, usually the President, offered to take certain measures or to enact legislation in order to satisfy the demands involved; c) the effect of unwanted legislation or governmental action was postponed until the normal conditions were restored; d) legislation was enacted and measures taken to satisfy the demands, sometimes, almost in full, sometimes in part as the result of a compromise; and e) legislation and other types of governmental action were suppressed to satisfy demands.

Input/Output Relationship

From the analysis of the inputs and outputs of the system, it seems possible to conclude that as a general rule:

1) The government output tended to satisfy demands when they were presented in a continuous and permanent way and it was apparent that they enjoyed considerable support, as in the case of university autonomy, political prisoners and religious education.

2) The regime tended to stop temporarily and resume after the crisis was over the application of legislation or other governmental action when the support for the demands against that legislation or governmental action was apparently of a transitory nature, as in the case of the weighing of trucks in the roads.

3) The government tended to satisfy demands to act or to abstain from enforcing legislation, injunctions, or other measures, when there were signs that a demand overflow threatened to overcharge or strain the system already busy solving more pressing problems. Such was the case

when the Corinto strikes coincided with the Olama and Mollejones invasion, and when the 1962 anti-tax movement coincided with the strong Aguero campaign to obtain the OAS intervention for the 1963 elections.

4) The regime tended to suppress specific demands when its hands were free from other types of problems and there was no danger of demand overflow as was the case with the February 1962 and June 1963 Corinto strikes, the 1964 San Antonio strike, the 1965 Building industry strike and the 1966 match and beer strikes.

5) The government resisted certain demands more than others depending on the political importance that it gave to the issue. Such was the case of certain political prisoners, and of the suppression of the secular education provision postponed at first because of liberal party opposition.

Feedback Effect

Feedback effect could also be observed here in that, 1) the measures taken or announced by the government as the way to satisfy general demands (Social Security contributions, new taxes) produced demands that they be abolished or reduced; 2) control measures taken to suppress previous demands in turn caused demands that they be suppressed (political prisoners); 3) the rapid satisfaction of certain specific petitions reduced the amount of demands to be processed by the system and permitted the more expedient processing of other more pressing demands (the Olama and Mollejones crisis, Aguero's demands for OAS intervention).

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The question that we have used as the basis of our research throughout this work is a question which Easton considers to be the center of attention in political theory. "How can a political system ever persist whether the world be one of stability or change?"[1] We have applied it to Nicaragua, whose political system regime and authorities have remained the same for a long period of time, and we have found that by following the general outline of systems analysis as spelled out by Easton, it is possible to provide some tentative answers about that difficult question with respect to Nicaragua.

We think that the general propositions of our theoretical framework[2] were generally validated by the research, for we found evidence that in Nicaragua: 1) the political system suffered considerable stress due to increases in the production of social wants during the period of seventeen years examined in the dissertation (1950-1967); 2-a) structural and cultural constraints operated to reduce the flow of demands entering the system; 2-b) general adaptive changes took place in response to the increase in demands that could not be negated by these constraints; 2-c) demands for the replacement of the incumbent authorities and for specific socio-economic and political changes were found to have entered the system at a considerable rate between 1957 and 1967 (the period for which specific demands were analysed); 2-d) specific governmental outputs to satisfy, control, reduce, or suppress such demands were found to have occurred; and 2-e) a feedback effect in which previous outputs of the regime acted as inputs to reduce or increase the flow of demands was evident.

We also think that if the assumption that Nicaragua can be taken as a case study of a developing country is right,[3] it would be possible

to posit as a proposition for further testing that in the changing world of the 20th century, the political system, the regime and the authorities of a developing country have to keep adapting to a rapidly changing environment; and, that the reason why they persist (when they do) is not a simple one. The uses of naked force, extra-societal support, political manipulation, or propaganda do not account by themselves for the permanence of those political systems, regimes, and authorities which persist under the stressful conditions of a developing society. They have to give appropriate responses to a constant and, for the moment at least, increasing flow of demands which they have to process into outputs that in turn will affect the succeeding volume of inputs which find their way into the political system. Their probabilities of persistence depend to a great extent on their ability to process these demand imputs satisfactorily.

I. MAIN FINDINGS OF THE DISSERTATION

The Flow of Demands

Environmental input.-- It was possible to show in Chapter III, Part I, that in the last seventeen years (1950-1967), the gross amount of social needs and wants of the Nicaraguan population increased constantly and at a very rapid pace. The considerable demographic changes that took place during the period produced a corresponding growth of the amounts of food, hospital beds, schools, and other goods and services that the country needed. The impact of these demographic changes was multiplied by the effect of alterations in the social, communications, and educational structures of the nation that were characteristic of those years. These alterations made it possible for greater portions of the Nicaraguan population to participate more fully in the social, economic, and political systems. In addition, the reception of extra-societal political ideologies, such as those proposed by the Cuban Revolution and the Alliance for Progress, and of cultural attitudes brought to the country by people returning from abroad after studying, working or traveling in more developed societies; the effect of foreigners living or traveling in Nicaragua, and the impact of advertising, movies, radio programs, and other means

of communications, considerably enlarged the range of things that people expected from the social and economic systems, and particularly, from the political system.

Constraints on the flow of demands.-- There was also evidence that the effect of these changes was not felt in its entirity by the political system because there are in Nicaragua certain structural conditions and cultural norms which serve as constraints on the flow of demands entering the political system. These constraints explain in part why the political system of Nicaragua has not been stressed beyond endurance by the socio-economic political influences and demands that were found in this study.

Structural constraints.-- Certain conditions that still persist in Nicaragua in spite of the changes undergone by the country during the seventeen years studies did not permit the intra and extra-societal influences to have full impact on large parts of the population. They also failed to provide the sufficient means through which most of the social needs and wants produced in Nicaraguan society could be presented to the political system as actual demands. These conditions, analyzed in Part II of Chapter III were, among others, the existence of great numbers of people still living in relatively isolated areas, a high percentage of illiteracy and few educated people, the lack of complex social and political organization due to a generally low level of development, and the lack of an efficient enough network of communications.

Cultural Constraints.-- In addition we were able to find some cultural attitudes of the people that tended to stop many potential demands from becoming actual. A general tendency to withhold action toward obtaining services from government was found to exist among the subjects of the survey that was undertaken in the city of Leon as a part of our research. This was true even if the same respondents were aware of the insufficiency of such services and of the responsibilities of government in general with respect to social problems.

General Adaptive Changes

Since there was evidence that the structural and cultural constraints were not strong enough to completely offset the influences of the changing environment, we expected to find general adaptive changes

in the Nicaraguan political structure insofar as the system and the regime of the country were able to persist between 1950 and 1967.

The growth of government.-- These changes were found to be of considerable importance. First, there was evidence of a constant growth in the governmental structure of Nicaragua. It became manifest through rapid year by year increases in: a) the total budget of the Nicaraguan government (from 81.4 million cordobas to 673.4 million); b) the percentage of the gross national product used by government and governmental autonomous agencies (from 4.8% to 19.2%); and c) the per capita governmental expenditure (from 60 to 300 cordobas). It was also found that the share of this expenditure invested in such activities as education, health and public works increased considerably during the period (from 26% to 51.2%).

Secondly, there was also evidence of a growing complexity in the governmental machinery. Problems of inefficiency in the face of great amounts of social demands were met with the creation of a considerable number of new governmental agencies and the reorganization of several of the existing ones.

Socio-economic legislation.-- Finally, the Nicaraguan regime tried to control in a direct manner some of the socio-economic problems that it faced by enacting a relatively large amount of legislation attempting to regulate prices, agricultural and industrial production, mining, imports and exports, social security and salaries.

Actual Demand Input.

Types of demands.-- In spite of these adaptive changes a continuous flow of demands entered the political system of Nicaragua between 1957 and 1967, the period to time examined in the IV and V Chapters of the dissertation. They were of different kinds and could be classified as follows: 1) demands for a change in the prevailing regime and for the replacement of the authorities; 2) demands for changes in previous governmental output tending to: a) provide the way for an eventual replacement of the authorities (demands for electoral supervision and reforms); or b) to provide solutions for specific problems (such as the existence of political prisoners, unwanted legislation, tax increases or inefficient

administrative agencies); 3) demands for specific governmental action (control of para-military political organizations--AMROCS or Frentes Populares--higher salaries for teachers, or control of strikes and land occupation); and 4) demands for the abstention from governmental action (demands to stop measures taken to control opposition demonstrations and meetings, the use of the State machinery to support liberal party candidates, or governmental intervention in strikes).

Ways in which demands were presented.-- Several means were used to present these demands. The most important were: 1) public statements made through the mass media of communication by political, civic, religious, students, or labor leaders; and 2) formal petitions presented to the government by political parties, institutions, organizations, ad hoc groups, or individuals.

They were reinforced with: 1) subversive activities directed at displacing the governmental authorities (Olama and Mollejones Invasions, Jinotepe and Diriamba coup) or at creating a situation of anarchy that could eventually lead to a coup d'etat (January 1967 Managua demonstration, June-October 1959 crisis); 2) strikes, paros and violent outbursts designed to impress upon the authorities the danger involved in not satisfying the corresponding demands; 3) meetings, marches, demonstrations, and collections of signatures to convey to the authorities the existence of support for the measures demanded; and 4) propaganda campaigns with press and radio editorials, articles, news items, and public statements made in order to create support or to convince the authorities of the convenience of accepting the measures that were being demanded.

The Output of the Regime

Types of government outputs.-- Faced with these demands the regime responded by producing a series of different outputs that could be classified as follows: 1) the government took measures to stop, reduce, or prevent in a direct manner the flow of demands coming into the political system: a) on several occasions it declared a state of siege, imposed martial law, censorship and curfews, enjoined radio stations from broadcasting certain news, warned persons involved in subversive activities or

in the promotion of certain demands, and declared the illegality of strikes; b) it investigated subversive activities of all kinds with the use of the security police and military intelligence services; c) it arrested prosecuted, and sanctioned (legally or de facto), persons involved in different activities connected with demands; d) it used paramilitary organizations to break up meetings and demonstrations; and e) it used military force to capture, disperse or destroy groups of insurgents, and to disperse demonstrations, break strikes and sit-ins, and control violent outbursts; 2) the government took measures directed at creating the conditions for a reduction of the flow of demands, both in reference to the rate at which they flowed and to the intensity of the support behind the demands. In this respect, the government, a) attempted to give the impression that it was ready to abide by the rules of international law particularly with reference to intervention in neighboring countries (Costa Rica) and with the peaceful settlement of border disputes (Honduras); b) tried to create the image of a more democratic regime by presenting itself as a transition to a democratic government (Luis Somoza), a government by laws (Rene Schick), and a government of technicians highly responsive to the needs of the people in a developing country (Anastasio Somoza Debayle), by reforming the electoral laws and the constitution to include "democratic" changes, and by reorganizing the Liberal Nationalist Party and modernizing its principles and program of action; c) endeavor to present itself as a less oppressive regime by enacting amnesty decrees, pardoning and freeing political prisoners, eliminating military trials for civilians, and trying a military officer (Colonel Juan A. Lopez) for actions against civilian prisoners; and d) tried to eliminate, divide, or diminish the support behind certain demands. To attain the latter, the authorities scheduled talks with parties, organization leaders, groups and individuals in order to seek agreements or compromises. They also offered to satisfy or actually satisfied in a selective way specific demands in which certain groups were especially interested. For example, the authorities guaranteed a representation in Government to the Nicaraguan conservatives in 1957 and 1963, offered Labor Code reforms to the General Confederation of Labor in 1959, and refused to ask for the OAS intervention in the elections to satisfy the National Opposition Front

demands in 1962 ; and 3) the government attempted to reduce the flow of demands by taking measures to satisfy them: a) totally (1962 and 1967 amnesty decrees, suppression of the gasoline tax in 1961, no re-election principle in the 1959 constitutional reform); b) partially (social security tax reductions in 1958, amnesty decrees and pardons in 1957 and 1958, percentage of budget appropriated to the National University in 1966); or c) temporarily, or in form only (weighing of the trucks in the roads in 1962, electoral honesty reforms in 1962 and 1966, reunification of the liberal party offers in 1958 and 1964).

General rules.-- The way in which demands were met by the regime can be said to have followed certain general rules that can be summarized in the following manner: 1) the government tended to satisfy demands: a) when they were presented in a continuous and permanent way and it was apparent that they enjoyed considerable support (amnesty and pardons in favor of political prisoners, constitutional guarantee for University autonomy, suppression of the secular education principle from the constitution, inclusion of the no re-election principle); and b) when there were possibilities of demand overflow because of the existence at the same time of several types of important demands, in which case the regime would tend to give way immediately to those demands that would not directly affect its political integrity (the Corinto strikes and Subtiaba land occupation incidents coinciding with the Olama and Mollejones invasion, and the 1962 tax suppression movement growing in 1962 at the same time with Aguero's campaign); 2) the government would tend to deny satisfaction to, or satisfy only in appearance or temporarily those demands that: a) could affect the political integrity of the regime (electoral supervision and fundamental reforms in the electoral machinery and changes in the power structure of the nationalist liberal party); b) did not enjoy organized support of consideration or supports were of a sporadic nature (weighing of the trucks and opposition to the enactment of the 1962 controlling law); c) did not threaten the regime with an overflow of demands because there were no other important demands coming at the same time (February 1962 and June 1963 Corinto strikes, San Antonio strike in 1965, land occupation in 1959 before the Olama and Mollejones invasion); and 3) the government resisted some demands more than others depending on the political importance that the authorities assigned to the issue (demands for the release

of particular political prisoners resisted more than those made for the release of others and demands to admit more political parties in the elections as compared with demands for electoral supervision).

Feedback

It could be observed that some of the outputs of the regime affected the subsequent flow of demands becoming in this way inputs in a process of feedback. The feedback effect was such that sometimes it reduced the flow of demands and sometimes it increased it. In some opportunities the effect that resulted was that which the authorities intended to produce with the corresponding output. In others, however, the effect was the opposite to or different from that which had been intended by the authorities.

Different feedback effects.-- The efforts of the Nicaraguan regime to create a democratic image can be said to have produced and was intended to have a demand reduction effect. These efforts produced the relative peaceful conditions that characterized political events between 1961 and 1966. On the other hand, the resurgence of violent demands that seemed to have begun at the end of the period examined in the dissertation (late 1966, early 1967) as a consequence of the electoral output of the regime (a Somoza candidate, a vigorous campaign, and tight control of the electoral machinery) cannot be said to have been intended by the authorities. The same was true of the enactment of new taxes in 1962. They were designed to cope with the rising costs of government, enlarged to meet the rapid environmental changes affecting the flow of demands between 1950 and 1962, but they produced a considerable amount of demands directed at obtaining the repeal of the taxes. On the other hand, the governmental output designed to reduce this flow of demands by repealing some taxes and reducing others, had the desired effect, for the demands ceased. A similar effect was produced by the changes in labor legislation made in 1962. Finally, and as an example of an unintended reduction of the flow of demands, the effect of popular information about the lack of responsiveness on the part of local and central governmental officers could be mentioned. In effect, the respondents of our survey tended to withhold demands because they had previous information about the relative lack of

responses that individual demands usually obtain from government officers.

Characteristics of the Nicaraguan Political Process

The data of this study suggests that in certain areas of the Nicaraguan polity, specifically when the determination of the final locus of political power is at stake, the flow of demands that enter the political system is characterized by relatively short-lived periods of violent activity in between periods characterized by an almost total lack of apparent political action. This condition seems to be the result of the lack of political organizations such as parties or pressure groups sufficiently structured and large enough to provide continuous and effective pressure on the political system. The regime seems to be able to withstand the existing pressure because it relies on the Nationalist Liberal Party and the Army. The former is the only large, if relatively loose political organization of the country because, as explained in Chapter II, it centers on the ever-growing governmental bureaucracy. The National Guard is the only armed institution of the country and is relatively small but very well-disciplined and trained.

Up to the present, both the regime and the authorities have been able to persist in Nicaragua. We think however, that even if the authorities eventually changed, the regime and the violent characteristics of the political process that have been just discussed would tend to persist because under the present conditions fundamental changes of a gradual nature would seem unlikely until, and if, sufficiently structured organizations take the place of the existing ones.

Suggestions for Future Research

Systems analysis has been in general a very helpful research tool in this inquiry. Its application to Nicaragua, in addition to providing the basis for the findings that have been reported, suggested areas of future research for scholars interested in the country, the Central American region, or in the general political implications of development. In the following paragraphs some of those topics of research that appear more relevant are listed.

Within the area of demand inputs, the study in detail of the existing political parties and pressure groups in order to determine their structure, the kinds of demands they are likely to make, the type of support that they may possibly give to such demands would undoubtedly yield interesting results. An extensive and intense survey analysis of the attitudes of the Nicaraguan population could also give important information about the reasons why there is such a low level of participation in organizations, even among the urban population, and why the tendencies to withhold demands to the political system that were found in this research exist. Correlation analysis could be applied here to determine the connections between occupation, levels of education, and other indicators and political attitudes, on the one hand and the above mentioned political attitudes on the other.

The whole field of supports as inputs to the political system needs to be researched in Nicaragua. In the case of Nicaragua, the Nationalist Liberal Party, the National Guard, the bureaucracy, the church, business and other organizations should be studied as sources of support to the regime to determine what they contribute to its ability to persist. In addition, the analysis of the ways in which governmental outputs affect or could affect support should be studied.

Finally, we would like to stress the importance of carrying out research to determine whether the political characteristics that were found in Nicaragua are permanent or if they will tend to disappear under the influence of environmental change. If so, to what degree are these characteristics common to all developing countries.

II. SOME WORDS OF CAUTION

After having explained the findings of our research, we would like to close our work with comments designed to clarify our position *vis a vis* some of the issues that have been discussed in the dissertation. We think that it is necessary that we do so because of two reasons. The first is that the political scholar as a human being cannot in the last analysis avoid evaluating what he finds in his inquiry even if in his

attempts to obtain objectivity he tries his best to describe what he sees as it is, and not as he thinks it should be. This is particularly true of the researcher when he examines his own polity. The second reason is that we have been talking about the ways in which the Nicaraguan political system has been adequately meeting the flow of demands that come to it from the environment. We would like to emphasize, even at the risk of repeating ourselves, that this does not mean that we think this output has been adequate from the point of view of our system of values, or any other system of values, because we have not been concerned here with this type of a problem. It only means that, in systems analysis terminology, output has thus far been, adequate to permit the political system, the regime, and the authorities of the country to persist in the face of an increasing flow of demands.

We want to stress here that we do not necessarily approve of the way in which many of the problems that exist in Nicaragua have been handled by the regime. We think that, even if allowances are made for the present low level of social, economic, and political development of the country its authorities have a responsibility to be responsive to needs and to be a positive factor in bringing about much better standards of living for the Nicaraguan population.

We would like to emphasize that in practically all areas of governmental activity what has been done is minimal when compared with what can be done if Nicaragua is ever going to approach the standards of more developed societies. To illustrate the point, the following examples could be mentioned. It has been estimated that at the present rate of achievement, it will take 150 years to reach the goal of primary education for all able children of school age.[4] The National Housing Institute (INVI) now transformed into the Housing Bank built 609 houses in 1966 when it has been estimated that it is necessary to build 18,000 housing units per year for the following three decades to overcome the present shortage of adequate housing facilities estimated at 197,000.[5] Social Security presently covers only the Managua area; it is scheduled to extend to the cities of Leon and Chinandega by the end of this year, but it is doubtful that it will extend to the rural areas at anytime in the foreseeable future.[6]

The prices of corn, beans, and rice reached new heights in June, July and August 1967 because the National Institute for External and Internal Trade (INCEI) failed to take effective measures to avoid cyclical food shortages.[7] There are great areas of the Nicaraguan economy where minimum salary regulations are not enforced and there are still 8,543 urban families with incomes of less than 155 dollars a year.[8]

In addition, and as Doctor Eduardo Montealegre, a noted Nicaraguan economist said in a Commencement Address at the National University in Leon,[9] the surprising gains in gross national product that have taken place in the country in the last seventeen years are primarily the result of the private efforts of enterprising Nicaraguans. We conclude that the government has thus far failed to implement adequate policies geared to take advantage of these increases in production in order to maximize their effects and to make the trend a permanent and continuous one.

Furthermore, the resurgence of violent opposition inputs which were found at the end of the period studied here has continued up to the time of writing. Four political hold-ups were staged between May and September and guerrilla warfare is going on in the mountains of Matagalpa.[10] This has brought back the use of military and police measures beyond what can be considered tolerable as a continuous condition. Thus, this serves to show that the reduction of these excessed during the Schick administration was only the consequence of the corresponding decrease in opposition inputs. We think that to a great extent the violent nature of Nicaraguan politics is the result of the failure of the regime to obtain full political legitimacy because it has continued to plan self-perpetuation as the primary priority.

The present administration has emphasized the development aspects of governmental activities and the necessity of a technical approach to solve existing problems. It has promised to take many measures to bring about rapid development through governmental action.[11] However, it should be pointed out that in order to implement such changes it is first imperative to obtain the necessary human and financial resources. This means in our opinion that it would be necessary to reorganize the Nicaraguan

bureaucracy in a fundamental way to reform the present tax and tax collecting systems, and to reduce the share of the national budget used for the government itself and for such purposes as the keeping of the National Guard. Since this would at the same time: a) affect the two main basis of support of the regime; and b) create the conditions for a serious increase in demands against taxes and other possible measures (as in 1962), the safest educated guess, is that the regime will continue to operate, for sometime at least, in a fashion similar to what has been characteristic of its behavior in the last ten years. In short, the regime, on a trial and error basis will continue to seek to avoid demand overflow by doing as little as possible without creating further demands for government action, by satisfying demands only when their satisfaction does not affect the political power basis of the regime, and by continuing to use image building devices to decrease demands and increase supports. This policy of politics by minimax strategy will retard Nicaraguan development because it minimizes the need to resolve popular demands and needs through development programs and maximizes the need to perpetuate the regime.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER I

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[53]Ibid., p. 38

[54]Ibid., p. 39

[55]Ibid., p. 39

[56]Ibid., p. 37

[57]Ibid., p. 81

[58]Ibid., p. 82

[59]Ibid., p. 143

[60]Teran and Incer, op. cit., p. 153.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER II

[1]Francisco Teran and Jaime Incer, Geografia de Nicaragua, (Managua: Banco Central de Nicaragua, 1964), p. 6.

[2]Direccion General de Estadistica y Censos, Censos Nacionales 1963, Poblacion, (Managua: Vol. 1, 1964), p. xxvii.

[3]Ibid., p. xi.

[4]Richard N. Adams, Cultural Surveys of Panama, Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, (Washington, D.C.: Pan American Sanitary Bureau, 1957), pp. 232 and 238.

[5]Ibid., p. 156

[6]Teran and Incer, op. cit., p. 157

[7]Direccion General de Estadistica, VI Censo de Poblacion, Volumen Preliminar, (Guatemala, 1953).

[8]Laslo Pataki, Nicaragua Desconocida, (Managua: Editorial Universal, 1956), ch. 1.

[9]Censos Nacionales 1963, Poblacion, op. cit., (Vol. 1, p. xxxi).

[10]Ibid., p. xvi

[11]Robert E. Scott, Mexican Government in Transition, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), p. 51.

[12]Censos Nacionales 1963, Poblacion, op., cit., (Vol. 1.)

[13]Ibid., p. xxv.

[14]Ibid., p. xxv.

[15]Ibid., Vol. II, p. xii.

[16]From Direccion General de Estadistica y Censos, Boletin de Estadistica, III Epoca, (Managua: 1966, No. 11), p. 127

[17] Banco Central de Nicaragua, Informe Anual 1965, p. 163.

[18]Censos Nacionales, 1963, Poblacion, (Vol. II,) pp. xi and xvi.

[19]Universidad Nacional de Nicaragua, Plan de Desarrollo 1966-1972, (Leon: 1965), p. 25.

[20]Ibid., p. 62

[21]Ibid., p. 62

[22]Memorandum to the author from Oficina Nacional de Planificacion, March 15, 1967. Data corresponds to 1964.

[23]Nemesio Porras, "Tenencia de la Tierra en Nicaragua", (Managua: Universidad Nacional de Nicaragua, 1962), p. 36 [mimeograph]

[24]Consejo Superior Universitario Centroamericano, Oferta y Demanda de Recursos Humanos en Centroamerica, (San Jose: 1966), p. 52

[25]Direccion General de Estadistica y Censos, Censos Nacionales 1963, Vivienda, (Managua: 1965, Vol. III), p. 1

[26]Banco Central de Nicaragua, Informe Anual 1966, p. 177.

[27]Marshall Wolfe, "La Clases Medias en Centroamerica", (Mexico: D.F., Naciones Unidas (CEPAL), 1960), p. 6. [mimeograph]

[28]Memorandum from the Oficina de Planificacion (March 15, 1967).

[29]Ibid.

[30]Censos Nacionales 1963, Vivienda, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 1.

[31]Ibid., p. xii.

[32]Ibid., p. xiii

[33]Boletin de Estadistica, op. cit., p. 127.

[34]Ibid., p. 27.

[35]Alianza Para el Progreso, Central American Transportation Study, (Guatemala: 1965), p. 40

[36]Boletin de Estadistica, op. cit., pp. 159-160.

[37]Banco Central, Informe Anual 1965, p. 89.

[38]Plan de Desarrollo 1966-1972, op. cit., p. 16.

[39]Oferta y Demanda de Recursos Humanos, op. cit., p. 4.

[40]Banco Central, Informe Anual 1966, p. 200

[41]Ibid., p. 174

[42]Memorandum to the author from Oficina de Migracion de Nicaragua, April 5, 1967.

[43]Oferta y Demanda de Recursos Humanos, op. cit., p.76.

[44]Notas Geograficas y Economicas sobre la Republica de Nicaragua, (Paris: Imprenta Hispano-Americana, 1872), p.235. [cited by Pablo Levy]

[45]Jose D. Gamez, Historia de Nicaragua, (Managua: Imprenta el Pais, 1889), pt. I, ch. VII

[46]Tomas Ayon, Historia de Nicaragua, (Managua: Imprenta el Pais, 1889), bk. III, ch. I.

[47]Jose D. Gamez, Historia de la Costa de los Mosquitos, (Managua: 1939), [gives general account of subject]

[48]Jose Coronel Urtecho, Reflexiones sobre la Historia de Nicaragua, (Leon: Hospicio, 1962), t. I, ch. I.

[49]Ibid.

[50]Jose D. Gamez, Historia de Nicaragua, op. cit., pt. III.

[51]Leon Debayle, Les Emprunts Exterieurs et la Reforme Monetaire de la Republique du Nicaragua, (Paris: Librairie General de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1927), ch. I.

[52]Sara L. Barquero, Gobernantes de Nicaragua, (Managua: Publicaciones de Educacion Publica, 1947), p. 204.

[53]Gregorio Selser, Sandino: General de Hombres Libres, (Buenos Aires: Triangulo, 1959), p. 335.

[54]Sara Luisa Barquero, op. cit., p. 234 and Gregorio Selser, op. cit., p. 337.

[55]Gregorio Selser, op. cit., ch. XIII.

[56]Ibid., ch. XV and ch. XVI.

[57]Partido Liberal de Nicaragua, Un Hombre de Estado Ante la Historia, (Managua: Talleres Nacionales, 1944), p. 35

[58][See footnote 86 below]

[59]Alvarez Lejarza, Las Constituciones de Nicaragua, (Madrid: Cultura Hispanica, 1958), p. 139.

[60]Ibid., p. 140.

[61]Ibid., p. 140

[62]La Gaceta, April 21, 1955.

[63]Ibid., August 20, 1959.

[64]Ibid., June 3, 1966.

[65]Republica de Nicaragua, Constitucion Politica con las Reformas Vigentes, Ley de Amparo y Ley Marcial, (Managua: article 11, 1966).

[66]Tribunal Supremo Electoral, Ley Electoral, (Managua: Imprenta Nacional, 1966), article 125. [Up to April 15, 1967 after which there are only 54 deputies as a consequence of the 1966 electoral reapportionment].

[67]Alvarez Lejarza, op. cit., p. 365.

[68]Constitucion Politica con las Reformas Vigentes, Ley de Amparo y Ley Marcial, op. cit., "Ley de Amparo", (articles 1 and 2).

[69]Ibid., Title VI, and articles 1 and 2 of the "Ley Marcial".

[70]Ibid., article 307.

[71]Sergio Ramirez, La Problematica del Derecho Constitucional Nicaraguense, (Leon: Universidad Nacional de Nicaragua, Escuela de Derecho, Tesis, 1964), pp. 52 and 55. [memeograph].

[72]Jose Maria Moncada, Estados Unidos en Nicaragua, (Managua: Atenas, 1942); Guillermo E. Cuadra, "Memorias de un Ex-Oficial de la Guardia Nacional" Revista Conservadora, (Nos. 25 to 34, October, 1962 to July, 1963); Carlos Cuadra Pasos "Introduccion a la Historia de la Guardia Nacional", Revista Conservadora, (No. 11, August, 1961), pp.4-11; and Comandancia de los U.S.M.C., "Resena de la Organizacion y Operaciones de la Guardia Nacional", Revista Conservadora, (Nos. 25 to 34 October, 1962 to July 1963).

[73]Constitucion Politica con las Reformas Vigentes, Ley de Amparo y Ley Marcial, op. cit., Article 314.

[74]Ibid., Article 315.

[75]Ibid., Article 319, and Oficina de Leyes y Relaciones de la Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, Codigo Juridico Militar de la Guardia Nacional, (Managua: Talleres Nacionales, 1948), ch. II.

[76]Mariano Fiallos Oyanguren, "El Arto. 38 de la Constitucion y su Vigencia Efectiva", Revista Juridica (Leon: October 1960), p. 25 [About the implications of such a condition for civil rights enforcement].

[77]Ley Electoral, op. cit., Articles 7 and 8.

[78]Ibid., Article 14.

[79]Partido Liberal Nacionalista, Estatutos, (Managua: Imprenta San Enrique, 1966), ch. III.

[80]Ley Electoral, op. cit., Articles 61, 62, and 65.

[81]Banco Central, Informe Anual 1965, p. 207.

[82]Direccion General del Presupuesto, Presupuesto General de Ingresos y Engresos de la Republica 1967, (Managua: 1966), pp. 587-607.

[83]Ibid., pp. 557-565.

[84]Constitucion Politica con las Reformas Vigentes, Ley de Amparo y Ley Marcial, op. cit., Articles 12, 217, 218, 219 and 223.

[85]Partido Liberal Nacionalista, Estatutos, op. cit., Article 14.

[86]The fortune left by General Somoza Garcia at his death in 1956 was estimated by Time (Vol. LXVIII, No. 15, October 8, 1956, p. 43) at 60 million dollars. It went to engross the already considerable holdings of the other members of the family. At present the Somoza family owns or holds controlling interest in at least the following: METASA (iron works), El Porvenir (textiles), three cotton gining plants, eight coffee and eight rice processing plants, La Polar (ice), LaNica Air Lines, Mamenic Line, Concabesnic (Maritime agencies and warehouses), Momotombo (matches), Canal (cement), Santa Rita and Montelimar (sugar and alcohol), Licores Bell (alcoholic beverages), Novedades and La Prensa Grafica (newspapers), El Tamarindo (table salt), fifty-one cattle and milk haciendas, eight sugar cane plantations, forty-six coffee plantations, 3,000 manzanas of rice, plus considerable extensions of cotton, corn, sesame, and sorghum plantations, two seaports (Puerto Somoza and Masachapa), several river and lake ports, renting houses, choice of vacant lots in Managua, land in the Managua surroundings, and several investments in practically all areas of the Nicaraguan economy. In addition, they have considerable holdings in the rest of Central America, the United States, Switzerland, and other countries. A listing is provided by Otilio Ulate in "Carta al Presidente Somoza", Revista Conservadora, No. 16 (January 1961). See also La Nacion, (San Jose, Costa Rica, June 24, 1964) as an example of the preoccupation that the considerable holdings of the Somozas produced in that country.

[87]Sergio Ramirez, op. cit., and Alvarez LeJarza, op. cit., give historical accounts of this trend.

[88]Constitucion Politicacon las Reformar Vigentes, op. cit., p. V.

[89]The polemic literature on Nicaraguan elections is extensive. For the early period of Nicaraguan history see, Gamez, op. cit., for the conservative "thirty years", Jeronimo Perez, Obras Historicas Completas, (Managua Imprenta Nacional, 1928), for the elections during the Zelaya regime, Emiliano Chamorro, "Autobiografia", Revista Conservadora, Nos. 5 to 18, (August 1960 to March 1962), for the second conservative regime, Partido Liberal Nacionalista, Recuerdos de un Pasado que siempre es de Actualidad, (second edition), (Managua: La Hora, 1962), for the U.S. supervised elections, Revista Conservadora, (No. 1, p. 26 and No. 16,

p. 43). For more recent elections, Ibid., and Adan Selva, Lodo y Ceniza de una Politica que ha Podrido las Raices de la Nacionalidad Nicaraguense, (Managua: ASEL, 1960); also, El Centroamericano, (February 7, 8 and 9, 1967), and La Prensa, (February 6, 7 and 8, 1967).

[90]Sergio Ramirez, op. cit., pp. 74 and 75.

[91]Emiliano Chamorro, op. cit., p. 83.

[92]Jeronimo Perez, op. cit., p. 203.

[93]Interview with Dr. Rodolfo Abaunza, member of the PLI Board of Directors and Senator for the 1967-72 Congress.

[94]Reinaldo A. Tefel, Socializacion en la Libertad, (Managua: Editorial Nicaraguense, 1964), p. 61.

[95]Partido Mobilizacion Republicana, Principios, Programas, Estatutos, (Managua: 1961).

[96]Interviews with Dr. Fernando Gutierrez Gutierrez, one of the founders of both the PRN and the PAR. Reinaldo A. Tefel, op. cit., pp. 58-61.

[97]Infra., p.

[98]A case in point is the creation of the Nicaraguan Conservative Party, as a split from the Conservative Party for the 1957 elections. See Partido Conservador Nicaraguense, Primer Ano de Accion Civica y Lucha Parlamentaria, (Managua: Editorial Artes Graficas, 1958), ch. I and ch. II.

[99]Interviews were held with leaders of the active opposition parties, Rodolfo Abaunza and Virgilio Godoy from PLI, Fernando Gutierrez Gutierrez from PAR (formerly PRN), Manuel Morales Peralta and Edgardo Matamoros from the PSCN; Fernando Zelaya from the Conservative Party, Edgardo Buitrago from the Nicaraguan Conservative Party, and Luis F. Perez Caldera from the MR party.

[100]Rolando Avendana Sandino, Masacre Estudiantil, (Leon: Tipografia America, 1960), ch. 2, and Infra., p. [Examples]

[101]Carlos Fonesca Amador, "Carta Abierta", in La Prensa, June 22, 1967. Mr. Fonseca is the leader of the FSLN.

[102]"Ley de Prensa", La Gaceta, January 26, 1967.

[103]Infra., p.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER III

[1]David Easton, Systems Analysis of Political Life, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), p. 22

[2]Philip Hauser, "Population, Poverty and World Politics" University of Illinois Bulletin, (Vol. 67, No. 97), pp. 3 and 7.

[3]Direccion General de Estadistica y Censos, Censos Nacionales 1963, Poblacion, (Managua: 1964), p. xv

[4]Memorandum to the author from Direccion General de Estadistica y Censos, March 10, 1967.

[5]Consejo Superior Universitario Centroamericano, Oferta y Demanda de Resursos Humanos en Centroamerica, (San Jose: 196, 1966), p. 1

[6]Lauchlin Currie, Poblacion y Desarrollo, (Washington: Population Reference Bureau, 1966), p. 8

[7]13,076 only, that is to say, 85% of the total population.

[8]Memorandum to the author from Oficina Central de Migracion, April 7, 1967.

[9]Censos Nacionales 1963, Poblacion, (Vol. I, p. xxx).

[10]Universidad Nacional de Nicaragua, Plan de Desarrollo 1966-1972, (Leon: 1965), p. 19

[11]Robert E. Scott, Mexican Government in Transition, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), p. 49.

[12]Censos Nacionales 1963, Poblacion, (Vol. I, pp. xv and xviii).

[13]Memorandum to the author from Direccion General de Estadistica, March 10, 1967.

[14]Censos Nacionales 1963, Poblacion, (Vol. I, p. xxxiii).

[15]Alianza Para el Progreso, Central American Transportation Study, (Guatemala: 1965), p. 40.

[16]Direccion General de Estadistica, Boletin de Estadistica, (Epoca III, No. 11), p. 160.

[17]Marshall Wolfe, "Las Clases Medias en Centroamerica", (Mexico D.F.,

Naciones Unidas (CEPAL), 1960), p. 52, [mimeograph], and Lawrence C. Lockley, Caracteristicas del Mercado Comun Centroamericano, (Tegucigalpa: Banco Centroamericano, 1964), p. 141.

[18]Lawrence C. Lockley, op. cit., p. 150.

[19]Censos Nacionale : 1963, Poblacion, (Vol. II, p. xii).

[20]From data in Plan de Desarrollo, 1966-1972, op. cit., pp. 23, 24, 133 and 134.

[21]Boletin de Estadistica, (Epoca III, No. 11), p. 97, and memorandum to the author from Junta Nacional de Asistencia Social, Secretaria, April 7, 1967.

[22]Banco Central, Informe Anual, 1961, pp. 54 and 55, and Informe Anual, 1966, pp. 64 and 65.

[23]Oferta y Demanda de Recursos Humanos, op. cit., p. 7.

[24]Banco Central, Informe Anual, 1965, p. 126.

[25]Banco Central, Informe Anual, 1966, pp. 126 and 139.

[26]Nemesio Porras, "Tenencia de la Tierra en Nicaragua", (Managua: Universidad Nacional de Nicaragua 1962), p. 42. [mimeograph]

[27]Boletin de Estadistica, (Epoca III, No. 11), p. 169 and Banco Central, Informex Anual 1965, p. 108.

[28]Boletin de Estadistica, (Epoca III, No. 11), p. 160.

[29]Memorandum to the author from Oficina de Aeronautica Civil, March 27, 1967.

[30]L. C. Lockley, op. cit., pp. 139 and 140.

[31]F. Oferta y Demanda de Recursos Humanos, op. cit., p. 76 and, Ministerio de Educacion de Nicaragua, "Informe Presentado a la Conferencia sobre Desarrollo Economico de Santiago de Chile", (Managua: 1962), p. 57 [mimeograph].

[32]Ministerio de Hacienda y Credito Publico, Cifras y Comentarios No. 29, p. 31.

[33]Interview with Sr. Mario Valladares, International Air Transport Association (IATA) representative in Leon.

[34]Central American Transportation Study, op. cit., p. 23 and Banco Central, Informe Anual 1965, p. 226.

[35]Mariano Fiallos Gil, Humanismo Beligerante, (Leon: Hospico, 1958), p. 221.

[36]See, Francisco Gonzalez Fley, Los Sindicatos, (Leon: Universidad Nacional, 1962), xxx; Jose E. Paiz, La Reforma Agraria en Nicaragua, (Leon: Universidad Nacional, 1962); and Noel A. Garcia Castillo, "El Movimiento Obrero en Nicaragua y la Penetracion del Comunismo", Revista Conservadora, (No. 24, September 1962), pp. 2-5.

[37]Anastasio Somoza Debayle, Mensaje Inaugural, (Managua: Imprenta Nacional, 1967), p. 4.

[38]Supra., p and Infra., p.

[39]Memorandum to the author from Direccion General de Estadistica y Censos, March 10, 1967.

[40]Charles H. Backstrom and Gerald D. Harsh, Survey Research, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963).

[41]Memorandum to the author, from Departamento de Estadistica y Registro de la Universidad Nacional de Nicaragua, February 27, 1967.

[42]Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1965), pp. 144-147.

[43]Ibid., Table X.2, p. 247.

[44]Supra. p.

[45]From data in Ministerio de Hacienda y Credito Publico, Direccion General del Presupuesto, Presupuesto General de Ingresos y Egresos de la Republica, 1950-1967.

[46]From data in Banco Central, Informe Anual 1966, p. 341.

[47]From data in Presupuesto General de Ingreso y Egresos de la Republica, 1950-1967.

[48]Alianza para el Progreso, Adelanto en Nicaragua, 1961-1966, (Managua: 1967), p. 37.

[49]Presupuesto General de Ingresos y Engresos de la Republica, 1950-1967.

[50]"Informe Presentado a la Conferencia Sobre Desarrollo Economico de Santiago de Chile", op. cit., p. 92, and Banco Central, Informe Anual 1966, p. 341.

[51]Banco Central, Informe Anual 1966, p. 341

[52]Ibid., p. 229.

[53]Anastasio Somoza Debayle, op. cit., p. 5.

[54]Banco Central, Informe Anual 1966, p. 341.

[55]Presupuesto General de Ingresos y Egresos de la Republica, 1966.

[56]Banco Central, Informe Anual, p. 341.

[57]La Gaceta, March 22, 1952, March 25, 1953, March 13, 1961, December 21, 1961, February 8, 1962, July 6, 1962, August 31, 1962, June 29, 1964, March 6, 1965, and August 17, 1965.

[58]Ibid., June 28, 1962, June 30, 1962, Subsequently reformed, July 25, August 1 and August 31, 1962.

[59]Ibid., June 29, 1957, June 30, 1962.

[60]Constitucion Politica con las Reformas Vigentes, Ley de Amparo y Ley Marcial, (Managua: 1966, Title VIII, ch. VI).

[61]Presupuesto General de Ingresos y Engresos de la Republica 1967.

[62]La Gaceta, March 13, 1954.

[63]Banco Central, Informe Anual 1966, pp. 311 and 312.

[64]La Gaceta, October 23, 1954.

[65]Banco Central, Informe Anual 1966, pp. 167 and 341.

[66]La Gaceta, January 2, 1956.

[67]Instituto Nacional de Seguridad Social, Anuario Estadistico 1966, (Managua: 1967), p. 34.

[68]La Gaceta, June 18, 1966.

[69]Banco Central, Informe Anual, 1966, p. 183.

[70]La Gaceta, September 16 and October 27, 1960.

[71]La Prensa, October 16, 1958, p. 1.

[72]La Gaceta, July 10, 1964.

[73]Ibid., May 2, 1966.

[74]Ibid., April 19, 1963.

[75]Memorandum from the Public Relations Office of the Instituto Agrario Nacional, August 20, 1967.

[76]La Gaceta, November 12, 1963, Consejo Nacional de Economia, Oficina de Planificacion, "Analisis del Desarrollo Economico y Social de Nicaragua, 1950-1962", (Managua: 1964), "Estudio del Desarrollo

Industrial de Nicaragua, 1950-1962", (Managua: 1964), "Estudio del Problema Habitacional de Nicaragua 1950-1962", (Managua: 1964), "Estudio de la Salud Publica de Nicaragua, 1950-1962", (Managua: 1964), "Programa de Inversiones Publicas 1965-1969", (Managua: 1965), "Mejoramiento de la Educacion en Nicaragua 1965-1975", (Managua: 1965), [all mimeograph].

[77]La Gaceta, April 17, 1958, February 7, 1961, December 2, 1958, March 2, 1965.

[78]Ibid., March 10, 1955 and April 24, 1958.

[79]James L. Busey, "Central American Union: The Last Attempt", The Western Political Quarterly, March, 1961.

[80]For a complete listing, Banco Central, Informe Anual 1966, p. 267.

[81]Supra.

[82]Constitucion Politica con las Reformas Vigentes, Ley de Amparo y Ley Marcial, (article 85.)

[83]Ibid., (article 86.)

[84]La Gaceta, October 14, 1966, October 22, 1965 and November 23, 1964.

[85]Ibid., November 30, 1965, October 5, 1965, October 18, 1963, January 13, 1964, August 8, 1961, August 8, 1961, March 23, 1961 and August 2, 1961.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER IV

[1]Most of the information used in Chapters IV and V comes from the daily newspapers El Centroamericano, La Prensa, and Novedades published in Nicaragua from January 1956 to May 1967 and which the author read as part of his research during the months of March, April and May, 1967. Specific footnotes are used only when the information mentioned in the text comes from other sources or when reference is made to a concrete news item published in one of the three newspapers mentioned above.

[2]Emilio Alvarez Lejarza, Las Constituciones de Nicaragua, (Madrid: Cultural Hispanica, 1958), pp. 138 and 139; Emiliano Chamorro, "Autobiografia", Revista Conservadora, (Nos. 5-18), pp. 189-202

[3]Consejo Nacional de Elecciones, "Informe Oficial sobre las Elecciones de Autoridades Supremas del 21 de Mayo de 1950", (Managua: 1950), [mimeograph]

[4]"Acuerdo Politico Suscrito entre el Partido Conservador de Nicaragua y el Partido Liberal Nacionalista por Medio de sus Delegados Plenipotenciarios Generales Emiliano Chamorro y Anastasio Somoza Garcia", Revista Conservadora, (No. 14), p. 185, (Article 4- ch.).

[5]Constitucion Politica, Ley de Amparo y Ley Marcial de Nicaragua, (Managua: Talleres Nacionales, 1951), Title XVII, Article 336, Nos. 1 to 7.

[6]Ibid., Articles 11, 127, 211, 214, 217, 218, 274, 336 - 6, and 186.

[7]Emiliano Chamorro, op, cit., p. 191.

[8]"Recuerdos de un Sobreviviente del 4 de Abril de 1954", El Centroamericano, (April 4, 1963), p. 1.

[9]La Gaceta, April 21, 1955.

[10]Novedades, November 22, 1955.

[11]El Centroamericano, February 4, 1955.

[12]Constitucion Politica y sus Reformas, (Managua: Talleres Nacionales, 1955), article 116.

[13]Novedades, November 11, 1956.

[14]Ibid., November 20, 1956.

[15]Novedades, January 9, 1957.

[16]La Noticia, November 30, 1956. Martial law was kept for Leon and Managua in order to give jurisdiction to the Military Court to legally try the civilians been prosecuted at the time in accordance with "Ley Marcial", articles 1 and 8 (Constitucion Politica y sus Reformas 1955.)

[17]"Partido Conservador Nicaraguense" in order to be distinguished from the main party, "Partido Conservador de Nicaragua" referred to in the text as Conservative Party. See the official version of the party about its foundation in Partido Conservador Nicaraguense, Primer Ano de Accion Civica y Lucha Parlamentaria, (Managua: Editorial Artes Graficas, 1958), pp. 1-9.

[18]Ibid., pp. 1-9.

[19]Novedades, February 2, 1957.

[20]Consejo Nacional de Elecciones, "Informe Oficial sobre las Elecciones de Autoridades Supremas del 3 de Febrero de 1957, (Managua: 1957) [mimeograph]

[21]Expression attributed to President Somoza and widely used in Nicaragua to refer to such parties. The author heard this explanation from Don Luis Somoza shortly after Schick's inauguration, "those are parties whose whole membership can confortably seat in a medium sized sofa" at a private conversation on June 17, 1963.

[22]El Centroamericano, April 8, 1958.

[23]Ibid., April 27, 1958.

[24]Ibid., April 8, 1959.

[25]Ibid., April 24, 1959.

[26]Ibid., May 5, 1959.

[27]Eduardo Conrado Vado, "La Rebelion de Carazo", Revista Conservadara (No. 15, December 1961), pp. 15-18.

[28]Novedades, September 28, 1963.

[29]Luis Pasos Arguello, "El Fallo de la Corte de la Haya contra Nicaragua", Revista Conservadora, (No. 5, December 1960), pp. 1-22, and Jose Sanson Teran, El Arbitraje Internacional y la Controversia de Limites entre Nicaragua y Honduras, (Barcelona: Editorial Hispano-Europea, 1959), pp. 64 and 80-88.

[30]Otilio Ulate, "Carta al Presidente Somoza", Revista Conservadora, (No. 16, January 1961), pp. 5 and 6.

[31]Luis Somoza Debayle, Discurso de Toma de Posesion, Primero de Mayo de 1957, (Managua: Talleres Nacionales, 1957).

[32]El Centroamericano, January 22, 1959.

[33]Ibid., March 19, 1959.

[34]Reported to the author by one of the leaders who attended the meeting.

[35]Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Cardenal, Luis Cardenal Arguello, Jose Medina Cuadra, among well known political leaders. The group included also Father Federico Arguello, former member of the Society of Jesus.

[36]Luis Somoza Debayle, op. cit., and reported in El Centroamericano, April 12, 1958.

[37]As reported to the author by Dr. Alejo Icaza Icaza, at the time President of the Liberal Independent Party in April 1958.

[38]La Gaceta, August 29, 1959.

[39]Novedades, January 29, 1960.

[40]Ibid., January 29, 1960 and July 4, 1964.

[41]El Centroamericano, February 11, 1958.

[42]La Prensa, October 4, 1960.

[43]El Centroamericano, August 15, 1961.

[44]Revista Conservadora, (No. 16, January 1962), pp. 1 to 9.

[45]El Centroamericano, Feburary 27, 1962.

[46]La Prensa, June 21, 1964, p. 4.

[47]La Gaceta, May 26, 1962.

[48]Tribunal Supremo Electoral, "Informe Oficial sobre las Elecciones de Autoridades Supremas del 3 de Febrero de 1963", (Managua: 1963). [mimeograph]

[49]Partido Liberal Nacionalista, Declaracion de Principios y Programa de Accion, (Managua: Imprenta San Enrique, 1966).

[50]Ibid., p. 29.

[51]Ibid., p. 1.

[52]La Gaceta, June 3, 1966.

[53]La Gaceta, May 25, 1962.

[54]Tribunal Supremo Electoral, Ley Electoral, Managua (Talleres Nacionales, 1966), article 14.

[55]La Prensa, August 5 and 6, 1966, El Centroamericano, August 6, 1966.

[56]Figured on the basis of Presupuesto General de Ingresos y Egresos de la Republica, 1962-1967.

[57]Anastasio Somoza Debayle, Hacia la Meta, Mensajes Politicos (Managua: Editorial San Jose, 1967). [collected campaign speeches]

[58]Interviews with Doctors, Oscar Aragon Valdez and Jose Pasos Marciacq who were captured that evening and witnessed and suffered tortures of different kinds.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER V

[1]The literature on the subject is abundant. See, among others, Pedro J. Chamorro Cardenal, Estirpe Sangrienta: Los Somoza, (Mexico, D.F. Editorial Patria y Libertad, 1957) and Clemente Guido, Noche de Torturas, Consejo de Guerra de 1956, (Managua: Editorial Artes Graficas, 1963).

[2]Partido Conservador Nicaraguense, Primer Ano de Accion Civica y Lucha Parlamentaria, (Managua, 1957), p. 3.

[3]El Gran Diario, February 17, 1957.

[4]El Centroamericano, June 9, 1958.

[5]Manuel Escobar (ed.), Codigo de Instruccion Criminal de Nicaragua, (Managua: El Espectador, 1949), [article 115], p. 80

[6]El Centroamericano, August 23, 1958.

[7]Ibid., July 4, 1964.

[8]Carlos Tunnermann, Breve Resena de la Conquista de la Autonomia Universitaria en Nicaragua, (Leon: Universidad Nacional de Nicaragua, 1958), p. 3.

[9]See for example, Flecha, October 1 and 6, 1965; La Noticia, October 6, 1955; La Prensa, October 6, 1955; El Diario Nicaraguense, October 1955.

[10]La Prensa , October 8 and 9, 1955; El Centroamericano, October 8, 1955, El Gran Diario, October 8, 1955 and La Noticia, October 8, 1955.

[11]La Gaceta, March 27, 1958.

[12]Revista Conservadora, No. 16, (October 1965), p. 1,and Universidad Nacional de Nicaragua, Sesquicentenario 1812-1962, (Leon: Hospicio, 1962).

[13]See for instance: "Discurso Pronunciado por el Rector de la Universidad Nacional Dr. Mariano Fiallos Gil el 11 de Enero de 1962 en el Salon de Sesiones de la Camara de Diputados" en Sesquicentenario 1812-1962, op. cit., p. 52, and "Presupuesto de la Universidad un Problema Nacional", La Noticia, January 10, 1962.

[14]La Prensa, January 29, 1966.

[15]Presupuesto General de Ingresos y Egresos de la Republica, 1957, 1958, 1963, 1966 and 1967.

[16]Universidad Nacional de Nicaragua, Ley Organica, (Leon: 1958).

[17]La Gaceta, May 5, 1966.

[18]Constitucion Politica con las Reformas Vigentes, Ley de Amparo y Ley Marcial, (Managua: 1966), [article 105], and Presupuesto General de Ingresos y Egresos de la Republica, 1967.

[19]Anastasio Somoza Debayle, Hacia la Meta, Mensajes Politicos, (Managua: Editorial San Jose, 1967), p. 152.

[20]Articles 5 and 9, Section 2 of the 1858 Constitution; article 50 of the 1893 Constitution; article 88 of the 1939 Constitution, in Emilio Alvarez Lejarza, Las Constituciones de Nicaragua, (Madrid: Cultura Hispanica, 1958), pp. 533, 563, 781, and 850. About Church attitude toward liberal reforms of 1893, see Alvarez Lejarza, op. cit., p. 124.

[21]Marco Antonio Garcia, La Santa Mision: Carta Pastoral (Granada: Editorial Magys, 1960)

[22]La Noticia, December 12, 1963, and La Gaceta, May 25, 1962.

[23]"Carta Informe al Congreso Nacional del Ministro de Educacion, Dr. Gonzalo Meneses Ocon", La Prensa, May 1963, p. 1.

[24]Partido Liberal Nacionalista, Declaracion de Principios y Programa de Accion, (Managua: Imprenta San Enrique, 1966), p. 18.

[25]La Gaceta, May 5, 1966.

[26]Mariano Fiallos Oyanguren,"Estabilidad Politica y Desarrollo Socio-Economico en Centro America", Repertorio Centroamericano, No. 6, December 1966.

[27]Universidad Nacional de Nicaragua, Plan de Desarrollo 1966-1972, (Leon: 1965), pp. 14 and 15.

[28]El Centroamericano, April 11, 1958.

[29]Ibid., April 7, 1959.

[30]Ibid., February 5, 1960.

[31]Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganaderia, Ley de Reforma Agraria, (Managua: Imprenta San Jose, 1964).

[32]El Centroamericano, March 27, 1965.

[33]Supra., p.

[34]El Centroamericano, October 21, 1960.

[35]Ibid., May 3, 1962.

[36]La Gaceta, October 13, 1962 and May 9, 1963.

[37]Boletin de Estadistica Epoca III, No. 11, pp. 169 and 170 and Banco Central, Informe Anual 1962, p. 61

[38]El Centroamericano, March 29, 1960.

[39]Ibid., July 20, 1957.

[40]Ibid., July 24, 1958.

[41]La Gaceta, April 24,1959.

[42]Ibid., March 18, 1961.

[43]El Centroamericano, January 16, 1962.

[44]La Gaceta, June 28, 1962, and June 30, 1962.

[45]Novedades, August 21, 1962.

[46]La Gaceta, July 25, 1962 and August 1, 1962.

[47]Ibid., August 31, 1962 and October 2, 1962.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER VI

[1]David Easton, Systems Analysis of Political Life, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), p. 15.

[2]Supra., pp.

[3]Supra., pp.

[4]Universidad Nacional de Nicaragua, Plan de Desarrollo 1966-1972, (Leon: 1965).

[5]Ibid., pp. 13 and 14.

[6]Banco Central, Informe Anual 1966, p. 180.

[7]La Prensa, September 12, 1967.

[8]Memorandum to the author from Oficina de Planificacion, (Managua: March 15, 1967).

[9]Eduardo Montealegre, "Desarrollo Economico, Educacion Superior y Comunidad (Leccion Inaugural), Dos Discursos , (Managua, Banco Nicaraguense, 1967).

[10]Novedades, September 6, 1967.

[11]Anastasio Somoza Debayle, Hacia la Meta, Mensajes Politicos, (Managua: Editorial San Jose, 1967), and Unidad de Proposito, (Managua: Imprenta Nacional, 1967)

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APPENDIX A (Table 6)

RESULTS OF THE SURVEY

Question 1. Sex of respondents.

Men	92
Women	159

N = 251.

Question 2. Occupation.

Housewives.	102
Domestic servants	24
Seamstress	18
Mason and carpenters	13
University students	12
Teachers	10
Farmers	10
Accountants	9
Industrial workers	8
Business and merchants	8
Taxi, private car, and truck drivers	7
Automobile mechanics	7
Taylors	3
Barbers	3
Auxiliary Nurses	3
Government employees	3
Radio repairing technicians	2
Lawyers	1
Secondary students	2
Shoemakers	1
Jewelers	1
Policemen	1
Physicians	1
Engineers	1

N = 251.

Question 3. Age.

18-24	67
25-29	30
30-34	25
35-39	35

Question 3 (cont.)

40-44	23
45-49	15
50-54	12
55-59	11
60-64	7
65-74	11
75 and over	8
no answer	7

N = 251.

Question 4. Does respondent read and write?

no	29
some	59
well	163

N = 251.

Questions 5 and 6. Level of education.

No School	42
Some primary	116
Primary completed	45
Some secondary	18
Secondary completed	26
University graduates	4

N = 251.

Question 7. Do you belong to any organization?

Yes	44
No	207

N = 251.

Question 8. Type of organization.

Club	6
Union	17
Religious	17
Political	3
Business	1

N = 44

Question 9. Assistance to Meetings of corresponding organizations.

All of them	19
Often	19
Seldom	3
Never	3

N = 44

Question 10. Opinion as to state of municipal affairs.

Very bad	43
Somewhat bad	132
Somewhat good	55
Very good	16
No answer	5

N = 251.

Question 11. Would you do anything to try to remedy a problem related to municipal affairs if it bothers you?

Yes	188
No	60
No answer	3

N = 251.

Question 12. Type of action that would be attempted.

a) go to municipal offices to complain	82
b) write a personal letter	27
c) complain in the papers or by radio	54
d) organize a group of neighbors, friends, etc.	109
e) write a letter and collect signatures	47
f) sign a letter if somebody else collects signatures	72
g) talk to somebody you know who could help	39
h) other	1

N = 188

Question 13. Order in which any of those things mentioned in question 12 would be attempted.

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h
first	56	11	9	64	17	21	11	1
second	12	11	25	35	16	24	20	
third	4	0	18	7	11	20	12	

N = 188

Question 14. Person you would talk (ques. 12-g).

Friend	11
Relative	2
Compadre	1
Employee	29

N = 39

Question 15. How many times have you done any of those things? (ques. 12).

None	145
1	18
2	5
3	12
4	4
5 or more	4

N = 188

Question 16. Which ones have you done? (ques. 12)

a	22
b	1
c	4
d	8
e	5
f	10
g	11
h	None

N = 43

Question 17. Person you have actually talked to. (ques. 16-g.)

Friend	4
Relative	0
Compadre	0
Employee	7

N = 11

Question 18. Why have you not done anything or why would you not?

Would not receive any attention	67
Dangerous to complain	6
Not worth the effort	42
Too much work for so little results.	32
Other	88

N = 208

Question 19. Opinion about effect of government.

Directly benefitted by it	18
No benefit	196
Only problems	31
No Answer	6

N = 251

Question 20. Opinion about taxes.

Do not receive anything in exchange.	62
Receive less than is taken	145
Enough is received	28
No answer	16

N = 251

Question 21. Would you do anything to stop unwanted taxes that are to be enacted?

Yes	213
No	32
No answer	6

N = 251

Question 22. Would you do anything to try to get something or better service from central government?

Yes	218
No	31
No answer	2

N = 251

Question 23. What would you do?

a) go to government offices and complain or try to obtain service.	51
b) write a personal letter	28
c) write a public letter to newspaper or radio station	54
d) organize group of neighbors, friends, etc.	147
e) write a letter and collect signatures	56
f) sign a letter if somebody else collects signatures	75
g) talk to somebody you know	62
h) other	1
i) no answer	2

N = 219

Question 24. Order in which you would do those things mentioned in question 23.

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h
first	24	14	8	104	20	20	23	1
second	15	8	27	29	23	24	11	
third	4	3	17	11	4	24	18	

N = 219

Question 25. Who would be the person you would talk to. (ques 23-g)

Friend	36
Relative	5
Compadre	1
Employee	16
Other	4
No Answer	3

N = 641

Question 26. How many times have you done any of the things you mentioned? (ques. 23)

None	184
1	15
2	7
3	9
4	2
5 or more	2
No answer	2

N = 221

Question 27. Which of those things have you done. (ques. 23)

a	7
b	2
c	-
d	11
e	5
f	13
g	8
h	2

N = 37

Question 28. Person you have talked to. (ques. 23-g)

Friend	4
Relative	-
Compadre	-
Employee	4
No answer	2

N = 10

Question 29. Why have you not done anything or why would you not? (ques. 23)

It would not be any use.	66
They do not care.	36
Dangerous to complain.	6
Too much work for so little results.	32
Other	100

N = 216

Question 30. Do you go to public offices here in Leon?

Often	6
Seldom	89
Never	155
No Answer	1

N = 251

Question 31. Type of office you visit in Leon.

Agricultural extension	7
City Hall	39
Labor office	9
Jefatura Politica	7
Police courts	20
Courts	24
Education inspection	20
National guard	25
Internal revenue	39
Sanitation station	61

N = 96

Question 32. Do you visit any public offices in Managua?

Often	5
Seldom	71
Never	175

N = 251

Question 33. Type of office you have visited in Managua.

Ministries	48
Presidential house	9
Internal revenue	12
Central or National bank	24
Courts	10
National Guard	5
Other	24

N = 76

Question 34. Why do you not go to public offices?

No need	127
Not use to going	31
Don't like to go to public offices	40
Other reasons	42

N = 176

Question 35. Did you register in the electoral rolls in November 1966?

Yes	211
No	36
No answer	4

N = 251

Question 36. Why did you not register? Because you:

a) are not planning to vote	10
b) are not interested in politics	10
c) forgot to	5
d) Other	12
e) no answer	4

N = 36

Question 37. Are you planning to vote in February 1967?

Yes	55
No	153
No answer	3

N = 211

Question 38. Why are you planning not to vote? Because you:

a) are not a citizen	3
b) are not interested in politics	39
c) it is the same whether one votes or not	5
d) do not like either party or candidate	6
e) voting for the person of your choice you would be liable to one loose only	4
f) other reasons	13

N = 55

Question 39. Newspapers should continue to publish and radio stations to broadcast complaints against government offices?

Agree	210
Disagree	16
No answer	5
No opinion	8

N = 251

Question 40. People expect too much of government and do not do anything themselves.

Agree	72
Disagree	166
No opinion	8
No answer	5

N = 251

Question 41. Government should do much more things for the people than it is actually doing.

Agree	229
Disagree	9
No opinion	11
No answer	2

N = 251

Question 42. Government should distribute land among the peasants.

Agree	232
Disagree	10
No opinion	6
No answer	3

N = 251

Question 43. Government should only see that people do not kill or steal and nothing more.

Agree	80
Disagree	153
No opinion	7
No answer	2

N = 251

Question 44. Government should see that labor laws are enforced to protect the workers.

Agree	245
Disagree	1
No opinion	3
No answer	2

N = 251

Question 45. Government should not allow inmoral pictures in the movie houses.

Agree	239
Disagree	8
No opinion	2
No answer	2

N =251

Question 46. Government should see that when tenants do not pay their rent, they be put out of their houses.

Agree	90
Disagree	149
No opinion	9
No answer	3

N = 251

Question 47. Government should see that workers and employees do their duty rather than helping them sue their employers for compensation.

Agree	143
Disagree	98
No opinion	7
No answer	3

N = 251

Question 48. Government should see that landlords keep the houses they rent in good shape.

Agree	222
Disagree	13
No opinion	13
No answer	3

N = 251

Question 49. If government would let people alone everything would be much better.

Agree	37
Disagree	207
No opinion	2
No answer	5

APPENDIX B

Cuestionario No. 394

Nombre del encuestador_____

Manzana No._____ Dirección y señas_____

_____

_____

Casa No._____(Comenzando a contar de la esquina).

Dirección y señas_____

_____

Visitas. 1_____, 2 _____, 3 _____, 4 _____

_____, 5 _____

Cuestionario

Buenos días (buenas tardes o buenas noches). Yo soy de la Universidad, me llamo_____. Estamos haciendo un trabajo muy importante. Es un estudio puramente científico y estamos tratando de averiguar las opiniones de la gente acerca de ciertos asuntos. Ud. nos podría ayudar muchísimo si nos hace el favor de darnos algunos informes que necesitamos. Primero queremos saber,

a) Cuántas personas mayores de 18 años viven en esta casa? _____

b) Cuántos varones mayores de 18 años viven en la casa? _____

CON ESTA INFORMACION USE LA CLAVE DE LA PAGINA SIGUIENTE. TRACE UNA LINEA VERTICAL A PARTIR DE LA CASILLA CORRESPONDIENTE AL NUMERO DE PERSONAS MAYORES DE 18 QUE VIVEN EN LA CASA Y UNA HORIZONTAL A PARTIR DE LA CORRESPONDIENTE AL NUMERO DE VARONES DE 18. PONGA LO QUE ESTA EN LA CASILLA EN QUE SE CRUZAN LAS DOS LINEAS EN 1) PAGINA 3)

	1 adulto	2 adultos	3 adultos	4 ó más adultos
ningún varón	adulto	mujer de más edad	mujer más joven	mujer más joven
1 varón	adulto	varón	varón	mujer de más edad
2 varones		varón de más edad	varón más joven	varón más joven
3 varones			varón más joven	varón de más edad
4 ó más varones				varón de más edad

1) Me gustaría hablar con _____

SI SE TRATA DE LA MISMA PERSONA QUE SALIO A LA PUERTA, PASAR A LA LINEA D)

SI SE TRATA DE OTRA PERSONA:

C) Está él (o ella·) en la casa _____

SI ESTA EN LA CASA

C+) Me lo llama por favor

SI NO ESTA EN LA CASA

C++) Cuándo lo podría encontrar _____

Dígale por favor que voy a tratar de verlo a esa hora)o día), que voy a regresar pues me interesa platicar con él (o ella)

CUANDO LO HALLE EN LA CASA:

Soy_____, estoy trabajando para la Universidad,

SIGA EN E

D) tal como le estaba diciendo,

E) estamos tratando de hacer un estudio muy importante para averiguar lo que opina la gente acerca de ciertos asuntos públicos, - se trata de un estudio científico, hecho por la Universidad y necesitamos su cooperación que le agradeceremos mucho. Se trata - de que nos permita hablar con Ud. por un rato contestarnos unas pocas preguntas. Si le parece, y no está muy ocupado ahorita, - podemos comenzar.

SI ESTA OCUPADO O NO QUIERE CONTESTAR LAS PREGUNTAS DE INMEDIATO

Entonces si Ud. me dice a qué hóra puedo venir que sea la más conveniente para Ud.. _____

TRATAR DE OBTENER UNA HORA Y DIA CONCRETOS,
AL COMENZAR LA ENTREVISTA:

Muchas gracias por permitirme platicar con Ud. sobre estas cosas, si quiere comenzamos ya.

2) Cuál es su profesión, oficio u ocupación ?	_____

TRATE DE OBTENER UNA RESPUESTA ESPECIFICA, SONDEE SI ES NECESARIO.

3) Cuántos años tiene?	_____

SI EL SUJETO NO DA SU EDAD O LA QUE DA ES NOTORIAMENTE INCORRECTA, CALCULELA UD. Y APUNTELA SIN DECIRLE NADA.

4) Sabe Ud. leer y escribir ?	No_____ Un poco_____ Bien_____
5) Cuántos años asistió Ud. a la escuela?	_____

SI NINGUNO PASE A LA P. 7

6) Terminó Ud.	La Primaria_____ La Secundaria_____ Una carrera Universitaria____
7) Pertenece Ud. a alguna organización, a algún club, sindicato, organización religiosa o política.	_____

SI LA RESPUESTA ES NEGATIVA PASE A LA P. 10

8) A cuál o cuales organizaciones pertenece Ud.?	_____ _____ _____

9) Dígame por favor, asiste Ud. con frecuencia a las reuniones de esa organización (u organizaciones)	A todas_____ De vez en cuando_____ Casi nunca_____ Nunca_____
10) Ahora quiero su opinión -- acerca de las cosas de -- aquí, de la ciudad: como - cree Ud. que la Municipalidad de León cumple sus funciones de limpieza de ca-- lles, reparación de las calles, supervisión de la -- eléctrica y de la aguadora para que den buen servicio, mantener en buen estado los parques, etc.	Muy mal_____ Bastante mal_____ Bastante bien_____ Bien_____
11) Si las cosas se ponen verdaderamente mal y Ud. cree -- que una de estas cosas de - las que le acabo de preguntar le causa perjuicio o le molesta mucho trataría Ud. de hacer algo para remediarla.	_____

SI LA RESPUESTA ES NO, PASAR A LA P. 18, EN LA PAGINA 8

12) Qué haría Ud.?	a) Ir a la Municipalidad a quejarse y gestionar _____ b) Escribir una carta personal a la Municipalidad _____ c) Escribir a algún periódico o radio, o hablar con algún periodista o locutor para que publiquen una queja _____

d) Organizar un grupo de vecinos o amigos para quejarse o gestionar ante la Municipalidad _____

e) Escribir una carta quejándose y pidiendo que reparen la calle o lo que sea y recoger firmas para presentarla _____

f) Firmar una carta de queja si alguien la hace y anda recogiendo firmas _____

g) Hablar con alguna persona a quien Ud. conoce y que es influyente y que puede ayudar _____.

SI ESTA (g) ES UNA DE LAS RESPUESTAS, HACER LA PREGUNTA 14

h) Alguna otra cosa_____

_____

TRATE DE OBTENER UNA RESPUESTA ESPECIFICA PARA h)

13) De todas esas cosas que Ud. me ha dicho que haría, cuál sería la que haría

Primero_____

Y si no le da resultado, que haría de segundo

Segundo_____

Y de

Tercero_____

14) Quién sería esa persona

a) Un amigo personal_____

b) Un pariente _____

c) Su compadre _____

d) Un empleado público_____

qué puesto tiene_____

ESPECIFIQUESE

e) Otra persona _____

15) Cuántas veces ha hecho Ud. alguna de esas cosas que - me nombró en las preguntas anteriores?. _____

SI LA RESPUESTA ES NINGUNA, PASE A LA PREGUNTA 18, PAGINA: 8

16) Cuáles son las que Ud. ha hecho?

a) Ir a la Municipalidad a quejarse y gestionar_____

b) Escribir una carta personal a la Municipalidad_____

c) Escribir a algún periódico o radio, o hablar con algún periodista o locutor para que publiquen una queja_____

d) Organizar un grupo de vecinos o amigos para quejarso o gestionar ante la Municipalidad _____.

e) Escribir una carta de queja pidiendo que reparen la calle o lo que sea y recoger - firmas para presentarla_____

f) Firmar una carta de queja si alguien la hace y anda recogiendo firmas_____.

g) Hablar con alguna persona a quien Ud. conoce que es influyente y puede ayudar_____.

SI ESTA (g) ES UNA DE LAS RESPUESTAS HACER LA PREGUNTA 17

h) Alguna otra cosa_____

_____

TRATE DE OBTENER UNA RESPUESTA ESPECIFICA PARA h)

17) Quién es esa persona

a) Un amigo personal_____

b) Un pariente_____

c) Su compadre_____

	d) Un empleado público_____ Qué puesto tiene_____ _____ e) Otra persona_____ _____
18) Por qué no, porque Ud. cree que,	a) No le harían caso, nada se logra con gestionar_____ b) No vale la pena quejarse, - no les importa_____ c) Siempre es peligroso quejar se, lo pueden fregar a uno, vengarse_____. d) Demasiado trabajo para lo - que se logra quejándose____ e) Otra razón (específica)____ _____
19) Ahora, pasemos a otro asunto, qué piensa Ud. acerca - del Gobierno de Nicaragua,- en cuanto a la manera como lo afecta a Ud., cree Ud. - que	a) Lo beneficia directamente__ b) Que ni lo perjudica, ni lo beneficia_____. c) Que sólo causa problemas___
20) Qué opina Ud. de los impuestos, cree Ud. que a cambio de los que se pagan se reciben beneficios tales como - servicios, públicos, escuelas, carreteras, mantenimiento del orden, etc.	a) No se recibe nada, sólo se pagan_____. b) Muy poco, menos de lo que - se debiera recibir_____ c) Bastante, uno se siente satisfecho_____.

21) Supongamos que Ud. se da cuenta de que van a poner un impuesto que a Ud. le parece que es injusto. Trataría Ud. de hacer algo para que no lo aprueben?. _____

22) Supongamos también que Ud. cree que se necesita una nueva escuela en el barrio o un camino o carretera, o una unidad sanitaria o cualquier otra cosa de las que están a cargo del Gobierno, haría Ud. algo para conseguir que la pongan o que la abran? _____

SI LA RESPUESTA ES NO, PASAR A LA PREGUNTA 29, EN LA PAGINA 11

23) Qué haría Ud.?

a) Ir a alguna oficina del Gobierno para quejarse y gestionar_____.

b) Escribir una carta personal a alguna oficina del Gobierno_____.

c) Escribir a algún periódico o radio, o hablar con algún periodista o locutor para que publiquen una queja_____

d) Organizar un grupo de vecinos o amigos para quejarse o gestionar ante alguna oficina del Gobierno_____

e) Escribir una carta quejándose y pidiendo que pongan una escuela o lo que sea y recoger firmas para presentarla_____

f) Firmar una carta de queja si alguien la hace y anda recogiendo firmas_____

g) Hablar con alguna persona a quien Ud. conoce y que es influyente y que puede ayudar_____

EN ESTA g) ES UNA DE LAS RESPUESTAS HACER LA PREGUNTA 25	h) Alguna otra cosa_____ _____
TRATE DE OBTENER UNA RESPUESTA ESPECIFICA PARA h)	
24) De todas estas cosas que Ud. me ha dicho que haría, cuál sería la que haría Y si no le da resultado, que haría. Y de	Primero_____ Segundo_____ Tercero_____
25) Quién sería esa persona	a) Un amigo personal_____ b) Un pariente_____ c) Su compadre_____ d) Un empleado público_____ Qué puesto tiene_____ e) Otra persona_____
26) Cuántas veces ha hecho Ud. alguna de esas cosas que - me nombró en las preguntas anteriores	_____
SI LA RESPUESTA ES NINGUNA, PASE A LA PREGUNTA 29, PAGINA 11	
27) Cuáles son las que Ud. ha hecho	a) Ir a alguna oficina del Gobierno a quejarse y gestionar. b) Escribir una carta personal a alguna oficina del Gobierno. c) Escribir a algún periódico o radio, hablar con algún periodista o locutor para que publiquen una queja_____. d) Organizar un grupo de vecinos o amigos para quejarse o gestionar ante alguna oficina - del gobierno_____.

e) Escribir una carta de queja pidiendo que pongan la escuela o lo que sea y recoger firmas para presentarla___

f) Firmar una carta de queja si alguien la hace y anda recogiendo firmas_____

g) Hablar con alguna persona a quien Ud. conoce que es influyente y puede ayudar_____

SI ESTA g) ES UNA DE LAS RESPUESTAS, HACER LA PREGUNTA 28

h) Alguna otra cosa_____

_____

TRATE DE OBTENER UNA RESPUESTA ESPECIFICA PARA h)

28) Quién es esa persona

a) Un amigo personal_____

b) Un pariente_____

c) Su compadre

d) Un empleado público_____

Qué puesto tiene_____

_____

e) Otra persona_____

_____

29) Por qué no, por qué Ud. cree que,

a) No le harían caso, nada se logra con gestionar_____

b) No vale la pena quejarse, no les importa_____

c) Siempre es peligroso quejarse, lo pueden fregar a uno, vengarse_____

d) Demasiado trabajo para lo que se logra quejándose_____

e) Otra razón (especificada)___

_____

30) Va Ud. a veces a las oficinas del Gobierno aquí en León a gestionar o pedir --

servicios, o cuando necesita algo, como cuanto va	a) a menudo_____ b) pocas veces_____ c) nunca_____
SI LA RESPUESTA ES NEGATIVA PASE A LA PREGUNTA 32	
31) A qué clase de oficinas va Ud. aquí en León?	a) Extensión Agrícola_____ b) Municipalidad_____ c) Oficina del Trabajo_____ d) Jefatura política_____ e) Dirección de Policía_____ f) Juzgados o Cortes_____ g) Inspección de Educación____ h) Comando de la Guardia Nacional_____ i) Administración de Rentas___ j) Unidad Sanitaria_____
32) Y en Managua va Ud. a oficinas del Gobierno cuando necesita algo	a) A menudo_____ b) Pocas veces_____ c) Nunca_____
SI LA RESPUESTA ES NEGATIVA PASE A LA PREGUNTA 34	
33) A qué clase de oficinas va Ud. en Managua	a) Ministerios_____ b) Oficinas de la Presidencial _____ c) Dirección de Ingresos_____ d) Banco Central o Nacional___

	e) Cortes o Juzgados_____ f) Oficinas de la Guardia Nacional_____ g) Otras (Especifíquese)_____ _____
34) Por qué no va Ud. nunca	a) No tiene necesidad_____ b) De nada sirve ir a gestionar _____ c) No le gusta pedir cosas ni favores_____ d) Otra razón (Especifíquese)___ _____
35) Se inscribió Ud. ahora en Noviembre en las mesas electorales?	_____
SI SE INSCRIBIO PASE A LA PREGUNTA 37	
36) Me podría Ud. decir por qué no se inscribió: por qué:	a) No piensa votar_____
SI ESTA a) ES UNA RESPUESTA HACER LA PREGUNTA 38	
	b) No le interesan esas cosas relacionadas con la política____ c) Pensaba hacerlo pero se le pasó por alto o no pudo_____ d) Otra razón_____ _____ _____
TRATE DE OBTENER UNA RESPUESTA ESPECIFICA PARA "OTRA RAZON"	
37) Tiene pensado votar en las elecciones este Febrero?	_____
SI LA RESPUESTA ES SI, PASE A LA PREGUNTA 39	
38) Y por qué no piensa votar, porque	a) No es ciudadano (no puede votar)_____

b) No le gusta meterse en política_____

c) Lo mismo da si uno vota o no vota_____

d) No le gustan ninguno de los - partidos y candidatos_____

e) Si vota uno por quien de verdad le gusta sólo lleva las - de perder_____

f) Otra razón_____

_____

_____

TRATE DE OBTENER UNA RESPUESTA ESPECIFICA PARA LA ULTIMA.

Ahora voy a comenzarle a hacer unas preguntas generales, acerca de su opinión, se trata de una cosa muy sencilla sólo me tiene que decir si está de acuerdo o no con lo que le pregunto, empezamos?

39) Frecuentemente aparecen en los periódicos y se oyen en el radio quejas contra oficinas del gobierno de gentes que protestan por el trato que les dan o porque no consiguen lo que quieren o necesitan. Qué piensa Ud. de que se escriban y publiquen esas cartas?

De acuerdo está bien_____

En desacuerdo, que no debían de publicarse_____

Sin opinión_____

40) Cree Ud. que la gente quiere que todo se lo haga el gobierno y no se esfuerzan por hacerlo ellos mismos

Si_____

No_____

Sin opinión_____

41) Cree Ud. que el gobierno debería hacer muchas más cosas de las que hace por el pueblo	Si_____ No_____ Sin opinión_____
42) Cree Ud. que el gobierno debería distribuir tierras entre los campesinos	Si_____ No_____ Sin opinión_____
43) Cree Ud. que el gobierno debería limitarse a evitar que la gente robe y mate y no hacer nada más que eso	Si_____ No_____ Sin opinión_____
44) El gobierno debería de preocuparse porque se cumplan a cabalidad las leyes laborales de protección a los trabajadores	Si_____ No_____ Sin opinión_____
45) El Gobierno debería de hacer que no se presenten películas inmorales en el cine	Si_____ No_____ Sin opinión_____
46) El Gobierno debería de preocuparse de que cuando los inquilinos no pagan el alquiler sean puestos en la calle	De acuerdo_____ No_____ Sin opinión_____

47) El Gobierno debería de preocuparse que los trabajadores y empleados cumplan sus obligaciones en vez de apañarlos para que anden demandando -- prestaciones de los patrones	De acuerdo_____ No_____ Sin opinión_____
48) El Gobierno se debería de -- preocupar de que los dueños de casas de alquiler las mantengan en buen estado y no - cobren alquileres altos	Si_____ No_____ Sin opinión_____
49) Si el Gobierno dejara tranquila a la gente y no se metiera en nada las cosas estarían mucho mejor	Si_____ No_____ Sin opinión_____